Total Information Awareness

An increasingly popular fallback position for many of the Iraq war's supporters has been the "fight them over there/flypaper theory." Just last night, President Bush alluded several times to the notion of taking on the terrorists "over there...before they attack us at home."

Under this analysis, America is made safer by confronting the jihadists in Iraq, rather than on American soil. Presumably, the presence of American troops provides an immediate and attractive target for jihadis who flood into Iraq and become stuck on the flypaper of our troop presence rather than turning their attentions westward to North America.

In the past, I have objected to certain aspects of this theory, particularly the failure to realize that there is not a finite number of jihadis in the world, especially if policies such as the Iraq war are increasing their ranks by radicalizing more and more otherwise non-combatants. It's as if we are breeding flies and then touting our flypaper at the same time.

Then there's the issue of what to do when we eventually do leave Iraq, thus removing our GI/targets, and the jihadists that remain decide to depart Iraq - only now with the tactical training, know-how, indoctrination, networking and other abilities so enhanced as to increase their lethality and ability to strike at us (this phenomenon was discussed by me on LAT here). It's as if we are breeding flies on steroids and then touting our flypaper at the same time, despite the flypaper's limited shelf-life.

This, of course, says nothing about the fact that in essence, under this model, we are using our soldiers as bait to lure in a dangerous element. Human targets if you will. Perhaps that sort of thing comes with the job description though.

Despite this introduction, it is worth pointing out that all of the above mentioned strategic concerns and analysis are based on a strictly American perspective. In other words, has anyone thought to ask the Iraqi people how they feel about their country becoming the stage upon which we Americans choose to fight our battle with the jihadists?

In the run up to the war, and since the invasion, many on the Right have prefered to characterize the Left as arrogant, elitist and racist based on the charge that the Left doesn't think the Iraqis, or Muslims in general for that matter, are capable of handling "democracy" (why else, after all, would anyone on the Left object to this war?). But many of these same voices feel perfectly comfortable with the notion of turning Iraq into one giant battlefield to test our mettle with the foreign fighters - displaying a glib disregard for the tens of thousands (or hundreds of thousands) of Iraqis who will get caught in the cross fire. How's that for arrogant and elitist? Is it within our right as a nation to designate Country X as an acceptable staging ground for such a conflict - regardless of the enormous toll in human lives such a prolonged engagement will take on the indigenous population? Does this willingness somehow display a profound respect for the denizens of Country X?

President Bush made frequent, and in my opinion (publius too) non-sequitur, references to 9/11 last night in the context of our operations in Iraq, but consider this: America, tragically, lost almost 3,000 people on 9/11. Iraq has lost well over 100,000. Is it fair to impose this kind of disproportional carnage on another nation - especially one unconnected to the events of 9/11 in the first place? Are Iraqi lives worth less, and this from the crowd that "respects" the Iraqi people? Bush as quoted by Reuters:

"Iraq is where they are making their stand. So we will fight them there, we will fight them across the world, and we will stay in the fight until the fight is won," he said on the anniversary of the formal return of sovereignty to Iraqis.

Understandably, such a cavalier willingness to transform Iraq into a perpetual battlefield with aspiring jihadists did not go over so well with many Iraqis. It becomes easier to understand how even those Iraqis pleased with the overthrow of Saddam could come to resent the presence of American troops.

"Why don't they find another place to fight terrorism?" asked Abdul Ridha al-Hafadhi, 58, head of a humanitarian aid group. "I don't feel comforted by Bush's remarks; there must be a timetable for their departure."

Syria anyone? Unless you're so arrogant and dismissive that you think they can't handle democracy...

(cross-posted on Liberals Against Terrorism)

[Update: From the files of "It becomes easier to understand how even those Iraqis pleased with the overthrow of Saddam could come to resent the presence of American troops..." check out this story (via the oh-so Cunning Realist - whose own post is well worth the read):

A senior US military chief has admitted "good, honest" Iraqis are fighting American forces.

Major General Joseph Taluto said he could understand why some ordinary people would take up arms against the US military because "they're offended by our presence".

In an interview with Gulf News, he said: "If a good, honest person feels having all these Humvees driving on the road, having us moving people out of the way, having us patrol the streets, having car bombs going off, you can understand how they could [want to fight us]."

General Taluto, head of the US 42nd Infantry Division which covers key trouble spots, including Baquba and Samarra, also said some Iraqis not involved in fighting did support insurgents who avoided hurting civilians.

He said: "There is a sense of a good resistance, or an accepted resistance. They say 'okay, if you shoot a coalition soldier, that's okay, it's not a bad thing but you shouldn't kill other Iraqis.'"[...]

His comments come in stark contrast to the assertions of other top US figures, who persist in claiming all insurgents are either Baathists or Al Qaida terrorists.

That, or flowers and candies. Either one.]

I agree with Mick Arran, this story was either buried or I missed it:

Security contractors were heckled, humiliated and physically abused by U.S. Marines in Iraq while jailed for 72 hours with insurgents, one of the detainees said Friday.

"It was disbelief the whole time. I couldn't believe what was happening," said Matt Raiche, 34, an ex-Marine who was one of 16 American and three Iraqi contractors detained at Camp Fallujah last month.

"I just found it crazy that we were being held with terrorists, that we were put in the same facility with them," he told The Associated Press in an interview at his lawyer's office. "They were calling us a rogue mercenary team."

Defense officials disclosed on Thursday that the security guards for Charlotte, N.C.-based Zapata Engineering were detained for three days after they fired from trucks and SUVs on Iraqi civilian cars and U.S. forces in Fallujah, 40 miles west of Baghdad.[...]

Company president Manuel Zapata said the only shot fired by his workers was a warning blast after they noticed a vehicle following them.

Raiche, of Dayton, Nev., said the contractors were stopped and taken into custody on May 28. He said a Marine told him that shots had been fired, and Raiche told him, "It wasn't us."

Raiche said several of the contractors were interrogated before they were released June 1 with no official explanation for their detention.

Raiche said guards intimidated the detainees with dogs, made them strip and told them to wear towels over their heads when they went to the restroom so insurgents in the facility would not recognize and harm them, Raiche said.

One of his colleagues was slammed to the ground by a guard, he said.

"His head bounced off the asphalt." Raiche said. "He told me he heard one guard say to another, 'If he moves, let the dog loose.'"

Raiche said his colleague told him that a guard then reached down and "squeezed his testicles so hard he could barely move."

When Raiche first arrived at the facility, he said a guard ordered him to the ground and put a knee in his back. He said he heard one Marine say, "How does it feel now making that big contractor money?"

Raiche said the Marines handcuffed them with "zip lock ties." When the detainees complained they were so tight they were losing circulation in their hands, they were cursed at and told to shut up, Raiche said.

Now if this is how American contractors - ex-military at that - are being treated, is there any expectation that Iraqis are being treated any better? This is reminiscent of the story of the US soldier who while posing undercover as a detainee at Gitmo, was beaten so savagely by military guards who were unaware of his status as an American that he suffers permanent brain damage. Further, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain that all detainees in Iraq are terrorists when there are standards for detention such as these. Look, the bottom line is this is one of the reasons counterinsurgency is so tricky and occupations so difficult - especially when there are cultural divides. Given the stresses of combat, and the perverse dynamic of the jailer and jailed, people will tend to over-react, seek vengeance against vague embodiments of the "enemy" and allow for crueler, more sadistic tendencies to come to the surface.

But this is true in almost every setting, no matter if the prison happens to be in a war zone or not. Consider, for example, the findings of the Zimbardo experiment as discussed by TTN:

In 1971 Dr. Philip G. Zimbardo conducted a psychological study to determine the effects of the prison environment on those within its walls. To do this, he constructed a simulated prison in the basement of Stanford's Psychology Department building. The simulation protocol was developed in consultation with a group of experienced prison consultants (including one former inmate) in order to ensure an accurate reflection of the reality of incarceration. To populate the prison, Zimbardo placed an ad in a local newspaper offering $15 a day for participants. Respondents were screened to eliminate candidates with health issues, psychological problems, histories of drug abuse, or criminal propensities. The remaining sample of 24 was randomly split into two groups; one half would serve as prisoners, the other half as guards.

Originally Zimbardo had planned to run the experiment for two weeks. However, in merely five days, the situation in the faux prison had spun wildly out of control. The prisoners were beginning to exhibit serious psychological pathologies, including deep interpersonal withdrawal and hysteria. In contrast, the guards had become sadists, subjecting the prisoners to ever-increasing levels of cruelty and humiliation. For the safety of everyone involved, the prisoners were released and the prison disassembled.

In spite of the fact that the experiment participants were identical as the study commenced, a few short days in the prison transformed them in hyperbolic fashion. The prisoners began as healthy men, but left as broken shells. The guards began as kind and civil individuals, yet quickly evolved into hideously sadistic abusers. No pre-existing condition could possibly explain the manifestation of these behaviors.

Quite literally, the participants were transformed by the prison itself.

This prisoner/guard relationship is particularly problematic for America's efforts in Iraq because there was a pre-existing mistrust and animosity to the United States amongst much of Iraq's population, and the abuses unfortunately fall in line with the otherwise implausible propaganda. Given that most of the detainees in these prisons are eventually released back into the population, the prison guards, jailers and MPs - who are all too often (caveat: though not always) transformed by the prison itself in less than savory ways - are serving as one wing of our ambassador corps in Iraq. What kind of message, what attitude toward insurgents and coalition forces, do you think these released prisoners bring to their respective communities? Unfortunately, the likely tales told only serve to reinforce the anti-American bias rampant in the region, which obviously complicates matters further.

So you can imagine why this is not exactly good news:

Faced with a ballooning prison population, U.S. commanders in Iraq are building new detention facilities at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison and Camp Bucca near the Kuwaiti border and are developing a third major prison, in northern Iraq.

The burgeoning number of detainees has also resulted in a lengthy delay in plans for the U.S. to transfer full control of Abu Ghraib to the Iraqi government.

Maj. Gen. William Brandenburg, who oversees U.S.-run prisons in Iraq, had planned to be out of Abu Ghraib by early spring. "I believed it until mid-December, but the numbers just weren't going that way," he said. "Business is booming."

I'm not suggesting we have many options in this regard, though I think it would be incumbent on the military units in charge to try to maintain better order and enforce stricter conduct guidelines amongst the jailers and guards. In reality, though, such close, around-the-clock monitoring may not be logistically possible while the incarceration of insurgents is absolutely necessary - but we know that many innocents and petty criminals will inevitably get ensnared by the net set to trap such insurgents. Again, this is why occupying a foreign country, and counterinsurgency operations in general, are such monumentally difficult tasks. Many of the tools you must use in pursuit of your objectives only serve to exacerbate the situation, making your goals that much harder to attain.

(cross posted at Liberals Against Terrorism)

I'm taking a break from politics and foreign policy to get something off my chest. Consider this a helpful set of recommendations for visitors and certain of my great city's residents who lack basic common sense. This post is the outward manifestation of, and frustrated retaliation for, over a decade's worth of tiny cuts, totaling well into the thousands. This is an attempt to help out those who frolic on vacation in New York City, and those that live here but somehow remain ignorant of the most basic of courtesies. This is a rant.

Sidewalks, Staircases, Subways and Streets

Sidewalks

The topic of sidewalk etiquette is one that is of particular significance to me, seeing as how my last three apartments have tracked nicely with a map of the top tourist attractions in the Big Apple so I, more than most, have come in contact with herds of that peculiar breed of American and foreigner known as touristus domesticus and touristus exoticus respectively - more commonly referred to as the uninitiated sidewalk pedestrian. Despite this attempt at taxonomy, I suspect that many of my nemeses are actual New Yorkers bereft of basic social skills. Nonetheless, some basic rules for the edification of all.

1. Stay to the Right: This is probably one of the only times you'll hear me utter that phrase, so tuck it away in your mind. Traffic moves on the right side in America folks - this applies to sidewalks, stairways, automobiles and the almighty baseball diamond. Why, you might ask, was this arbitrary directional norm adopted? I have no freakin' clue, and I don't much care. For those contrarians out there that prefer the left side as the chosen path to travel, Great Britain and other related venues offer some prime locations to get your left on, but in New York City, and America in general, stay so far to the right that you'd make Karl Rove blush (under the assumption there is actual blood coursing through his veins...I kid, I kid).

So, when walking down the crowded streets in Manhattan, or up and down congested subway stairways, stay on the right side or prepare to get a rude shoulder or elbow. This simple rule helps maintain order and movement out of what would otherwise be gridlocked chaos which would somehow bring about the apocalypse. Trust me on this one.

2. Keep Moving: Every sidewalk in Manhattan is like a conveyer belt, especially during peak hours. When you are walking along the sidewalk, rest assured in the knowledge that there is a queue of harried New Yorkers behind you nipping at your heels, marching in lockstep along with your cadence, just waiting for the opening to make a pass. So for heaven's sake, don't just stop suddenly the moment the thought occurs to you. Such sudden movements can cause a nine-person pile up leading to serious minor injuries [oxymoron intentional]. I don't care if you just realized you overshot your destination, that you left the front door open, the iron on, or the keys to your suitcase nuclear device in the hands of an aspiring, though unstable, jihadi. The way to change course on the sidewalk is to give a look around first and then veer off to the side in a way that won't send ripples of disruption through the caravan. This is especially true when traveling in groups. Which brings me to my next point.

3. The Herd: If you're ever out with a group, and good on you for having friends in the first place considering your utter lack of social graces, try to remember that there are other people who might, you know, also want to use the walkway. When traveling four or five abreast down the sidewalk, like some version of the Sharks and the Jets, understand that one or more of you just might have to yield to the demands of two way traffic. The way to decide who moves is easy: refer to Rule #1. The person farthest left should move to the right either in front of, or behind the group. But remember, don't stop suddenly. But even gradual stops can be problematic as I will explain in Rule #4.

4. Not Down on the Corner: If you're lost or confused or trying to decide which direction or destination you want to gravitate to next, whatever you do, don't pick a primary hub of a corner to hold your impromptu summit. Sounds like common sense right? But you'd be amazed how many times a group will choose the epicenter of the corner of Busy and Crowded to discuss dinner plans or consult a map. Please follow the deceleration dictates of Rule #2 and choose a fringe area off to the side to congregate if you must.

Staircases

1. See: Rules #1-4 above.

2. Mother's Day Is Everyday: You lazy, self-important, insensitive cads. When you see a new mother with a stroller standing at the top or bottom of a flight of subway stairs, for the love of everything decent in the world, help her carry one end of the unwieldy stroller up or down as needed. This is easy to manage, will only take you a matter of seconds, she will be infinitely appreciative, flash you a warm smile and you will be safe in the knowledge that her toddler isn't hurdling down the stairs to her screams of panic like some drawn out, slow motion scene from The Untouchables.

3. Stairmaster: You lazy, self-important, insensitive cads. When you get on a crowded elevator in a building with 10 or more floors, don't you dare hit the button for the second floor. Unless you have a bona fide physical impediment, step up to the plate and walk up one whole, actual flight of stairs (note: obesity doesn't count as a physical impediment and is actually a stronger argument to use the stairs). Think of it as exercise, your own personal mini-stairmaster workout for the day. Something to spice up your otherwise sedentary monotony behind some desk in some cubicle somewhere. That and you can avoid the hostile stares of those in the elevator who are thinking about what a lazy, self-important, insensitive cad you are. The only thing worse than the second floor ascender is when you're on the trip down in a crowded elevator and it stops on the second floor and someone gets on. You mean to tell me you can't walk down one flight of stairs? Sloth be not proud.

Subways

1. Waiting In Vain: There's little that sets the blood aboil like being cut in line. When waiting for what seems like an eternity for a subway on a hot, dank platform, the anger is multiplied by a factor of ten - especially since long waits mean the platforms get crowded as riders pile up so the eventual train that arrives is likely packed like sardines from prior stations' pile ups. So, if you want to avoid altercations, hostilities and occasionally violent outbursts, don't wait in the background, and then when the train arrives, push your way in front of people who have been waiting longer then you. That is a wanker move.

2. Speaking of Sardines: Even if you're late for work, even if you're itching to get home after a hard day's toil and even if you're the top surgeon on your way to perform urgent quadruple bypass at Columbia Presbyterian, have the decency not to jam yourself into a subway car that is already bursting at the seams with people. Will ten minutes really make that much of a difference in your life? More than having what many would consider fairly advanced foreplay with a hundred or so commuters at once? (note: not as sexy as that might sound to some of you deviants out there). Yesterday, on the 1 Train, I heard a pregnant women frantically shouting because people were inadvertently pushing at her stomach in order to squeeze into a car that was already well past capacity. Priorities people.

3. Fools Rush In: Here's a simple one, and easy to master too. When waiting for a subway, even if you're excited to be heading wherever it is you're going, when the train comes to a stop and the doors open, step aside and let the people off the train before attempting to enter. It's easier this way. Think about it logically, people get off train making room for you and others to get on train. Oh yeah, and it avoids nasty head-on collisions.

4. Observe the Hierarchy: You lazy, self-important, insensitive cads. This goes out to the young and able-bodied subway riders. When a subway is crowded, and some are forced to stand and straphang, be chivalrous and offer up your seat to those who might need it more. This is especially true for those that rush to claim a seat even though they're only going one or two stops. Haven't you just spent almost an entire day sitting behind a desk? Won't the stand do you some good? There's a basic hierarchy to observe and it goes like this: First, deference should paid to pregnant women. They're carrying an extra person for the love of God. Next, young mothers or fathers carrying infants or pushing strollers. That should be self-explanatory. After them come senior citizens, first women then men (excuse the implicit sexism, but it just feels right and some rule is needed). Show some respect you ingrates, with some work, luck, good fortune and wit you too can aspire to be old one day. This will be just one of your rewards. After that, the seat's all yours. Enjoy.

Streets

1. Get In Line: Though you see them everywhere, not all taxis are unoccupied, and during certain hours of the day and in certain areas, their scarcity is acutely felt by would-be travelers. Here's a tip for the neophytes: when the light is on illuminating the taxi's number on the top of the taxi, it is unoccupied so hail away. When the light is off, someone is inside so no need to waste your wave and whistle. But no matter what, you should never come to a curbside in which you see someone already trying to hail a cab and move ahead of them down the street to preempt any taxis heading in your direction. Show some grace and wait your turn. There is a place in hell for people who think this is somehow acceptable conduct.

2. Beware Cyclists: New York City is awash in bike messengers, and their ubiquity has only seemed to grow since the prophetic, cinematic tour de force known as "Quicksilver" starring Kevin Bacon. Here's the rub though: you have to look out for these bandits of the bicycle. They operate in a world without rules, full of expectations but sans responsibilities. The takers who never give. And it's not just limited to the professionals. What am I talking about? The fact that cyclists completely ignore all traffic laws, but want to be treated as if they were cars when it benefits them. In other words, if you dare to step into the street when the coast appears clear from car traffic despite the "Don't Walk" sign, but fail to notice an oncoming cyclist, they will rip into you like you just killed a puppy for sport. But, if you have the "Walk" sign (the green light in other words) and all cars are obediently waiting at their red light, don't be surprised if you get blind sided by a bicycle rider who thinks red lights shouldn't apply to them, only the green. Seriously. Always look both ways, even when you have the right of way.


There. I feel better now. And you? Well, you got a useful guide to some of the basic etiquette of urban life. I suppose there's one more thing I should throw in - a warning of sorts. If you ever find yourself in the Meatpacking District, shuffling between the many clubs and bars that punctuate that part of town, you should know that those aggressive prostitutes that pepper you with propositions, well they're actually.....nah, why ruin the surprise.

(hat tip to the Daily Show for inspiration at the end).

Difficult as it may be to pull attention away from the outrages of the day, in particular, the dead-eyed Bolshevik agitprop antics of Karl Rove ; and loathe though I am to risk inducing an ear worm in any of Eric's readers, the weekend is nigh, and a little perspective might be salutary. In other words, Fuck Karl Rove - Fuck Him Very Much - but let's think about what happens next, too.

The crux of the basic disagreement in this little debate-book is, in a sense, implied in the title of Mr Perlstein's larger work from earlier in the year: Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus. The Stock Ticker.... begins with an essay by Perlstein, followed by short pieces of rebuttal or agreement by disparate Democratic and Progressive voices, and ending with a Perlstein rejoinder. The two camps are roughly as follows: Perlstein and others, on the one hand, argue for a rhetorically bold, systemic rebuilding of the Democratic party for the long-term, with a principled and unwavering focus on economic populism; and, on the other hand, some Clintonista or DLC-types argue that the party is actually doing alright, and would even be in power now if not for various factors (the Blue Dress, 9/11). It's a pretty lively exchange, and interesting things are said by all. But Perlstein's side is ultimately most convincing. For all their hard-won achievements, the Clintonistas/DLC-types seem to be assuming an environment of some kind of at least very basic consensus across party lines - a conservative one, a post-Reagan one. It is this reporter's opinion (and, obviously, Perlstein's thesis in the other book) that there is no such thing. It's a subtle but vital difference between world views.

Perlstein uses as a 'parable' the story of the Boeing Corporation. In the earlier part of the 20th century, Boeing traded short-term profit for a dogged, single-minded long-term investment (time and billions of dollars) in what eventually became the fantastically successful Boeing 707, then did it again with the 747. The fruition of these huge gambles made the company the overwhelmingly dominant aircraft manufacturer in the world from the late 50s until recently. The company only fumbled - and capitulated to Airbus - when it changed focus and became the kind of firm 1990s Wall Street preferred: one focused on ever-greater quarterly earnings, and never mind about the long-term. Perlstein argues that Democrats' strategic tacking right-and-left (mostly right) in an effort to peel off just enough 'independent' voters to get 50%+ 1 has 'hollowed out' the party, much as short-term profit-maximizing has demonstrably hollowed out Boeing.

[G.H.W.] Bush, with the economy as it was [and with Perot in the race], had the lowest approval rating of any president seeking reelection in history[:] my little mutt Buster could've beaten George H. W. Bush in 1992.

Ruy Teixeira's dismissal of this line as 'unusually silly' is telling in its humorlessness and literalness (salient problems for liberals lately). Perlstein is an historian, and should be allowed his FDR reference ('my little dog Fala'). Indeed, his point is serious: any decent Democrat should've been able to beat Bush 41 in '92, and too much cause-and-effect shouldn't be read into Clinton's 'New' Democrat innovations. Beware: Post hoc, ergo, propter hoc.. Perlstein's emphasis on the importance of party ID is also taken a bit literally by Teixeira, who points out in his rebuttal that Democratic Party ID dipped only slightly in recent years and is inching back up. Perlstein's point is not about polling data per se, but about personal identification with the Party; people don't personally identify with the Democratic Party because they don't have a clear, basic idea of what they're identifying with. He notes:

Judis and Teixeira make a fascinating observation about the increasing number of voters who refuse to identify with a party: "When the new independent vote is broken down, it reveals a trend towards the Democrats in the 1990s and a clear and substantial Democratic partisan advantage...Once those independents are assigned the party they are closer to, Democrats enjoy a 13 percent advantage."

Here's the riddle: what is a swing voter? More and more, it is an American who thinks like a Democrat but refuses to identify as one.

DLC person William Galston and Clintonista Elaine Kamarck argue - generally speaking - that in the Clinton years, the country saw solid progress, pointing especially to the economic growth of the 90s, and the EITC. They are not wrong, but their baseline is different from Perlstein's and others who tend to agree with him (and who also point out the inevitable bubble-burst at the end of the 90s); Perlstein writes:

The traumas that shaped the world view of a Teixeira, a Greenberg, a Judis, were the post-60s backfirings of left-of-center boldness. The same goes for Al From, whose formative political experience, he has told me, was McGovern's loss in 1972. The traumas of my own political generation, conversely, were the backfirings of left-of-center timidity

Clinton's achievements (we can't call them 'triumphs') - like the expansion of the EITC - were essentially defensive. You don't become a majority party - the subtitle of the book is, How The Democrats Can Once Again Become America's Dominant Political Party - playing defense. Perlstein argues not that it's OK to lose (Boeing didn't lose until they chose to), but for being willing to lose - sticking to the core principle of economic justice - in order to actually win. He's calling for political imagination.

One of the more interesting chapters in this little book is by Daniel Cantor, the Executive Director of the Working Families of New York Party. WFP is a fusion party, something which, at the moment, is legal in only NY, CT, DE, MS, SC and SD, although there evidently is lobbying going on in other states to make it legal elsewhere. Cantor explains:

Fusion is simple. It refers to the electoral tactic of two parties 'fusing' on one candidate, meaning the candidate appears twice on the ballot under two separate party labels. "Vote Perlstein for State Assembly' we might say in New York, "but vote for him on the WFP line and send him a message about...health care [or taxes, or living wages, or whatever else the WFP chapter in his district thinks important." [....] Rick gets 45 percent as a Democrat, his Republican opponent gets 47 percent, and the last 8 percent shows up on the WFP line....Rick wins 53 percent [total] to 47 percent, but he owes us 8 percent of his victory [...]

Fundamentally, fusion is the peculiar, American form of proportional representation, in that it allows political minorities - understood arithmetically - to show their strength and to make coalitions with other parties.

A sly and brilliant way to move parties (any party) in the direction you want! What's not to love? The duopoly will resist in the majority of states where fusion parties aren't yet legal, of course, but it sounds like a good fight to me. The Republicans already kind of have a fusion 'party' of sorts: the right wing evangelicals. This sounds to me like a very practical way to corral the famously unwieldy Democratic party, and to insert some proportionality into our politics.

______

Despite what some of his interlocutors see (perhaps with a little justification) as glibness, Perlstein is definitely on to something here. Notwithstanding literalist quibbles, the Boeing metaphor is exactly right in a fundamental, even non-metaphorical way. The paradox of the rise of the modern Republican party is that the GOP used long-term planning and doggedness to ultimately promulgate a regime of decidedly short-term, short-sighted policies, in effect nationalizing the 'quarterly earnings' fetish of Wall Street: 'starve/bleed the beast' fiscal policies; maximum political polarization ; the one-time-profit sell-offs of public properties in the 80s; the reckless throwing of the only lately-rebuilt military into a less than considered land war in Iraq - an entire culture of 'eat, drink and be pious, for tomorrow we shall die': the Armageddon Culture. Perlstein's antidote for the Democratic Party is also the antidote for the country as a whole. It is irresistible.

Greg Djerejian agrees with Kos, conservative bloggers defend Dick Durbin, then proceed to criticize Powerline and reject mis-treatment of detainees that may not rise to the level of torture - and other warning signs of the impending Armageddon. No, seriously, the Rapture Index must be higher than the mercury in a Baghdad thermometer come mid-July. It's time for me to brush up on my Left Behind reading.

Some in the past have complained of the exaggerated celebration that some liberals (including myself possibly) might partake in every time someone just to the right-of-center unequivocally condemns torture and similar detainee abuse. To the extent that I am guilty as charged, understand that I do this to reinforce my belief in the foundations of our democracy, the fabric of our society - that certain issues should not be defended out of knee-jerk partisanship, and that underneath all the squabbling Americans have a sense of decency that will overcome some of human nature's frailties and failings that tend to emerge and assert themselves in times of stress and fear. At least that's my hope.

I thought torture was just such an issue, one that would be met with a swift and comprehensive rejection from all political factions. But, like publius, the avalanche of apologias from many, and the ghoulish revelry of some, on the Right have shaken my confidence and left me wondering. Pieces like those excerpted below serve to gird my wayward faith. So forgive my cheerleader-ism for a moment, and indulge my written sigh of relief which comes as I realize that there are sensible people on the other side of the aisle that understand the importance of our liberal traditions (and do your best to ignore the flaming these guys get from their regular readers in the comments section the moment they stake out what should not be such a controversial position, similar to the treatment the QandO authors received here and here which I discussed here).

First (via Greg) is John Cole with a sensible and balanced appraisal of L'Affaire Durbin:

Senator Dick Durbin made a comment in a long and thoughtful (for Durbin) speech that politically was profoundly stupid (the full speech can be found here, courtesy of Joe's Dartblog), but it is the height of absurdity and partisan foolishness to call for his censure and to allow ourselves to be distracted from the larger issue. Yes, he is a Democrat. Yes, he probably shouldn't have included a reference to Nazis. But that doesn't give us license to distort his remarks and launch an immature witch-hunt.[...]

...he most assuredly did not call American troops Nazis. Here is the relevant portion of Durbin's speech:

When you read some of the graphic descriptions of what has occurred here -- I almost hesitate to put them in the record, and yet they have to be added to this debate. Let me read to you what one FBI agent saw. And I quote from his report, with the FBI e-mail (displayed here courtesy of the ACLU) italicized:

On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a detainee chained hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor, with no chair, food or water. Most times they urinated or defecated on themselves, and had been left there for 18-24 hours or more. On one occasion, the air conditioning had been turned down so far and the temperature was so cold in the room, that the barefooted detainee was shaking with cold....On another occasion, the [air conditioner] had been turned off, making the temperature in the unventilated room well over 100 degrees. The detainee was almost unconscious on the floor, with a pile of hair next to him. He had apparently been literally pulling his hair out throughout the night. On another occasion, not only was the temperature unbearably hot, but extremely loud rap music was being played in the room, and had been since the day before, with the detainee chained hand and foot in the fetal position on the tile floor.

If I read this to you and did not tell you that it was an FBI agent describing what Americans had done to prisoners in their control, you would most certainly believe this must have been done by Nazis, Soviets in their gulags, or some mad regime -- Pol Pot or others -- that had no concern for human beings. Sadly, that is not the case. This was the action of Americans in the treatment of their prisoners.

Read the FBI email again, without Durbin's remarks[...]

Are Durbin's remarks really that offensive? Do you honestly hear descriptions like that and think to yourself - "Gee, American troops do that all the time."

Of course you don't, and I don't either. I think of some third world dictator, some tin-pot despot who brutalizes not only his enemy but his own people. Someone like, for example, Saddam Hussein. Or Pol Pot. And that was Durbin's point - not that we are Nazis, but that we are better than Nazis by an order of magnitude, and that such acts of abuse, while rare, are beneath us.

What should offend you is not what Durbin said, but the possibility that what Durbin said regarding the abuse may be accurate - even if it happened only once. And spare me the false bravado and the tough-guy attitudes about how this doesn't sound so tough, and they deserve what they get. I am all in favor of stern measures and tough interrogation practices, but there are lines that should not be crossed.

If your attitude is that because some evil people killed 3,000 people on 9/11, we have the moral high ground and are thus free to do as we please, including chaining people in a fetal position and forcing them to wallow in their own urine and feces, you might as well stop reading now because we aren't going to agree on anything. We have the right to detain these people, we have the right to interrogate these people, and we, in the future, have a right to try them for their crimes and punish them appropriately.

But we also have an obligation to ourselves and to the rest of the world to treat these detainees humanely, lawfully, and in accordance to the history of decency that I proudly associate with the United States. To do otherwise is to stain our dignity and our honor, as well as our reputation and good standing in the world.

Now is that so hard? So radical? Is that bashing America, or praising America - think about it? Rather than get swept up in the "Chorus" of voices seeking to assuage the underlying cognitive dissonance of a given revelation, or treating any and all self-criticism that seeks to improve on our nation's ideals as "unpatriotic," take an unvarnished look at the situation and do better. Instead of allowing a foible of the messenger or an oversight by the vehicle carrying the message to obscure the salient issues, cut through the less than perfect form to the heart of the more crucial substance. John Cole quotes Andrew Olmstead on the matter:

While I think the Senator's point would have been stronger had he quit before describing the use of rap music, I can't deny the Senator's argument. If the FBI report is accurate, that's some pretty damnning [sic]stuff. People left to marinate in their own urine and feces is pretty mild from the standpoint of torture, but I think it certainly rises to the level of maltreatment (to borrow from a commenter at QandO) and is certainly not the kind of thing we think of American soldiers as doing. I've discussed my own concerns about torture in greater depth before. I don't have any heartburn with stress positions or female interrogators invading detainees' physical space. But leaving a prisoner in his own waste, or forcing him to endure low-grade physical torment for hours via high or low temperatures is questionable at best in my book, and I would prefer those options remain off the table. Even if they don't necessarily rise to the level of torture, they just don't strike me as things we ought to be doing.

Which means that tend to I agree with Senator Durbin. Reading that report, it's not the kind of thing you would instinctively believe Americans would do. The allusion to the Nazis and other totalitarian regimes is arguably unwise, but I'm not sure it's inaccurate. No, what we do at Guantanamo doesn't rise anywhere near the horrors of the Nazis or the Communists, but that description sounds a lot closer to what we think of when we think of totalitarian states than when we think of America. At least, what I think we'd like people to think of when they think of America.

Agreed. Next is Cole's fellow Red State blogger Josh Trevino (nee Tacitus):

So, we've now established that Senator Durbin has a poor grasp of historical parallel. Oh, bravo for us indeed. (Next: Robert Byrd was in the Klan!) Make no mistake, it needed to be done: but it is done, and it is, as it always was, a sideshow. The continuing hysteria over it is just that; John Cole is quite right to point out that the time has come to act like adults. And what does that entail? In this case, a bit of reflection, not on Durbin's blundering rhetoric, but on his substance.

The substance is, distressingly enough, there. Specifically, the Senator cites some appalling abuse as witnessed by an FBI agent. While it is fashionable in certain crowds to shrug at these things on the grounds that the victims are all terrorists anyway, the affected apathy leaves some assumptions unexamined. Those assumptions are: first, that the abuse as reported was as bad as it got; second, that the victims are all terrorists. Both assumptions are false. We know that dozens of prisoners have died in American custody, with a shameful proportion being probable homicides. We also know that many prisoners have been released from Camp X-Ray, apparently not terrorists after all.

Now, two caveats here: no one, to my knowledge, has died at Camp X-Ray; and the specific techniques witnessed by Durbin's FBI source were, I am fairly sure, accepted US military interrogation tactics as long as twenty years ago. These are mitigating facts if you fixate on rhetoric in a vacuum, studiously ignore the constellation of American prisons other than Guantanamo, and pretend that rap music, shackles and uncomfortable air temperature is the extent of the problem. Knowing that on the next news cycle Durbin will be yesterday's news and our wartime prisons will remain a current affair, what would an adult do?

See? You get to keep all your ideological goodies, and you still get to take gratuitous swipes at Democrats, liberals and the like. It just sounds better when you're also saying that torture is un-American and that the treatment described in the FBI memos is more reminiscent of brutal despotism than the American tradition - at least that which we would like to foster and preserve as the American tradition. That while clumsily delivered, Durbin's main point remains correct. I would think that would be hard to miss.

From the beginning of the John Bolton saga, supporters of the Bush administration (at least those not so principled as to withhold their support for Bolton), have tried to frame the debate over his appointment as ambassador to the United Nations as a question of his personal style - an irascible quirkiness that has drawn the superficial ire of knee-jerk liberals. They claim that Bolton is a tough and demanding boss who might have ruffled the feathers of some of his underlings, but hey, so are so many other senators, members of congress, business leaders, managers, coaches, etc. If such a demeanor and temperament were grounds for the loss of employment, this clever misdirection argues, then the vast corridors of power would be emptied out in a massive purge.

The Bolton-boosters go one further, though, by arguing that this coarse, gruff style, this hard-nosed determination, are actually to be viewed as assets in the cause of reforming the United Nations. John Bolton's tough as nails exterior gets results, or so the talking points go. Underneath this smoke screen, however, the reality of the well-reasoned and intelligent opposition to Bolton can be found - and it is not primarily a question of personal style, though in the arena of diplomacy these attributes are more pertinent than in many other professions.

Foreign policy expert, and Libya scholar Ronald Bruce St John captures the most salient aspects of the case against Bolton:

John Bolton has been widely characterized as a combative, intolerant, strong-willed, hard-line, bullying, abrasive, and abusive diplomat. While the evidence suggests these charges are mostly true, they largely miss the point. John Bolton is unfit to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, not just because of his management style, but because he has repeatedly distorted U.S. intelligence and misdirected U.S. diplomacy to serve an ideological agenda. [emphasis added]

St John focuses on Bolton's role, or lack thereof, in what many have described as one of the Bush administration's greatest victories in the arena of foreign policy: securing the agreement of the Libyan government to relinquish its pursuit of WMD. Some Bolton supporters have tried to paint this as a vindication of Bolton's various policies, mannerisms and strategies, but the opposite appears to be the case. As St John chronicles, during the period in question, Bolton was giving a series of dubious and brash speeches and issuing statements to the press that overestimated Libya's capacity and intentions vis a vis WMD which in turn were serving to alienate Libya thus disrupting the detente that had been gradually coalescing between the two countries since the 1990s. Worse still, he was actively obstructing progress in negotiations with Libya on WMD and many other related topics. Guess what the preferred solution was: remove Bolton from the scene.

Even as Bolton continued throughout 2003 to misrepresent the threat posed by Libya's WMD programs, he jeopardized the talks between Libya, Great Britain, and the United States, which Libya initiated in March 2003 and which culminated in the historic Libyan announcement at year-end to renounce weapons of mass destruction. According to a recent Newsweek report, the tripartite talks in London proceeded to a successful conclusion only after the Bush administration's top arms control official was removed from the negotiations. Bolton was sidelined after the British complained "at the highest level" (read Tony Blair) that Bolton's obstructionist behavior threatened to torpedo the talks.

Here is an excerpt from the Newsweek article St John referenced:

On several occasions, America's closest ally in the war on terror, Britain, was irked by what U.S. and British sources say were efforts by Bolton to undermine promising diplomatic openings. Perhaps the most dramatic instance took place early in the U.S.-British talks in 2003 to force Libya to surrender its nuclear program, NEWSWEEK has learned. The Libya deal succeeded only after British officials "at the highest level" persuaded the White House to keep Bolton off the negotiating team. A crucial issue, according to sources involved in the affair, was Muammar Kaddafi's demand that if Libya abandoned its WMD program, the U.S. in turn would drop its goal of regime change. But Bolton was unwilling to support this compromise. The White House agreed to keep Bolton "out of the loop," as one source puts it.

So we see that Bolton's ideological dogmatism - a rigid adherence to a philosophy that refuses to offer carrots along with sticks - interfered with his ability to function as a diplomat, and his ability to see a clear opening for what turned out to be a momentous breakthrough in US non-proliferation efforts - the task that Bolton was supposed to be in charge of but which was aided most by his absence.

According to Flynt Leverett, Bolton was sidelined for the Lockerbie discussions as well, for familiar reasons (as an aside, Leverett's piece is also a nice correction to the revisionist view that the capture of Saddam led to Qaddafi's change of heart):

One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more constructive course with Libya was that the White House, uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's neoconservative wing - which strongly opposes any offer of carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots could help end such problematic behavior - when crucial decisions were made. The initial approach on the Lockerbie case was approved by an informal coalition made up of Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

From the Libya example, we see that opposition to Bolton is not based solely or fundamentally on his personality traits - as abrasive as those may be. Quite simply, he fails to get results in the world of diplomacy. As St John noted:

In the Libyan case, it is clear John Bolton repeatedly slanted intelligence to conform to his ideological preconceptions. And his extreme and uncompromising line later undermined a promising diplomatic opening, threatening the eventually successful negotiations to persuade Libya to renounce weapons of mass destruction. Based on his performance here, a case better documented than recent policy disputes with the likes of Iran, North Korea, and Syria, it would appear Republican Senator George V. Voinovich of Ohio got it right when he described Bolton as a "poster child of what someone in the diplomatic corps should not be." It's hard to think of a worse choice to represent the United States at the United Nations--or anywhere else for that matter. [emphasis added]

But wait, just when you thought the Libya story, in which Bolton managed to alienate our closest ally, Britain, was enough to disqualify him from the post at the UN: it gets worse (Remeber: if this is how he interacts with British diplomats, what are his prospects for productive negotiations with diplomats from Germany, France, Russia and China to name but a few). The Washington Post is reporting (via Stygius and Laura Rozen) that the departure of Bolton from the State Department has actually improved the performance of many of the programs and initiatives that were languishing under his stewardship.

For years, a key U.S. program intended to keep Russian nuclear fuel out of terrorist hands has been frozen by an arcane legal dispute. As undersecretary of state, John R. Bolton was charged with fixing the problem, but critics complained he was the roadblock.

Now with Bolton no longer in the job, U.S. negotiators report a breakthrough with the Russians and predict a resolution will be sealed by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin at an international summit in Scotland next month, clearing the way to eliminate enough plutonium to fuel 8,000 nuclear bombs.

The prospective revival of the plutonium disposal project underlines a noticeable change since Bolton's departure from his old job as arms control chief. Regardless of whether the Senate confirms him as U.N. ambassador during a scheduled vote today, fellow U.S. officials and independent analysts said his absence has already been felt at the State Department.

At the bottom of his post, Stygius has a series of links to the plutonium impasse that led Republican Senator Pete Domenici to vent his frustration in an unusually hostile manner for an intra-party dispute as described in an essay on the ArmsControlWonk site:

As Bolton sat within arm's reach, Domenici went as far as to declare on the record that he was "not sure to this point that [Bolton is] up to" resolving the dispute, that he was uncertain "that he attaches the significance" to the program that the Senators did, and that if Bolton "doesn't think it's important enough to solve, this issue of liability, then I submit that you ought to get somebody that can."

But wait, just when you thought the Libya story combined with the Russian story - both of which compromised our national security as a result of Bolton's actions and inactions - were enough to disqualify him as ambassador to the UN, it gets worse.

Without the hard-charging Bolton around, the Bush administration not only has moved to reconcile with Russia over nuclear threat reduction but also has dropped its campaign to oust the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and made common cause with European allies in offering incentives to Iran to persuade it to drop any ambitions for nuclear weapons.

Bolton had also resisted using the so-called New York channel for communications with North Korea, a one-on-one meeting used sporadically through Bush's presidency and most recently revived in May. And fellow U.S. officials said Bolton had opposed a new strategic opening to India offering the prospect of sharing civilian nuclear technology, a move made in March.[...]

...Bolton was shut out of Iran after Rice's ascension, according to two U.S. officials, and his policy was reversed. In early January, officials from France, Britain and Germany flew secretly to Washington for a brainstorming session on Iran. Bolton was not invited, European diplomats said. Instead, they met with Elliott Abrams of the National Security Council.

"We weren't the ones who wanted to keep the meeting secret," one European diplomat said. "It was the American side that didn't want him there." [emphasis added]

So let me see if I have this straight: the American government, nay, the Bush administration itself finds that keeping Bolton away from the process - in effect, not inviting him to the party - is the most effective way to realize progress on the issues and tasks that Bolton is, or is supposed to be, in charge of yet we are all supposed to accept the party line that this guy is going to be good for us at the United Nations? Stygius said it best:

If the most positive contribution John Bolton has made to solving global proliferation problems has been by his absence, why are we still being subjected to the argument that his "tough" and "abrasive" style gets results, when instead his permanent absence from government service may in the end be Bolton's greatest contribution to US national security?[...]

To date, Condoleezza Rice's most significant Iran policy innovation has been Bolton's exclusion from State discussions. And does anyone think he continues to play a substantive role in North Korea discussions? Since Bolton is Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, one can understand why this sort of thing decapitates the stock pro-Bolton argument that his "toughness" makes him more "effective" and that he gets results. This is a sham.

Bolton's unique ineptitude, and the realization of such by his superiors and colleagues has led to some peculiar, though fairly widely accepted, speculation on the motive for his nomination to the UN ambassadorship: rather than keeping him at State or promoting him there under incoming Secretary Condi Rice (who clearly didn't want him around), the UN nomination was a demotion - a way of permanently taking Bolton out of the loop on policy making and putting him into a more ministerial role. From the Washington Post:

When she took over as secretary of state in January, Condoleezza Rice moved to sideline Bolton and reverse some of his approaches, U.S. officials said. By proposing him for the United Nations, she effectively moved him out of the policymaking center at the department's Foggy Bottom headquarters.

Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that this is true, and that the primary motive was not to hobble the UN further (perhaps there was a synergy of goals). But then why on earth should the Senate, let alone the American people, accept and endorse a nominee who is so distrusted and has such a poor record of performance that nobody wants him in their camp? And this from the people that are his ideological and political allies mind you. Shouldn't that fact alone be reason enough to want him out of government altogether, as opposed to being an argument for giving him the not entirely irrelevant position at the UN?

You don't appoint the diplomatic world's most notorious problem child as your representative in the premier international organization because no one else wants to baby-sit him, not at a time when our image in the world could use a serious boost not a further hit - which Bolton has managed to deliver before even entering office. I'm flabbergasted.

Now comes word that Bush will likely circumvent the increasingly problematic Senate confirmation process and opt instead for a recess appointment of Bolton. Bush is actually losing support on Bolton in the Senate the longer the process takes, the more is learned and the more it becomes clear that the Bush administration will not turn over the requested information on Bolton to the interested Senators. Fred Kaplan has some words of advice on what might be one more layer on a pile of truly, remarkably bad moves.

Still, President Bush might want to reassess the situation, and not just because Bolton is a lousy pick - a judgment that Bush does not share, in any case. He might want to consider the following question: At a time when he is touting the glories of democracy, does he want his ambassador at the United Nations - America's global spokesman - to have come by the job through such undemocratic maneuvers?

Oh, I don't know. It would kind of be fitting for Bolton wouldn't it.

It was as if Vice President Cheney's latest prevarication, that the insurgency in Iraq was in its "last throes," inadvertently triggered a conversation, in earnest, regarding the timing, means, justifications and costs and benefits for beginning the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. I'm not serious about the causality, but the peculiar juxtaposition of storylines is hard to miss. This bi-partisan forum is not based on the increasingly detached sanguinity of Cheney, but rather a realization that the current trajectory in Iraq is untenable given the realities that the costs to US taxpayers, the strains on military capacity, the death toll for Iraqi, Coalition and US personnel, and several other related problems are not going away in the near future - at least not with the strategy currently being employed.

This mid-course reality check on the Cheney-esque fantasies of some on the Right has actually braoched the political divide for politician and pundit alike. The voices of discontent have ranged from a bi-partisan Congressional resolution authored by such strange bedfellows as liberal Dennis Kucinich and staunch conservative Walter "Freedom Fries" Jones, which calls on Bush to announce by year's end a plan for a withdrawal from Iraq that would begin by October 1, 2006, to Tom Friedman's own ode to wishful thinking.

Neither of these highlighted cases is particularly earth-shattering in their revelation, but as Eleanor Clift pointed out on the McLaughlin Group this Sunday, think of Kucinich and Jones as the Congressional canaries in the coal mine. A sign of the brewing storm of public opinion that is slowly but surely turning against the President and the campaign in Iraq.

Frank Rich summarized the perceptible shift, and Cheney's waning efficacy as a misinformer:

The administration can keep boasting of the Iraqi military's progress in taking over for Americans and keep maintaining that, as Dick Cheney put it, the insurgency is in its "last throes." But when even the conservative Republican congressman who pushed the House cafeteria to rename French fries "freedom fries" (Walter B. Jones of North Carolina) argues for withdrawal, it's fruitless. Once a story line becomes incredible, it's hard to get the audience to fall for it again.

Tom Friedman, on the other hand, issued a pundit's plea to re-tool the occupation and improve on some of its failures in the hopes of salvaging the mission - whatever that might entail. Friedman offers something in the way of good advice but then drowns out the better part by latching on to the curiously illogical suggestion that we "double the American boots on the ground" from the current total of approximately 130,000 to something in the neighborhood of 260,000. Juan Cole, who I imagine is no more well versed in military affairs than Friedman, nevertheless makes easy work of Friedman's docile fish bobbing in the barrel - relying on facts and figures published by Friedman's own journalistic home, the New York Times.

I'm not sure why Tom doesn't know this, but we don't have the troops to do that. There are only 10 fighting divisions in the Army, and standing up more would take 5 years. (A division is typically between 20,000 and 25,000 troops). You can't put all ten into Iraq (remember Afghanistan and South Korea?), and couldn't keep them all there permanently if you could. Friedman's suggestion literally cannot be implemented.[...]

It is an index of how desperate the US political class is that impractical ideas are put forward by major journalists in newspapers of record that have already reported on their impracticality.

Now adding a temporary surge in the number of forces in the Iraq theater might accomplish something in terms of tamping the insurgencies, and such a short-lived increase in size would be more plausible than a long term "doubling," I'm still not convinced of the long term effectiveness of this move given the underlying realities. Before that, though, Friedman preempted his vacuous advice with an even emptier statement of dubious merit.

Conservatives don't want to talk about [Iraq] because, with a few exceptions, they think their job is just to applaud whatever the Bush team does. Liberals don't want to talk about Iraq because, with a few exceptions, they thought the war was wrong and deep down don't want the Bush team to succeed.

This sparked a good deal of justified indignation on the Left (Silber via Atrios is well worth the read). Matt Yglesias suggested Friedman put up or shut up:

Friedman's a pretty important guy and surely knows a lot of liberals, so he probably knows some liberals worth naming. This is a pretty serious allegation -- who's he talking about? If he would tell us, then maybe people would have a chance to defend themselves against this smear.

Though a bit late to the game, I would like to direct Mr. Friedman's attention to this liberal's archives, a simple perusing of which will indicate an obsessive willingness to discuss Iraq from the perspective of someone who wants to make it work, is willing to stay long term and has repeatedly offered humble suggestions for achieving those ends. While you're at it Tom, you might want to drop by a site called Liberals Against Terrorism - the entire premise of which is to concoct winning strategies in Iraq and elsewhere from a...get this...liberal perspective (this is true of the site in general, as well as the individual members' own blogs - including the most recent addition - the highly recommended Stygius). Ditto Democracy Arsenal, Laura Rozen, and too many others to list really. As a matter of fact, it's hard to think of many liberal blogs that haven't taken this position (ie the entire left leaning constituency of my blogroll). Commenters are by and large in agreement to varying degrees and nuance. That being said, I'm sure the politically spiteful are out there, but as the exception rather than the norm.

So, no to Greg Djerejian's snide innuendos and no to Tom Friedman: it is not the truth that hurts, nor this preposterous yet trite "enemy within" drivel, it is the ignorance and willingness to embrace it (seriously, shame on you Greg, you should know better - Tom may be ignorant, but you have LAT and TIA blogrolled).

While I'm on the subject, I should point to a number of recent efforts (as in last couple of weeks) by liberals on the related topics of helping the Iraq mission to succeed, defining success and informing the eventual decision to commence withdrawing troops (Tom, are you paying attention?). Praktike offers a novel approach for garnering regional cooperation through a mosaic of diplomatic levers to be applied in tandem - though admittedly not the strong suit nor preferred route of the more hawkish in the Bush administration, Prak at least stakes out a fresh position. The Armchair Generalist weighs in with military options, providing links to a number of intelligent pieces (some even from the liberals and left of center types that presumably don't exist in the Friedman-verse - see for example, the Democracy Arsenal post linked to by reader JC in the comments). Brad Plumer links to a thought provoking report from Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institute who makes the all too reasonable point that we must define what "success" really looks like and then fix policy around those goals. That being said, Byman's version of Iraq is far from the lofty ideals of some of Bush's more quixotic supporters. Plumer, accurately enough, calls Byman's plan the "Afghanization of Iraq." There are many many more examples from just the last handful of days.

All of these suggestions are worth considering, discussing, refuting, refining and implementing. The question remains however: will the Bush administration react to the facts on the ground? Will it alter policy and its course of action in the face of reality's obstinate opposition?

One such area demanding a new approach is the fiscal crisis in our nation. Praktike said something that rings true no matter what approach is taken in Iraq, whether it be something different or more of the same:

One thing we do need to do regardless of what happens in Iraq is raise taxes, which, I suppose, is when we find out just how much Americans really support this kind of project. [emphasis in original]

So here's Bush's Catch-22: with domestic support for the war in Iraq dwindling, and the midterm elections in 2006 on the not-so-distant horizon, Bush has to try to re-sell the American people on this war during his tour-de-stay the course launching soon, while at the same time finally asking some of them to put their money where their mouth is by repealing portions of the multi-trillion dollar tax cuts that inured to the benefit of the wealthiest Americans while bankrupting the treasury during a time of war. Not exactly an easy sell, even by Bush's standards and that would assume the political will to actually put the fiscal house in order via this means rather than continued embrace of Laffer nonsense and the like. But it's well past due for America's super wealthy to "throe down" if these people believe in the mission as passionately as they proclaim.

A triumvirate of articles in this month's Atlantic sketch the reality and parameters of the problem, as well as a possible future should this recipe for disaster continue to brew unaltered. Jonathan Rauch describes "one of the largest fiscal dislocations in modern American history" ($6 trillion surplus, to $3 trillion deficit), and the fact that the attempts by the GOP to fix the situation have only made it worse:

If you are worried about the federal deficit (and you should be), ask yourself which would do more to improve the country's finances - President Bush's latest budget or a pastrami sandwich. The administration made much of the fact that the budget Bush proposed in February was his tightest yet and was projected to reduce the deficit by half, to $207 billion, in 2010. What the administration did not make much of - you had to look deep in the fine print - is that the deficit would actually decline a bit more between now and 2010 if the Bush plan were not enacted and existing laws were just left alone.

In other words, go with the pastrami. It is fiscally sounder, plus it's good with mustard and a dill pickle.

Kenneth Friedman warns of the impact a severe economic downturn could have on American values, political life and liberal traditions - a possibility made more likely by the reckless fiscal policies currently being pursued by the GOP leadership in Washington.

Would it really be so bad if living standards in the United States stagnated - or even declined somewhat - for a decade or two? It might well be worse than most people imagine. History suggests that the quality of our democracy - more fundamentally, the moral character of American society - would be at risk if we experienced a many-year downturn. As the distinguished economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron once observed, even a country with a long democratic history can become a "democracy without democrats." Merely being rich is no bar to a society's retreat into rigidity and intolerance once enough of its citizens sense that they are no longer getting ahead.[...]

The reason is not hard to understand. When their living standards are rising, people do not view themselves, their fellow citizens, and their society as a whole the way they do when those standards are stagnant or falling. They are more trusting, more inclusive, and more open to change when they view their future prospects and their children's with confidence rather than anxiety or fear. Economic growth is not merely the enabler of higher consumption; it is in many ways the wellspring from which democracy and civil society flow. We should be fully cognizant of the risks to our values and liberties if that nourishing source runs dry.

James Fallows offers a nightmarish, but not as outlandish as I would prefer, future scenario told from the perspective of the 2016 presidential election - which was preceded by an extreme economic "meltdown" in America triggered in large part by policies that "cocked the gun" under the Bush administration.

Everything changed in 2001. But it didn't all change on September 11.[...]

Yes, the ramifications of 9/11 will be with us for decades, much as the aftereffects of Pearl Harbor explain the presence of thousands of U.S. troops in Asia seventy-five years later.[...]

Before there was 9/11, however, there was June 7, 2001. For our purposes modern economic history began that day.

On June 7 President George W. Bush celebrated his first big legislative victory. Only two weeks earlier his new administration had suffered a terrible political blow, when a Republican senator left the party and gave Democrats a one-vote majority in the Senate. But the administration was nevertheless able to persuade a dozen Democratic senators to vote its way and authorize a tax cut that would decrease federal tax revenues by some $1.35 trillion between then and 2010.

This was presented at the time as a way to avoid the "problem" of paying down the federal debt too fast. According to the administration's forecasts, the government was on the way to running up $5.6 trillion in surpluses over the coming decade. The entire federal debt accumulated between the nation's founding and 2001 totaled only about $3.2 trillion - and for technical reasons at most $2 trillion of that total could be paid off within the next decade. Therefore some $3.6 trillion in "unusable" surplus - or about $12,000 for every American - was likely to pile up in the Treasury. The administration proposed to give slightly less than half of that back through tax cuts, saving the rest for Social Security and other obligations.[...]

If the president or anyone else...had had perfect foresight, he would have seen that no surpluses of any sort would materialize, either for the government to hoard or for taxpayers to get back. (A year later the budget would show a deficit of $158 billion; a year after that $378 billion.) By the end of Bush's second term the federal debt, rather than having nearly disappeared, as he expected, had tripled. If those in the crowd had had that kind of foresight, they would have called their brokers the next day to unload all their stock holdings. A few hours after Bush signed the tax-cut bill, the Dow Jones industrial average closed at 11,090, a level it has never reached again.

In a way it doesn't matter what the national government intended, or why all forecasts proved so wrong. Through the rest of his presidency Bush contended that the reason was 9/11 - that it had changed the budget as it changed everything else. It forced the government to spend more, for war and for homeland security, even as the economic dislocation it caused meant the government could collect less. Most people outside the administration considered this explanation misleading, or at least incomplete. For instance, as Bush began his second term the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said that the biggest reason for growing deficits was the tax cuts.

But here is what really mattered about that June day in 2001: from that point on the U.S. government had less money to work with than it had under the previous eight presidents. Through four decades and through administrations as diverse as Lyndon Johnson's and Ronald Reagan's, federal tax revenue had stayed within a fairly narrow band. The tax cuts of 2001 pushed it out of that safety zone, reducing it to its lowest level as a share of the economy in the modern era. And as we will see, these cuts - the first of three rounds - did so just when the country's commitments and obligations had begun to grow.

Although more abstract and less identifiable in easy to understand formats, this nation's economic health is a national security issue. We cannot succeed in Iraq, or anywhere else for that matter, under almost any reasonable metric of success unless we have the means to pay for our efforts. But instead of a serious approach to foreign policy and national security, the "Vulcans" have neglected this nation's fiscal well being - adopting policies and tax cutting schemes that finish second to a pastrami sandwhich in usefulness.

So while so many pundits, politicians, bloggers and citizens are busying themselves discussing strategies for succeeding in Iraq, making heartfelt appeals to the American people to "stay the course," or making recommendations like imposing a draft or otherwise increasing the size of our military, we must first take the time to insure that we will have the ability to pay the check for all of our grand strategies and neo-visions. Without tax revenue, without a strong economic base, policy discussions will become de facto moot, and our decisions will be governed more by fiscal demands than strategic concerns. Without the money to fund it, nothing is possible. Unfortunately, this call to arms is falling on deaf ears. So many supporters of our efforts talk a good game, but when it's time to "throe down," the chorus goes silent. Again, Jonathan Rauch:

Bush's first-term deficits were defensible as responses to emergencies, but the emergencies are over; and the strategy of avoiding the extreme downside and picking up the pieces later works only if you do pick up the pieces later. That would involve cutting spending more deeply than Bush has yet proposed, revoking some of his tax cuts or reforming the tax system in ways that generate new revenues, and, at the very least, paying for his initiatives. So far he has shown little inclination to do any of those things; in fact, he wants to make the tax cuts permanent. [emphasis added]

Katz's anyone?

This gem comes courtesy of Terry Moran whose professionalism led to the sighting of an increasingly rare species of animal in the White House press corp: the follow up questioner. Actually, Terry asked a bunch of them - much to Scott "Where's Jeff Gannon/Guckert When You Need Him" McClellan's consternation. This is the culmination of Moran's attempts to counter McClellan's feint and dodge:

Q Right. What is the evidence that the insurgency is in its last throes?

McCLELLAN: I think I just explained to you the desperation of terrorists and their tactics.

Q What's the evidence on the ground that it's being extinguished?[...]

Q Well, I'm just wondering what the metric is for measuring the defeat of the insurgency.

McCLELLAN: Well, you can go back and look at the Vice President's remarks. I think he talked about it.

Q Yes. Is there any idea how long a 'last throe' lasts for?

McCLELLAN: Go ahead, Steve....

Good question. I can see why Scottie moved on to "Steve." Read the rest of the exchange for the pure comedy of it all - undeniably tragic as that comedy may be (via the Armchair Generalist).

____________


I always look forward to my guest shots here at TIA, but, with my lumpy freelance life, sometimes work obtrudes in a big way - no time to even comment very much (and yes, I have been jonesing). So for now, just a quick citation. I have a more substantive post brewing, which I will try to put up later today or Saturday.

For those of you who haven't discovered The Next Hurrah - a group blog which focuses mostly on American politics and culture - I'd recommend taking a look. It's one of my daily reads now. In a particularly good essay the other day about the Lynching Law Apology, DHinMI argues convincingly that:

....lynching was much more than racist terror, it was a flouting of the rule of law. It was an international embarrassment for the United States. And in this era of Abu Ghraib and Gitmo and Alberto Gonzales torture memos, failure to support Mary Landrieu’s resolution apologizing for the Senate’s failure to enact anti-lynching laws should be seen as not just racially insensitive, but a failure to stand up and assert the primacy of law in America.

The whole thing is worth reading, including as it does good argument and a fair amount of historical background.

DHinMI has caught a vital political tension. What used to be euphemized as 'Law and Order' now tends to be done with the words 'justice' and 'liberty' (and 'they get three squares a day!'). Our country has often been somewhat ad hoc in negotiating the tension between rule of law and visceral 'justice'. In a time when we are faced with the irresistible need to revise and clarify that tension, our current leaders are mostly taking the morally weak, EZ way out. Let's hope the wheel is beginning to turn, and we remember and value that calm, inner voice - our true selves - again: a nation of laws, not men.

Just a reminder to TIA readers that Fridays belong to TIA's columnists jonny and TTN, with jonny handling today's affairs. For those interested, I will be at my summer house in the Hamptons at Liberals Against Terrorism trying to pick up the slack for praktike who now resides in Cairo, Egypt - where the man who knows almost everything is learning Arabic - and is not always able to maintain his prodigious output. Take it away jonny....

Based on a mutual agreement, Marc Schulman and I have decided to conclude our cross-blog debate on democracy promotion and the other related topics that arose through the course of the discussion. First and foremost I want to thank Marc for his flexibility, cooperation, intelligence and civility. It truly was a pleasure to discuss these complex and difficult issues with someone capable of reasoned debate, and capable of truly challenging my positions.

I also want to say that I truly believe I have learned something by this process - the debate forced me to hone some of my arguments and Marc's perspective caused me to reevaluate certain positions and shift some beliefs in some areas. In that respect, my ideas on this subject are somewhat different than they were before the debate started. For this, I am indebted to Marc. For those who wish to play catch-up, below is the final compilation of the links to the various posts in the "Spreading Democracy Debate" between TIA and American Future:

AF: Initial Post
TIA: Initial Post
AF: First Rebuttal
TIA: First Rebuttal
AF: Second Rebuttal
TIA: Second Rebuttal
AF: Third Rebuttal
TIA: Third Rebuttal
AF: Fourth Rebuttal
TIA: Fourth Rebuttal
AF: Fifth Rebuttal
TIA: Fifth Rebuttal

And if the reader wishes to follow up on these themes further, two more blogs are beginning a variation of this debate by looking at the issue from the following perspective:

How the use of history has shaped or should shape the role which the United States should play in the spread of global democracy to oppressed or less developed nations.

Marc has the relevant links here.

[Update: I would also be remiss if I failed to flag this well thought out critique of us in the West who have made democracy promotion the topic du jour. A highly recommended coda to the now concluding conversation (via praktike of course).

Remember that White House official, the chief of staff for the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the one with no scientific background who somehow took it upon himself to edit a series of scientific papers on climate change produced by government studies in order to water down scientific findings concerning global warming? Yeah, that one. Well, it seems he's moving on to...greener pastures?

A former White House official and onetime oil industry lobbyist whose editing of government reports on climate change prompted criticism from environmentalists will join Exxon Mobil Corp., the oil company said yesterday.

The White House announced over the weekend that Philip A. Cooney, chief of staff of its Council on Environmental Quality, had resigned. He previously had been head of the climate program at the American Petroleum Institute, the trade group for large oil companies.

I don't know what's worse - that the Bush administration would hire former oil industry lobbyists to hold key posts tasked with safeguarding the environment, or that so many Bush cabinet members end up taking private sector jobs, almost immediately upon resigning, with the very industries they were charged with overseeing in their capacity as public servants.

Oh wait, now I remember. What's worse is a former lobbyist who takes the job overseeing the same industry he lobbied for, and while at his post he edits scientific findings to align with the reckless propaganda of that industry, and then immediately rejoins the industry from whence he came in the first place when he leaves his post. That's worse.

In his fourth rebuttal, Marc better explains his concept of threat assessment, vis a vis terrorism, and how it correlates to the willingness to use military force. He concedes that there are exceptions to this relationship, and that as such, it is possible to take the threat seriously but consider certain military endeavors misguided and/or counterproductive. With these qualifications in mind, I think we are pretty close to agreement on this - or at least we occupy parallel positions equidistant to the center.

He also chides me for only telling half of the Reagan story in terms of Reagan's willingness to travel the "soft" power route with Gorbachev in his second term. I assure the reader that there was no devious purpose to omitting that half of the story, nor was I seeking to bolster my case. In fact, by leaving out this portion of the narrative, I weakened my case. In that respect, I welcome the opportunity to clarify my position.

In speaking of this analogy in a prior post, I actually focused on Reagan's shift in strategies as a lesson in how to better take advantage of previously established hard-nosed bona fides. In that post, I was answering Norman Podhoretz's exhortation that Bush stay the course in what Podhoretz calls "World War IV" - which, among other strategies, involves a series of military invasions throughout the Muslim world. Podhoretz attempted to assure the reader that Bush would not mimic Reagan's change of gears:

In backing up this thesis, Luttwak notes that Ronald Reagan became less rather than more hawkish in his second term...while the Bush Doctrine was certainly inspired and influenced by Ronald Reagan, Bush will just as certainly travel a different road from the one Reagan took in his second term.

Here is what I wrote in response:

That is a very interesting statement. Consider, for a moment, what Reagan was able to achieve by taking the moderate "road" in his second term. It was nothing short of a tectonic watershed moment in history. Brilliant really. He played willing partner to Gorbachev's dance of glasnost and perestroika. Relations between the US and the USSR thawed as never before, paving the way for the eventual collapse of the Iron Curtain, and an era of American unipolarity. But Podhoretz assures us that Bush will not follow Reagan's lead. And this is supposed to comfort us somehow?

Clearly the situations are not completely analogous, but Reagan's approach provides a valuable lesson. Reagan staked out strong positions, made clear his forceful intentions, and then, when the opportunity was right, he played the moderate. Bush should do the same. After leading us into Iraq and Afghanistan, and establishing his hawkish bona fides, it would suit Bush now to cultivate the soft power options that have been neglected and overlooked thus far. Not with the jihadists mind you. They are not going to produce a Gorbachev-like figure. But there are other avenues and leaders through which Bush can seek to influence the Middle East, and improve the United States' relationship with the Muslim world. It is a perfect time to do as Reagan did.

Next, Marc brings the discussion back to Iran, and what foreign policy options we should pursue in relation to that nation's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Again, I think this is an interesting topic, and discussing it with Marc is more than worthwhile, but I think it is ultimately tangential to the original purpose of the debate. Neither of us truly disagrees on the democracy promotion strategies to be taken with Iran. Neither of us supports an all out invasion followed by democratic regime change. Marc does favor air strikes on the Iranian nuclear facilities that we can locate and reach, should a certain series of events unfold, whereas I do not - but this option is not really connected to democracy promotion. Marc considers Iranian nuclear weapons to be a threat worthy of disregarding the counter-threats related to the blowback, that he acknowledges would likely result in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Marc's is by no stretch of the imagination an unreasonable position, even though we ultimately disagree. The predicament is simply not an easy call one way or the other.

I do disagree with Marc that our invasion of Iraq has somehow increased our leverage on Iraq and better prepared us to act. The proximity of US troops is one factor to consider, but in terms of air strikes, proximity is not as crucial. In addition, another way to interpret the situation, contra-Marc's map, would be to say that the United States military conveniently eliminated two of Iran's hostile neighbors (the Taliban and especially Saddam) and replaced them with regimes that will ultimately be much friendlier to Tehran and easier for Iran to influence. Further, the proximity of our interests in this instance might actually be a weakness not a strength. Our project in Iraq makes us uniquely vulnerable to Iran in a region of the world where Iran's otherwise limited influence and ability to strike at us are at their apex.

As such, I say we can live with a nuclear Iran, although I would much prefer that we found a viable way to forestall that reality. As I wrote in the comments on this site yesterday, if push comes to shove, we could treat Iran like Pakistan - which happens to be a country with nuclear weapons, that actively shared materials, equipment and know-how with North Korea, Libya, and other notable rogue states (probably Iran in fact). On top of that, Pakistan actively aided Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

So, considering Pakistan's dubious actions, history and intentions, if we can live with Pakistan having nukes, perhaps we can make due with Iran having them. Iran's possession of nuclear weapons is no guarantee they'll use them. Far from it. From their perspective, the use of a nuclear weapon against the US, or any nation for that matter, will almost certainly spell their complete and total annihilation. They would disappear from the map and, save the diaspora, would cease to exist as a people on this Earth. Knowing that, they would be reluctant to provoke their total destruction. Nations states show restraint whereas transnational jihadists would not. But, ultimately, I digress.

Back to the debate at hand. Perhaps it's the lawyer in me, and for this I ask that Marc forgive me, but I'm not ready to let go of the Schulman Doctrine quite yet. My issue is that, despite some eloquent protestations to the contrary, it seems to be a well dressed endorsement of the status quo. This is a summary of Marc's thesis as I understand it, followed by supporting excerpts from his posts. I am not trying to be unfair in this, as I sincerely believe this to be where Marc is coming from - and in much of this we are in agreement:

1. Our security is enhanced through democratization (something we agree on, though perhaps to varying degrees):

The security of the United States – the safety of Americans – is more intimately related to the spread of democracy than ever before in our history. Gone are the days when some states with authoritarian governments were the threats to our safety and security.[...]

But I also view the spread of democracy as a means to an end: greater security, not just for our country, but for all countries that have been, or may become, the stages for terrorist atrocities.

2. Terrorism is today's biggest threat, terrorism is fostered by the repression of authoritarian regimes, thus we should target those authoritarian regimes that produce the terrorists intent on killing us (mostly in agreement, though to lessening degrees in the second and third parts):

Today, terrorism is the primary threat....While Hiz’bullah received, and continues to receive, financial support from Iran and elsewhere, its cadres are filled with people from a number of countries who voluntarily join the ranks. States may influence terrorist organizations, but they don't control them. No one is drafted into Hiz'bullah, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, or any other such group.[...]

This, along with their countries of birth, lends credence to the argument that authoritarianism breeds terrorism, and the replacement of authoritarian by democratic regimes providing freedom and liberty is the most effective way to reduce the threats to our lives.[...]

Against this backdrop, the question of the circumstances in which the US should attempt to spread democracy answers itself. We should give priority to establishing democratic regimes in those countries from which terrorists who view America as their enemy are most heavily recruited. The authoritarian/totalitarian governments of North Korea, China, and Zimbabwe are repugnant, but these countries haven’t produced terrorists intent on killing us. It’s the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East that should be targeted for democratization.

3. Those that take this threat seriously are willing to use military force, and the failure to do so would give a free pass to these authoritarian regimes and we can't afford to support these regimes any longer because we know it doesn't work and such support breeds enmity in the target population (some level of agreement between us throughout, though probably at differing levels of each):

When forceful diplomacy can't be used to spread democracy, the choice is not between unilateral US military intervention and leaving the status quo in place. Instead, it's between unilateral US military intervention and an appeasement of authoritarians and totalitarians that grants them the time and freedom of action to further threaten American security and repress their people. [...]

Will democracy promotion work? There's no way to prove that it will, and no way to prove that it won't. So it's a gamble. But the alternative is a sure thing. We know that supporting authoritarian governments in the Arab world didn't work, and that our support of such governments earned us the enduring enmity of the "Arab Street."

This sounds like a bold proclamation of some new grand strategy, but when this thesis is teased out, it amounts to very little in terms of a variation from the status quo - even though Marc seemed to provide such an impassioned plea to leave the old approach behind. Despite his statements on democracy as provider of security, authoritarianism as impetus to terrorism, force as a necessary component of democratization and prioritization of those regimes that spawn terrorists, I asked Marc if he would favor using military intervention (forced regime change) to topple any of the authoritarian regimes that should be given priority under his rubric (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, various North African states), to which he replied no. He would potentially support air strikes, but not regime change, in Iran (a nation that supports Palestinian terrorists, but not the international jihadists intent on killing us) - even though he says Iran is the biggest state sponsor of terror (and I agree, though not all terrorism is the same level of threat to us). Then I asked Marc if, absent forced regime change, we should at least be altering our aid packages or general postures with respect to some of these authoritarian regimes that the Bush administration continues to coddle (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, etc.) to which he replied:

Do I like supporting brutal dictators? No, I don't, but my objection is within the context of these words from my initial post:

Above all, we should not heed the advice of those who argue that if we don’t try to spread democracy everywhere, we shouldn’t attempt to spread it anywhere.

Ours is not a perfect world. Sometimes, we must do business with a lesser evil in order to confront a greater evil. Today, the greater evil is the terrorism that threatens our lives.

Fair enough. If Marc's position is that we must do business with certain unsavory regimes in order to garner their cooperation in the GWOT, fine. But there are reasonable objections to this that fall outside the argument that says we should spread democracy everywhere or nowhere. This is saying that not only will we not try to spread democracy in some places worthy of our attention - places that should actually be our priority because of their relation to terrorism - but we will in turn support these brutally authoritarian regimes with financial, diplomatic and military assistance. Despite the apparent evolution in policy proposed by the Schulman Doctrine, there is already a name for that policy, and it's nothing new. That is just realpolitik 2.0 - the Muslim version, made to look pretty by the well chiseled rhetorical facade of freedom, liberty and democracy. The same lesser evil arguments were made during the Cold War to justify our support for dictators like Rios Montt, the Shah, Samoza, Duvalier, Marcos, Noriega, Pinochet, Saddam Hussein, etc. - often with a similarly attractive veneer. Same policy, but now terrorism has replaced Communism as the main threat - though the lack of real concern for democratic institutions remains fairly consistent (though to the Bush administration's credit, there does seem to be some higher level of regard for democracy - yet translating this into policy remains problematic).

If that is the position Marc wants to stake out (and it is not an unreasonable one by the way), then people might point out the disconnect between the actions that would result from such a policy on the one hand and the rhetoric employed in the quotes excerpted in Parts 1 and 3 above on the other. Not altogether unlike the lack of consistency between the Bush administration's lofty prose - waxing poetic about the virtues of democracy and its ability to ensure our safety - while continuing to support the same authoritarian regimes (as well as some new faces) that supposedly got us into so much trouble in the first place. I just don't see how you get from the position that supporting authoritarian regimes breeds terrorism as well as enmity on the Arab Street and our security demands action now because the alternative is appeasement, to let's keep supporting the same authoritarian regimes that are supposedly the source of all these problems.

Marc's obvious riposte, and one that he actually put forth, is what would I do in relation to these problems with supporting authoritarian regimes (Pakistan and Uzbekistan for example)? In terms of Pakistan, I think, in the end, that they are perhaps too instrumental to our efforts in Afghanistan, and as a nuclear power, a different set of rules applies. But I never declared that such relationships should cease. With Uzbekistan, I think we can take a stronger or more proactive approach, attaching aid to tangible reforms, and along the way offering attractive memberships in international organizations and financial clubs as a means of inducing change from within - ditto Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morrocco, Egypt, Tunisia, etc. But this position is less problematic given the framework for policy I advocated, whereas Marc is supposedly going beyond the slow moving and ineffective soft power approaches. Although these approaches were mildly scorned by Marc, and more forcefully by some of his readers, I think they are really all that is left from the Schulman Doctrine after all the particulars are hashed out.

In my third rebuttal, I asked Marc to clarify the particulars of the Schulman Doctrine and the extent to which it would alter, inform, direct or otherwise affect current and future foreign policy in the realm of democracy promotion. Marc's third rebuttal, along similar lines, asks that I clarify my position on Iran given the framework I have established for the use of military force.

The first thing I should point out is that, though a compelling topic, this discussion vis a vis Iran is something of a departure from the parameters of this debate since both Marc and I are opposed to an invasion of Iran accompanied by an attempt to facilitate democracy's emergence in that country. I assume, with some confidence, that both of us would be delighted to see Iran undergo an internal democratic evolution, and that we could and should employ some soft and hard power tools to encourage this (though short of military invasion), but ultimately we are in agreement over the most controversial aspect of what this policy could entail: preemptive invasion.

In responding to my prior statements on Iran, Marc says:

In addition, I’m on the same page with Eric when he says, with respect to Iran, that "Without the credible threat of force, other diplomacy is weakened."

The issue is what, exactly, constitutes a "credible threat of force." Only one thing is certain: a credible use of force means a credible use of force by the US. The other parties to the dispute with Iran –- the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) –- lack the means and, arguably, the will to take military action against the theocrats in Tehran.

I would have to agree with Marc on his clarification of this discussion. By credible use of force, I do mean essentially our own. Despite the fact that Israel, arguably, has the will and the means to use force against Iran, I think such a strike would be so disastrous for US interests in the region, that I would table that discussion for now. I think Marc agrees with me on that as well, though I could be mistaken.

Next, Marc poses a fairly elaborate hypothetical scenario in order to draw out a further elucidation of my standard for using force.

Suppose that the scenario I outlined in my First Rebuttal unfolds:

-Negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran fail
-The resulting Security Council resolution emboldens, rather than dissuades, the mullahs
-An underground Iranian nuclear test is detected

Further, suppose that a sequence of events similar to those preceding the US-led invasion of Iraq takes place at the Security Council:

-The US (and, possibly, Britain) introduces a resolution calling for air strikes against nuclear targets in Iran
-France (and, possibly, Britain) declares that it will veto any resolution providing international legitimacy to the use of force against Iran

Under these circumstances, I would favor unilateral US air strikes. Further, if the threat of force is to be credible to the Iranian government, the mullahs must believe that the US would again be willing to undertake unilateral, "illegitimate" military action.

Is this where Eric and I would part company on Iran? [emphasis in original]

The short answer to Marc is yes, this is where we would part company - though not necessarily for the reasons he implies. It is not the unilateral nature of such airstrikes per se, but rather the strategic assessment of the costs and benefits of such a move. If you recall, in my second rebuttal I laid out a loose framework designed to optimize cooperation, foster a perception of legitimacy for US actions and create an environment more conducive to the realization of American interests through the repair of the relationship between the leviathan we are proposing and the interests of the rest of the world.

Under that framework, there is a multi-tiered approach that would involve courting the UN's approval (preferably by people who do not view the institution as worthless), absent the UN's approval (perhaps regardless), appealing to NATO and other smaller but still well respected international organizations, followed by an attempt to secure the consent and cooperation of our close allies and then, finally, making our case on the stage of public opinion to the world population at large (against a rhetorical backdrop that appreciates cooperation, allies, international organizations and the opinions of others). Despite these guiding principles, and the presumption of deference thereto, if the threat were urgent enough, then exigency would demand action regardless of the realization of any of those various levels of approval.

A nuclear Iran could fit into the definition of urgent, and as such, I would not necessarily wait on any approval of the UN or NATO before acting. That being said, what would a campaign of air strikes against Iran look like and how would it affect the situation on the ground in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan?

A group of experts conducted a well-reasoned war gaming exercise in which various strategies for acting against Iran were tested and then reported in the Atlantic by James Fallows (non-subscription holders here and analyzed by praktike here).

One of the conclusions from that exercise is that any plan for air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities would probably fail to eliminate all the crucial sites and their infrastructure. Iran has hardened the potential targets by positioning them in major urban areas, as well as concealing them in difficult to reach bunkers. Thus, the efficacy of the air strikes themselves would be less than optimal - with an optimistic appraisal being a setback of some years, though not an annihilation of the requisite facilities, equipment and material. But wouldn't something be better than nothing you might ask?

No. Not in this case. Because that something, which is far short of lasting, would come at a heavy heavy price. You see, Iran would not just sit back and take this aggression sitting down. They wouldn't have to. From the Atlantic article:

Gardiner cautioned that any of the measures against Iran would carry strategic risks. The two major dangers were that Iran would use its influence to inflame anti-American violence in Iraq, and that it would use its leverage to jack up oil prices, hurting America's economy and the world's. In this sense option No. 2 - the pre-emptive air raid - would pose as much risk as the full assault, he said. In either case the Iranian regime would conclude that America was bent on its destruction, and it would have no reason to hold back on any tool of retaliation it could find. "The region is like a mobile," he said. "Once an element is set in motion, it is impossible to say where the whole thing will come to rest."

I'd take Gardiner's admonition one country better, throw in Afghanistan. To quote my blog-mate praktike:

The other thing about Iran is that they wouldn't hesitate to hit out in Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly elsewhere. They have those two countries blanketed with agents, and I've been seeing Afghans start to point the finger at Iran more often recently. In Ken Pollack's book on Iran, he said that the US warned Iran about some of its activities there and they toned it down, but they've got all of our installations cased.

So, let's say we strike Iranian facilities, some of which are embedded in heavily populated areas, and in turn we cause some level of civilian casualties - the results of which, no matter how grisly, would be exaggerated by the ruling regime. This in turn would enrage many of the Shiites in Iraq, especially the Sadr-ites who are already just barely tolerating the presence of US forces. In response, Iran uses its influence to cause trouble in Iraq and Afghanistan relying on agents and assets cultivated over the course of many years.

What do you think the US would do in response? Sit back and let Iran cause trouble in these two sensitive locales? Unlikely. What would result would be a cycle of retaliations that would only escalate in a dangerous game of tit for tat which would also serve to harden the resolve of certain Shiite quarters in Iraq against our presence. The potential for the US military to get sucked into a two front (or three if Afghanistan is destabilized) conflict as a result of these air strikes is all too real. But if that occurs, could our military withstand the strain without resorting to a draft? Even with a draft, would we have the time and assets to train and equip the influx of conscripts? What would such an expanded conflict do to our already out of control deficits and lumbering economic growth? The result could be a backslide in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with an Iranian regime that is actively trying to lash out against us and our allies in an unrestrained fashion.

With that in mind, my counsel would be against such a provocative, and ultimately far from effective, action. That being said, as I've maintained all along, I would like to see the Bush administration rattle the saber as frenetically as possible in order to try to intimidate the ruling regime in Iran, creating the incentive for them to negotiate a halt to their quest to acquire nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, I think the regime in Iran is all too aware of the leverage they have over the situation as it currently stands, so I don't expect them to acquiesce on this issue. Thus, as unsavory as this might sound, we might just have to get used to the idea that Iran will have nuclear weapons at some point in the future.

In Marc's second rebuttal, he concedes this point:

Eric Martin correctly observes that a basic premise of my thesis is that "the more seriously you take the threat of terrorism, the more likely you are to endorse military actions that, at least ostensibly, target terrorism."

Unfortunately he doesn't explain this relationship in any greater detail, nor did he address my hypothetical question (which is actually based on right-wing pundit Michael Savage's suggestion), which asked if someone who proposes nuking Mecca takes the terrorism threat more seriously than someone who would argue against such a move. How would Marc define the elusive concept of "targeting terrorism"? Would he use the metric of those regimes from which most terrorists are recruited?

Along these lines, if there are two counterterroism experts and one says that we should invade Syria, and the other says that is unwise, is the former the one who takes the threat more seriously? What if there was a third such pundit who goes even farther, suggesting a prolonged military campaign from Syria, to Saudi Arabia then to Egypt? Is this third pundit the one who takes the threat the most seriously of the three? Is there a true proportional relationship between perception of threat and bellicosity? Marc himself is comfortable with a wait and see approach with Saudi Arabia, but under his own analysis, does this mean that he doesn't take the threat of terrorism seriously?

The reasons I ask these questions are not rhetorical. I am truly curious because I think I take the threat of terrorism pretty seriously, but according to Marc's framework, I apparently am more blase than many others. But as a resident of lower Manhattan, I have seen up close the death and destruction, and live with the knowledge that my domicile is the most attractive target for any future attack. How then is it that I don't appreciate the threat?

Suffice to say that I reject the theory that there is some sort of proportional relationship between willingness to use military force and the degree to which a threat is perceived, appreciated and taken seriously. In my opinion, the person who takes the threat of terrorism most seriously is the person that seeks to promote the optimal strategy for defeating, containing and neutralizing the threats terrorism present. This should combine many aspects, tools and methods, but this approach will undoubtedly realize that using military force in some contexts would be counterproductive and that advocating such a route would be to actually fail to appreciate the threat of terrorism - not appreciate it more. It is far too simplistic, and indicative of a certain mindset, (which I discussed most recently here, and previously here and here) to confuse willingness to use force with strength, violence with power and hawkishness with maturity.

The strength of a given policy is in the results, not the means employed. Starting a war is not a strong move per se, or one that "appreciates" a given threat if doing so will work to undermine the overarching goals that predated the conflict. Military force is not self-justifying. Sometimes war is necessary (Hitler wasn't going to respond otherwise), but sometimes war ends up sending negative shockwaves through entire regions - reverberating to the detriment of all parties involved (World War I). My favorite example in this arena is Ronald Reagan's commendable, and history altering, cooperation with Mikhail Gorbachev in the joint pursuit of glasnost and perestroika - the momentum of which ultimately resulted in the unraveling of the USSR. Remember, there were Right wing pundits at the time who vehemently criticized Reagan and then Bush for their "soft" stances on Communism. But it was precisely because these Presidents understood and appreciated the threat that Communism presented that they chose the "soft" route. Because it is what was called for in that setting. It is what worked.

As with other challenges, the threat of terrorism should be met with wise policy, clever strategy and flexible policymakers capable of adapting and adjusting. But if you start from the premise that the more you want to use the military, the more seriously you take the threat, you will end up with an insular group of hawks making policy, and that environment is not conducive to beneficial outcomes (ahem).

Next, Marc points out that his rationale for supporting the invasion of Iraq was not "grounded on its involvement in terrorism and, relatedly, its WMD programs," but instead the fear that inaction would be tantamount to the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. My counterargument to this theory would be that Saddam had shown no Hitler-esque or megalomaniacal signs over the course of the previous decade-plus, his military capacity (especially WMDs) was severely weakened, and as such it did not appear that the world was appeasing an aggressive, well armed regime in a manner similar to Hitler's in the 1930s. But that topic is a bit tangential and could probably amount to an entire debate unto itself.

Yet still, with this justification for the Iraq campaign in mind, I admit to still being somewhat puzzled by Marc's overall theory, what I will call the "Schulman Doctrine," and how it applies to facts on the ground. If you remember from Marc's initial post, the Schulman Doctrine has a two-tiered analysis. First, the willingness to use force is a function of how seriously a given person perceives the threat of terrorism. But since there are certain logistical restraints (too many targets, not enough resources), we should give priority to establishing democratic regimes "in those countries from which terrorists who view America as their enemy are most heavily recruited."

So far, so good. But how should the Schulman Doctrine guide our policy? According to Marc, it wasn't needed to justify the invasion of Iraq, and wouldn't really fit well if so required. So, what then? Should we invade Saudi Arabia and Egypt - the two countries from which most terrorists (or at least the crucial leadership) are spawned? Apparently not according to Marc's stance vis a vis Saudi Arabia. Indonesia then? Maybe a Patton-esque campaign across North Africa? I'm not sure, but if the premise is that those who take the threat seriously will use force, and the targets should be countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, should we be preparing for those invasions once the military assets are available? If possible, I would like to hear from Marc how the Schulman Doctrine should inform current policy choices and interventions in various arenas because absent this, it sounds like it lacks any real purpose or focus. If the Schulman Doctrine results in an endorsement of the status quo, is that not inconsistent with his description of threat assessment and other of his arguments such as in this paragraph below:

When forceful diplomacy can't be used to spread democracy, the choice is not between unilateral US military intervention and leaving the status quo in place. Instead, it's between unilateral US military intervention and an appeasement of authoritarians and totalitarians that grants them the time and freedom of action to further threaten American security and repress their people.

Marc goes on to note:

Will democracy promotion work? There's no way to prove that it will, and no way to prove that it won't. So it's a gamble. But the alternative is a sure thing. We know that supporting authoritarian governments in the Arab world didn't work, and that our support of such governments earned us the enduring enmity of the "Arab Street."

Strong language, and a commendable sentiment, but again, how does it translate? So far, the Bush administration has shown few signs of withdrawing support from the authoritarian regimes that are the most problematic in terms of producing terrorists - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, various North African nations, etc. Does Marc criticize this approach? If not, why?

The get tough/no more support rhetoric has been plentiful from Bush and his cabinet, but the policy end has only seemed to have been set in motion vis a vis Iraq, most recently Syria and in other areas of the globe like Venezuela. But as mentioned previously, Iraq had relatively nothing to do with the terrorists that threaten US interests in terms of Iraqi citizens joining terrorist groups or support from the Hussein regime, ditto Chavez in Venezuela. Even Syria, though problematic, is not the same fount as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. In other places, like Uzbekistan and Pakistan, the administration has actually increased support for brutal dictators like Islam Karimov - whose regime has shown the gruesome penchant for boiling political dissidents alive in giant cauldrons (here is photographic evidence of Karimov's barbarity, but WARNING, this is very graphic). Any democracy-meter that places Islam Karimov on a more elevated level than Hugo Chavez is dysfunctional beyond repair (and I am no fan of Chavez). Someone should tell one of Bush's favorite authors Natan Sharansky about it though (via praktike).

The incongruity in message and policy is not lost on the denizens of the "Arab Street" - those whose enmity Marc is, not unreasonably, concerned with. But how does Marc view this lack of consistency, and how should we better align the policies with the virtues extolled in State of the Union addresses and other media events? Below are some examples of such a lack of continuity from a prior post on the subject. First, Marc "Abu Aardvark" Lynch, who was cited in that post:

Most Arabs are deeply cynical about American intentions, and they can't help but notice when "useful" Arab countries get a pass. Tunisia invites Ariel Sharon to come visit, and the Bush administration has not a word to say when a human rights activist is sent to jail for publishing an article on the internet describing torture in the Tunisian prisons. Heck, the administration doesn't even seem to consider it a problem that the regional office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative is based in a country which the State Department describes as having an extremely poor human rights record, where "members of the security forces tortured and physically abused prisoners and detainees... [and] arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals."

Nor did the Bush administration have a word to say about Jordan, where King Abdullah's regime spent much of the last year getting more and more repressive. It got bad enough that Abdullah finally sacked his prime minister and appointed a new "reformist" PM a month ago, but - amazingly - no Bush official has yet said a single word in public about it....Wesley Clark, who wants more behind the scenes work and less chest-thumping, might actually like this. I don't, because it's such an easy target for the very large number of Arabs who think that the US democracy talk is a bunch of hypocritical hot air - a weapon to use against our enemies, but not for our friends. Places like Tunisia and Jordan really hurt America's image as a credible democracy promoter among Arabs, who pay attention to such things.

It got worse last week. The pictures of Bush kissing Crown Prince Abdullah and walking hand in hand with the Saudi leader reinforced this impression for Arabs. The op-ed pages of the Arab press have been filled to the brim the last week with pieces extolling (or damning) the return to normal American-Saudi relations. Whatever the Realist reasons for cozying up to the Saudis - oil prices, their newly helpful attitude on terrorism - it's got nothing to do with Arab democracy, and Arabs see that. Remember, they already don't trust this administration, so there's a big hurdle...and scenes like the Crawford love-fest raise it even higher.

Matt Yglesias penned an article that provided a comprehensive chronicling of the disconnect between the message of democracy and the policies we have tolerated without withdrawing support or offering condemnation. From that post, directly:

There are actually too many examples [from Yglesias] to excerpt, which in itself is a testament to the fact that our image as protector of reformists and democrats no matter their national location might not be as widely perceived as would be necessary to truly light the spark of regional change. In fact, there has been an inverse effect in some areas:

The administration's maximalist framing of the terrorism war, and the deals it has cut with unsavory leaders because of that decision, is having its most deleterious effect on reformers in those countries. While the aforementioned regimes are at least nominally aligned with the United States against violent jihadism, perverse incentives exist that all but guarantee that the dictators will fight terrorism in about the same way that Captain Renault cracked down on gambling at Rick's. A Musharaff or a Karimov is only able to pitch himself as worthy of U.S. support on the grounds that the alternative would be worse. If not me, the dictators say, the Islamists would take over. In certain times and places this may, in fact, be a correct assessment of the situation. But ready U.S. acceptance of such arguments gives autocrats every reason to ensure that their regime -- and the world -- is always threatened by Islamist violence. If, somehow, the problem were to go away, so would the U.S. support, and backward regimes would find themselves without the kind of money and muscle that only the United States can provide against their remaining domestic opponents.

As a result, these autocrats tend to demonstrate much more interest in cracking down on liberal opposition groups than on the Islamists we are supposedly supporting them against. A perfect example is provided by Musharaff's antics in Pakistan's recent parliamentary election. Candidates were required to possess a college degree in order to be eligible, obviously a violation of democratic principles. But if the goal was to hold back an Islamist tide, why were madrassa certificates accepted as a qualification equivalent to a college degree? The result was that many secular candidates were banned from running, while all the leaders of religious parties were in the clear. The upshot: Islamists, who have never performed well in Pakistan's sporadic elections, more than doubled their share of the vote over their previous high. This, in turn, lends superficial credibility in the future to arguments that continued U.S. support -- to the tune of $3 billion over five years -- for the military regime is the only alternative to an Islamist takeover. The regime's shenanigans aside, however, there remains little reason to believe that radicals would win a free and fair election.

In addition, I doubt that this penchant for double-speak is in any way ameliorated by the overly triumphalistic crowing about certain shallow and cosmetic changes.

Within Iraq's immediate neighborhood, moreover, there's been no sign of a democratic domino effect. The president and his defenders have tended to cherry-pick occasional signs of progress -- noting, for example, that Saudi Arabia has introduced "a plan for gradual introduction of elections." The pace of Saudi reform, however, is gradual in the extreme. The elections will be for municipal offices only and will not permit the formation of political parties. Most notably, only a minority of seats on the councils will be up for competitive election, leaving effective power -- even in the circumscribed sphere of local administration -- in the hands of officials appointed by the monarchy. Contrary trends could just as easily be cited.

In conclusion, I think that me and Marc share many of the same instincts in terms of the degree to which the US should continue employing the Muslim version of realpolitik. My questions to him relate to how the Schulman Doctrine interacts with these concerns, how it should inform our military decisions going forward and how well, or not, he thinks the Bush administration is doing in matching up the lofty rhetoric with actual policies.

Due to the overwhelming positive feedback TIA received for the alternating guest posts from TTN and Jonny over the extended Memorial Day weekend, and much to my pleasure, TIA will be turning over the site every Friday to one of these worthy compatriots.

This week TTN has composed yet another typically intelligent piece, which I have somewhat rudely buried beneath the back and forth of the ongoing blog debate between myself and Marc Schulman. But don't let his post get lost in the shuffle, it is well worth the read (I'll be moving it up one notch on the site since, due to my timestamp error, I unceremoniously pushed his down one). Next Friday, it's Jonny's TIA again, and I will try to be less intrusive. Looking forward to it.

As for the debate in progress, I will be posting my third rebuttal to Mr. Schulman some time later tonight or early tomorrow. Despite the framework we established, Marc has been generously accommodating of my somewhat demanding day job and the minor deviations from our agreed upon schedule which have resulted. A true gentleman and a scholar. Stay tuned for more....

I regularly find it hard to believe that we can live in the most technologically advanced society that the world has ever known, yet still be completely out of touch with the true nature of science. Amazing, yes -- but impossible to deny. We consume the fruits of this process without the slightest understanding of how these fruits are cultivated. And because we don't know what science is, we often fail to recognize the impostors.

Over the last couple of weeks, I've run across two excellent examples of this phenomenon. Not only are these examples educational, they're also pretty darn funny. So, let's take a look, shall we?

Last Friday I got caught up watching Bill O'Reilly amidst my mindless channel surfing. He had teased the upcoming segment by claiming that he would have psychiatrists dueling it out over the subject of gay marriage. Well, for me, that's a lock. Seems that I have a bit of a thing for psychology. Plus, I couldn't imagine a reputable psychological argument against gay marriage. How could I pass that up?

Unfortunately, the debate failed to live up to the hype. As it turned out, the disagreement stemmed from the American Psychiatric Association's decision to take a position with respect to gay marriage. One shrink thought it was OK for the APA to take positions on political issues, one did not. Color me bored.

Apparently, Bill was similarly dissatisfied with what was shaping up to be a procedural discussion. His solution was to attack the science that justified the APA's position.

O'REILLY: Are you familiar with the Swedish study on marriage, ma'am?

DR. NADA STOTLAND (vice president, American Psychiatric Association): No -- which study are you referring to?

O'REILLY: OK. They did a sociological study in Sweden that said that marriage between men and women declined drastically since gay marriage was legalized there. And now up to, I don't know, 60, 65 percent of all Swedes are not married. So the institution of marriage, basically, in that country collapsed, because there was no tradition to it.

And you know, I was wondering before the -- your organization made your decision to come out and say this is a good thing, whether you took a look at that study. [Emphasis mine]

Now, it's a little easy to get distracted here because they're so much funny stuff going on. I mean, how can you not laugh when a bloviating TV host attempts to call a professional scientist ignorant in her own field? That's what I call comedy.

However, behind all the hilarity is an important point. Notice the usage of the word "study" in the previous quote. Bill uses it three times to refer to research that supposedly challenges the conclusions of the APA. Dr. Stotland also uses the term, this time to ask Bill what the hell he's talking about. Clearly these two, and the larger television audience, understand the implication of this word. A "study" is a scientifically rigorous examination of a given phenomenon. Moreover, because such an investigation is scientifically rigorous, we are all expected to give its conclusions some credence. This isn't just some idiot mouthing off on the op-ed page. This is objective science.

In reality, though, one of these two people actually understands what a study really is, and it isn't Bill O'Reilly.

Immediately after Bill referred to this "study", I started poking around on the Internet in order to learn more about it. Like Dr. Stotland, I had never heard of this research and I was interested to discover what, if any, merit it had. While doing so I came across several sources that do a number on the conclusions of this "study" (here and here). But beyond the questionable analysis and logical fallacies, a far more dramatic fact becomes clear.

You see, it's hardly surprising that Dr. Stotland had never heard of the study when you realize that it doesn't exist! That's right. In fact, the "study" to which Bill refers is actually this article published in The Weekly Standard.

So, either Bill O'Reilly is woefully misinformed (a definite possibility) or he has absolutely no idea what makes a study scientific. You see, any idiot can hole up in his living room, conduct experiments, and draw conclusions. He can even write up those conclusions, sprinkling his document with a thousand SAT words mined out of Roget's Thesaurus. But, it really isn't science until his findings have undergone a fair degree of peer review. Generally this means submitting your work to an established scientific journal where your methods and analysis are examined by others conversant in the field. If they believe your work to be sound, they will permit its publication. It is only at this point that it becomes a "study" in the sense we have come to understand.

Before that, you're just an idiot with too much time on your hands.

I uncovered this second example while reading about hearings held recently by the Kansas State Board of Education considering the introduction of Intelligent Design into the state's scientific curriculum. Of course, the ID movement presents a rather "target-rich" environment for those of us looking to skewer scientific frauds. But this little anecdote made an impression upon me. Massimo Pigliucci, Ph.D., is an evolutionary biologist teaching at the State University of New York, Stony Brook. As such, he occasionally duels with ID advocates who claim that their theory should be considered alongside Darwin's. Apparently, this led him to once cross swords with William Dembski, a leading Intelligent Design proponent. This event provided an incredibly revealing moment, which Pigliucci describes as follows.

I once debated ID proponent William Dembski at the NY Academy of Science, and pointedly asked him what he would do if he got a grant from the National Science Foundation. He couldn't come up with anything…

Now remember, Dembski claims to be, first and foremost, a scientist. Unlike some, he is not a religious zealot. He's just searching for the truth -- just like every other man and woman wearing a lab coat.

Yet, he strangely has no research that he'd like to conduct. That's pretty darn unusual. Any scientist worth her salt has a million ideas brewing inside her head that she would test at the first opportunity. For most scientists, formulating experiments isn't the hard part -- paying for it is. With Dembski, not so much. And this is, of course, the problem with the entire ID movement. It's literally drowning in cash, but spends all of its money on advocacy -- and none on research!

As they say, if you want to understand something, follow the money.

While it's fun and all to expose the embarrassing ignorance on display in these two examples, I do have a more profound point to make. As I mentioned earlier, we live in a highly technical society. Our existence would have a dramatically different flavor without the benefits that science has provided to us. And while we have paid a price for some of this scientific advancement, a great deal of it has been a boon to our society. We are made aware of this fact every single day.

Moreover, the record of success that science has posted over the last 500 years has given us all reason to trust it. Faith typically isn't something we associate with science, yet for nonpractitioners that's basically what their enthusiasm for science amounts to. Again and again we have seen science come to the rescue in order to free us from the practical struggles of existence. Over time, we have learned that our faith in science is warranted.

Due to our societal trust in science, advocates of all stripes have strived to employ it in service of their goals. People tend to listen to and trust scientists, therefore having one on your side has obvious benefits. Advocates lace their pitches with references to data and scientific analysis, hoping that this will increase the persuasiveness of their argument. For years, the tobacco industry supported narrowly tailored research so that they might scientifically buttress their claim of the cigarette's harmlessness. The petroleum industry does likewise to deflect concerns over global climate change. Even groups that are openly hostile to science will use it to advance their positions when it suits them. The persuasive power of science is too powerful to pass up.

However, just calling something science doesn't make it science. It is a very specific process that has evolved in order to avoid error, confirmation bias, and outright chicanery. If you don't follow the method, your results don't deserve the veneration we typically reserved for truly scientific conclusions. Without the method, you are trusting the investigator, not science.

But most people aren't aware of these fine distinctions and O'Reilly, the ID movement, and many, many others realize this. They understand that they will win converts by scientifically backing their position. If they are unable to do this honestly, they will simply produce fraudulent claims and label them scientific, fully aware that few will see through the charade. It is deeply dishonest, but its effectiveness is proven and therefore they cannot eschew the practice.

That is, until such a time as the general public comes to understand that "science" is more than a word, more than a test tube, and more than a lab coat. Once we collectively begin to understand this fact and challenge those who improperly don the mantle of science, this practice will wither away.

But, that may take some time. Until then, keep an eye peeled for advocacy dressed up as science. Clothes may make the man, but such trappings do little for poor research. It might look great on the outside, but if it isn't science all the way through, it's just junk.

No matter what you call it.

Now that the back and forth is in full swing, it's time for me to take a stab at Marc's first rebuttal found here.

As with my first rebuttal, the first thing I would like to do is preempt some of Marc's clever framing of the debate - and by clever, I mean that as a compliment from one rhetorician to another. Marc says about my initial post:

I view the issue through the lens of 9/11, terrorism and national security....I know that his lens is very different from mine: there's no linkage between spreading democracy and 9/11, terrorism and national security in his post [emphasis added].

I would have to disagree pretty strongly with Marc's characterization of my initial post. In that piece, I discussed, at various times, the following factors, causes, effects and ramifications from imposing democracy through invasion:

-Enormous financial costs, contributing greatly to fiscal insecurity and risk.

-A significant drain on our military assets (as an aside, and unmentioned in my first post, the military has recently lowered standards in terms of drug abuse, misconduct, obesity and a slew of other offenses that used to mean expulsion in order to offset recruitment and retention shortfalls brought about by a certain exercise in democracy promotion). Interestingly enough, Marc chides me in another section of the post about offering no military options to deal with Iran, but what he doesn't address is that our military doesn't really have many options unless they want to abandon Iraq, and even then, Iran could make Iraq look like a....cakewalk.

-The potential to create situations such as civil wars that destabilize entire regions, and in the present context the region in question happens to be the Middle East which is the source of so much of the world's oil.

I think you really have to stretch logic to contend that the above listed factors are not "national security" issues. As far as links to terrorism and 9/11, in Marc's defense, I really took up that conversation in my first rebuttal and not the initial post. But, due to the enormity of the topic, I had to leave out some aspects of the discussion, and even then my post was probably too long for the blog format (as I'm sure many readers would attest).

Next Marc takes me to task for what he deems is my "blanket dismissal of using military force" which he considers unwise. In his own words:

In the future, there may be situations in which all other avenues to defusing a serious threat may turn out to be dead ends. If the choice is between using force and doing nothing, would Eric always choose the latter?

The answer to his question is an emphatic "no." I have never counseled against using military force in any and every situation. I was unequivocally in favor of using force in Afghanistan. Similarly, I was in favor of the campaigns in Kosovo and Bosnia, and would have supported intervention in Rwanda and would be amenable to a similar type move in Darfur today. In terms of halting genocide, a better case could have been made for invading Iraq in 1982 and/or 1988 - the dates of Saddam's most treacherous crackdowns and ethnic cleansings. Similarly, during the Shiite uprising that followed on the heels of Gulf War I. As brutal as he was, Saddam was not engaged in mass murder of that scale on a regular basis.

Again, in Marc's defense, perhaps my syntax in the paragraphs he cited was imprecise. So in the interest of accuracy, allow me to clarify. My position is that there should be a presumption against using military force to spread democracy in and of itself because it is risky, has a poor chance of success, costly, drains our military's capacity, can incite extremism, can create failed states and chaos which are breeding grounds for terrorism, and, at least in the case of Iraq, can provide terrorists and aspiring terrorists with a central node for recruitment, indoctrination, learning skills and tactics, networking and, unfortunately, more.

When the risks outweigh that considerable presumption, then those risks should be neutralized, and we should do our best to reconstruct the society in question according to more humane standards - deferring to local custom, culture, expertise and input. I think Afghanistan passed this test, but Iraq failed it - for the reasons I laid out in my rebuttal and more.

As for Marc's discussion of Iran, my position is that launching an invasion of Iran right now, with the intent of nation building and neutralizing their nuclear capacity, would be a disastrous turn of events for many reasons. First, I would recommend this article in the Atlantic which I have cited before, but hat tip to reader Cal for providing a link that doesn't require a subscription. I would only add that we would be foolish to underestimate the difficulty of a two front war and the impact that invading Iran (the world's most populous Shiite nation) would have on the majority Shiite population in Iraq. Right now they are our tentative allies. If they turn on us, Iraq will be lost - or at least our ability to affect its trajectory.

That being said, force should never be taken off the table, and the situation will change so our policies must adapt. Without the credible threat of force, other diplomacy is weakened. I am not opposed to any military confrontation with Iran ever, but with Iraq still raging, such a move now would be extremely dangerous. By the way, Iran is well aware of this.

Next Marc makes a claim about my position on legitimacy that, although he says is outside the terms of this debate, I would like to address briefly. Marc says that I discuss, vis a vis Iraq:

...what for him is the war's illegitimacy...

The first point I would make is that it matters little what Marc or I think of the legitimacy of the Iraq war. Legitimacy matters only in as much as our actions are perceived as legitimate by the target population (Iraqis) and those people whose support and assistance we would prefer to have (allies, tentative allies and potential allies). Nevertheless, I do not belong in the cult of legitimacy. I just think that the Bush administration has, unfortunately, been swayed by certain ideologues who are hostile to any suggestion that legitimacy is worth anything at all. Contra the most strident neocon position, legitimacy is not nothing - it greases the wheels of many of our foreign policy goals and assures the cooperation and support for so many costly and time consuming efforts that we are currently engaged in, and will arise in the future. Here is the first part of the John Lewis Gaddis quote I cited in my first rebuttal, which represents a view that I hold:

The American claim of a broadly conceived right to pre-empt danger is not going to disappear, because no other nation or international organization will be prepared anytime soon to assume that responsibility. But the need to legitimize that strategy is not going to go away, either; otherwise, the friction it generates will ultimately defeat it, even if its enemies do not. What this means is that the second Bush administration will have to try again to gain multilateral support for the pre-emptive use of U.S. military power.

Doing so will not involve giving anyone else a veto over what the United States does to ensure its security and to advance its interests. It will, however, require persuading as large a group of states as possible that these actions will also enhance, or at least not degrade, their own interests. The United States did that regularly--and highly successfully--during World War II and the Cold War. It also obtained international consent for the use of predominantly American military force in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1999, and in Afghanistan in 2001. Iraq has been the exception, not the rule, and there are lessons to be learned from the anomaly.

Gaddis goes on to suggest an alteration in the tone and rhetoric emanating from the White House and its supporters - the outright hostility to, and insult of, allies, institutions and sensibilities - would be the first step in repairing the damage. I discuss these issues at length in these two posts (here and here) if the reader is interested in following the story further. Here is the summary of my suggestions for trying to secure legitimacy in the post-Cold War era (please note, I am not, I repeat not, saying that we require UN approval for every action).

Thus there is something of a new test forming. On the one hand, appeal to international law and the United Nations and, importantly, do so from a vantage point of respect for the institutions and an ideological position of appreciation for the importance of such multilateral organizations. Do not proceed with brash and inflammatory rhetoric which is prone to create distrust and entrenched opposition.

If those efforts are not met with success, continue to lobby, while at the same time consulting with smaller organizations such as NATO (or some future incarnation thereof), and the whole while address the world community in general. If all three corners are counseling against our actions, there might be a good reason why. It would be wise to reconsider, or at the very least, agree to delay the decision for further vetting. This extra deliberation could be used to better make our case, or consider alternatives.

While there could be exceptions to these modified pillars in the potential case of extreme and imminent threats that somehow fail to alarm our allies, I think these fundamentals provide a strong overarching principle to guide us going forward. They better guard our own interests than a strict obedience to international law would, but at the same time defer more to our allies and international bodies, and give weight to their counsel, so as to foster trust, support and an air of legitimacy which are all so vital for our current mission and so many other goals.

Next I will respond to Marc's second rebuttal which can be found here.

Now that TIA and American Future have put forward their respective first volleys in the cross-blog debate on the promotion of democracy, it is time for the actual debating to begin. As a point of order, March Schulman and I will be limiting these rebuttals to one per day in the interest of our readers and their ability to follow along as the discussion proceeds. Without further ado, on to the forum....

The first thing I would like to address is one of the basic premises of Marc's entire thesis - how threat assessments drive policy choices. Marc says:

In the remainder of this essay, I discuss three methods available to the US in its effort to spread democracy: public diplomacy, forceful diplomacy, and military intervention. The methods -– which, borrowing Joseph Nye’s terminology, range from soft power to hard power –- one is willing to endorse depends on the seriousness with which one takes the terrorist threat.

I don't fault Marc for trying, but accepting his framing of the debate as he lays it out leads to the inevitability of certain conclusions. Under this construct, the more seriously you take the threat of terrorism, the more likely you are to endorse military actions that, at least ostensibly, target terrorism. This simply isn't the case in all contexts - and there is too much room to debate how effectively various military strategies target terrorism. It is quite possible, and not uncommon, for counterterrorism officials, scholars and experts to take the threat of terrorism very seriously - in a dire sense even - without advocating for military intervention in all contexts. Taken to its extreme, could you argue that someone who advocates nuking Mecca takes terrorism more seriously than say, a Richard Clarke who thinks there is more ground to made up with soft power?

Some of these well informed individuals would argue that some examples of military action could actually exacerbate the terrorism problem, rather than provide an antidote. For example, Marc's thesis is pretty solid in terms of assessing the support for our military intervention in Afghanistan. It would be hard to maintain that one takes the threat seriously, yet opposes uprooting Al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. The invasion of Iraq, however, is not so clear cut. Iraq was not the locus of international terrorism, it contained no major training facilities, leaders or recruitment hubs, nor was Iraq involved in sponsoring international jihadist movements. Thus, it is quite plausible to argue that attacking a Muslim nation only tangentially related to the problem, with images of death and destruction broadcast nightly on satellite television, could actually inflame passions, bolster the US-as-crusader propaganda spewed by Bin Laden and increase recruitment capacity and support for jihadists. So, one could reasonably argue, precisely because terrorism is so serious a threat, we should be reluctant to endorse military interventions - reserving them for only the most exigent circumstances. Which is a nice segue to my next point of departure with Marc.

....the question of the circumstances in which the US should attempt to spread democracy answers itself. We should give priority to establishing democratic regimes in those countries from which terrorists who view America as their enemy are most heavily recruited. [emphasis in original]

The first thing I would like to point out from this, is that the Schulman Doctrine would seem to suggest that invading Iraq and attempting to implant democracy was a poor strategic move. In his own words, we should give priority to those countries from which terrorists are most heavily recruited. Well, that would put Iraq just about at the bottom of the list, well below some Western European countries even, such as France, England and Spain. In actual numbers, they might even lag behind the United States. For whatever reason, Iraqis have not traditionally joined jihadist or terrorist movements, whereas second and third generation European Muslims are not an uncommon sighting in the ranks of terrorist organizations. According to profiles of Al Qaeda members by counterterrorism experts like Marc Sageman, the presence of Iraqis in the ranks of Al Qaeda and other Salafist jihadist organizations is, for all intents and purposes, non existent. That, unfortunately and ironically, might change post-invasion.

Interestingly, Marc, as someone who takes the threat of terrorism seriously, and thus under his rubric is quite willing to use military intervention as a tactic, and who claims that we should prioritize our actions to countries from which most terrorists are recruited, seems quite comfortable taking a wait and see/indirect approach with Saudi Arabia - the nation that by his own admission would top the list of priorities. Somehow, though, for a country like Iraq that was not contributing any terrorists, this more cautious approach was unacceptable. This despite the fact that Marc might characterize such an approach with Saudi Arabia as "appeasement that...grants them the time and freedom of action to further threaten American security and repress their people."

People choose to become terrorists. Several academic studies have shown that poverty is not the breeding ground for terrorists; the poor are pre-occupied with sustaining their miserable existence, lack access to the modern ways of delivering propaganda (e.g., the Internet), and don’t possess the education and skills that are in demand by terrorist groups. As evinced by Al-Qaeda's leadership and the 9/11 hijackers, well-educated individuals of above-average means are readily susceptible to recruitment by terrorist organizations. This, along with their countries of birth, lends credence to the argument that authoritarianism breeds terrorism, and the replacement of authoritarian by democratic regimes providing freedom and liberty is the most effective way to reduce the threats to our lives. [emphasis in original]

In his analysis of the root causes of terrorism, I think Marc has it partially right, but he makes a leap of faith that I am not sure is supported by the available evidence. He is correct to note that, somewhat counterintuitively, terrorists are generally not recruited from the ranks of the poor, marginalized or uneducated. As he says, quite the opposite - at least and especially when dealing with international jihadist strains of terrorism, rather than indigenous, national movements. It's the second part of his analysis - "that authoritarianism breeds terrorism" - that is wanting for support. For example, the stark absence of Iraqis from the membership rolls of jihadist terrorist organizations, contrasted with the consistent presence of Muslims born and raised in Western liberal democracies, is a pretty big curveball thrown at that theory. If authoritarianism breeds terrorism, and Saddam was the most brutish authoritarian, where are all the Iraqi terrorists? Similarly, if freedom and liberty are the antidotes to terrorism, why do wave after wave of citizens raised in nations well ahead of the curve in terms of freedom and liberty end up joining terrorist groups?

In a related, though less consequential sense, I think Marc's assessment of the Afghani contributions to the jihadist movement was also a departure from the evidence.

If the Taliban were still in power, the Afghani madrasses would still be teaching hatred of Americans and sending their graduating students to Al-Qaeda camps, where training for further terrorist attacks would be taking place.

In truth, Afghanis like Iraqis, were strangely apathetic to jihadist movements. True, the Taliban was willing to host Bin Laden, but there were almost no Afghanis amongst the ranks of Al Qaeda. Like Iraqis, you don't find Afghanis fighting in the various jihads in Bosnia, Chechnya or Southeast Asia. The place that nourished the jihadist movement throughout much of the 1980s has, oddly enough, not sprouted any homegrown prospects. But I digress.

As a general rule, I think that democracy will help to defuse some of the extremism that fuels terrorism. It will of course, take many many years to realize the fruits of this tree, and democracy promotion is not nearly the instant cure that Schulman makes it out to be. For example, Schulman dismisses the diplomatic routes due to their time-intensive nature:

Can any public diplomacy program – no matter how well thought out -- overcome the obstacles placed in its way by in-country media and religious authorities, the Western media, and NGOs? The most optimistic answer to this question is that it might over a span of many years. But we don’t have many years. Because the threat from terrorism is here and now, we can’t rely on public diplomacy to spread democracy. While soft power may be effective in the long-term, it’s woefully inadequate in the short-term.

But the creation of a democracy itself through military intervention will occur, if we are lucky enough to be successful, over the "span of many years." After that, we must wait for democracy's normalizing effects to permeate the mindset of the population as a whole, which in turn will take many more years. I remain unconvinced that military intervention followed by nation building offers a more direct or expedited route to peace, stability and an end to terrorist activity.

Part of the problem with this analysis is that it ignores the raison d'etre for Al Qaeda and the global Salafist jihadist movement in general. These organizations exist because they believe that the ruling regimes in the Arab world are led by apostates - heretical in the sense that these regimes have departed from the dictates of Sharia law and the mores in place during the time of the prophet Mohammed (the golden age). The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, grew out of reaction to the secular Nasser regime in Egypt, and was reinforced by ideological fellow travelers who were plagued by the perception that the Muslim world's decline compared to the West stemmed from the fact that the Muslim world had strayed from the righteous path. They believe that a return to a quasi-mythical, pan-Muslim caliphate, ruled by the strict dogma of Sharia, will propel Allah's chosen people ahead of the West.

The problem with the democracy-as panacea theory is that these people will not be satisfied by yet another incarnation of secular, non-Sharia, Western-tainted impurity. Democracy, from their point of view, will not return the umma to Allah's good graces. The hope is that over time, and through inclusion in the political process, they will come to appreciate democracy, but in the short term, the Salafists will be just as determined to try to bring about their mystical caliphate -through terrorism and other means depending on the asymmetry of power. In fact, in some ways, a nascent democracy is less adept at curtailing terrorism than a police state. So in the short term, the terrorist threat could be worse at the onset of the democratization of the Muslim world. In Iraq, the situation is even worse. We have created a failed state where one did not exist, allowing lawlessness and terrorism to thrive, while the Iraqi government and coalition forces struggle to contain the violence.

Worse still, and along the lines of the argument that military action can exacerbate the terrorist situation, Iraq has now replaced Afghanistan as the central hub for the training, recruitment, indoctrination and networking for aspiring jihadists. Although we obliterated one such locus of activity in Kabul, we have replaced it with Baghdad. When the conflict in Iraq ends, and the flypaper loses its stickiness, Al Qaeda 2.0 will be unleashed on the world.

Here are some relevant quotes that I cited in a post that dealt extensively with this subject:

First Brian Ulrich:

...[P]eople turn to terrorism as a tactic because they can't achieve their goals through other means....By the same principle, the non-Muslims people like Bin Laden see as enemies can't be defeated by conventional military means. Therefore, people turn to terrorism. So there is something of a link. This does not mean that spreading democracy will end terrorism, because if the terrorists feel they still won't get their way, they'll continue to be terrorists. Abu Musab Zarqawi is making this point rather effectively in Iraq.

Then Matt Yglesias:

...[P]eople with goals that cannot be achieved through the ballot box -- disputes involving ethnic or sectarian minorities figure prominently in this -- aren't going to be impressed by democracy. What I think it's important to emphasize, however, is...the simple fact that whatever forces of social alienation explain extremism's appeal, they're perfectly consistent with the existence of democracy as in France.

And Matt from a related post:

...[A] lot of your radicalized Arabs in the world are people of (mostly North African) Arab origin living in Europe and, especially, France with its large Muslim population. Whatever these people are so mad about, it's not that the country they live in isn't democratic. Many of them were born in Europe, or spent most of their lives there...

And this, after all, should come as no surprise. The terrorists of the IRA and the ETA (and whatever you call that Corsican terrorist group) live in democracies as well. The[y] object to the ground rules of democratic politics as practiced in Northern Ireland or Spain (or wherever) for what are basically unrelated reasons. Malaysia and Indonesia have given birth to more than there fair share of terrorists, and while neither quite counts as a fully paid-up member of the democratic brotherhood, both are far from being the most autocratic states in the Middle East. Indeed, harsh dictatorships like Syria and Iraq have barely generated any terrorists whatsoever, though the Syrian government maintains ties to Lebanese-born people involved in Hezbollah who retain a robust terrorism capacity. But the actual Hezbollah members are Lebanese, and while they certainly grew up under some adverse conditions (to offer and understatement) Lebanon has never been one of your more iron-fisted Arab dictatorships.

And this from an invaluable article in Foreign Policy by Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers:

"Middle East Democracy Is the Cure for Islamist Terrorism"

No. This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism.

History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country's history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government's promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country's stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region....

The experience of countries in different regions makes clear that terrorist groups can operate for sustained periods even in successful democracies, whether it is the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the ETA (Basque separatists) in Spain. The ETA gained strength during the first two decades of Spain's democratization process, flourishing more than it had under the dictatorship of Gen. Francisco Franco. In fragile democratic states - as new Arab democracies would likely be for years - radical groups committed to violence can do even more harm, often for long periods, as evidenced by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or the Maoist rebels in Nepal.

Therefore, I believe that overall Marc's willingness to employ military intervention follows from a flawed set of premises regarding how quickly and to what totality democracy can neutralize terrorism - especially in light of his critique of the use of soft power as too time consuming. I also think he completely ignored the issue of cost in terms of economic and military assets and political capital at home and abroad.

There are other minor issues that I could raise with Marc's post, like the fact that he attributes too much to Western media in terms of promoting anti-Americanism and not enough to actual US policies that wouldn't be popular no matter what the Times' editorial page said (read: for example, Newsweek's gaffe did less to spark anger than did actual US policies, as listed by conservative columnist Anne Applebaum, that sought to exploit the religious proclivities of detainees, as well as the actual incidents of Koran mishandling that the Army acknoweldged. Not to mention, say, Israel.). And that he takes as fact the somewhat dubious assumption that the inspections/sanctions regime in Iraq would have inevitably expired (and I suppose we were helpless to alter this course). But I believe that the above represents the most substantive and basic points of divergence (against the backdrop of two people that believe in the mission of democracy, and probably agree on more than we disagree on).

[Update: Marc's first rebuttal is up, and I would recommend it to all. He makes some very good counterpunches that I will have to try to address tomorrow (or tonight). He also composes a valuable introductory, point by point recounting of where and on what we agree. Reading that list makes me realize that we really are closer in opinion than the above might suggest, and I don't want to create an impression otherwise.]

The good folks at the Daily Demarche have invited bloggers from the Left and the Right to pair up for a series of cross-blog debates on the intimidatingly open-ended topic of "the future of global democracy and the role that the United States should play in the spread of democracy to oppressed or less developed nations" - as the issue was framed by the authors of the Daily Demarche. I've paired up with Marc Schulman of American Future - a thoughtful, reasonable, right of center voice and a mainstay in the TIA blogroll for many months (ed note: I am borrowing liberally from Marc's own introductory paragraphs since I believe he provided a succinct summary and our respective mission is essentially the same - but most importantly, he sanctioned such blatant thievery).

While I am certain we will disagree on the particulars, Marc and I believe that America does have a role in spreading democracy. As such, neither of us are isolationists, and we mostly reject the realist notion that the internal affairs of other nations are of no consequence to our country. Thus, our debate will likely center around issues such as these:

- In what circumstances should the US attempt to spread democracy?

-What means should the US employ in attempting to spread democracy?

-While attempting to spread democracy, what are the constraints that the US should abide by?

In our initial posts, Marc and I will stake out our positions on these (and other) issues. Subsequently, I'll respond to his post and he'll react to mine to the extent that there is any disagreement, additional comment or fine tuning necessary. Marc's first post can be found here.

Someone's Been Eating My Porridge

The hunt for the terrorists is a technical matter, and we must hope that our military has enough virtue left from the Clinton ravages to do the job. But we should have no misgivings about our ability to destroy tyrannies. It is what we do best. It comes naturally to us, for we are the one truly revolutionary country in the world, as we have been for more than 200 years. Creative destruction is our middle name. We do it automatically, and that is precisely why the tyrants hate us, and are driven to attack us.

-Michael Ledeen

We need to sustain our game face, we must keep our fangs bared, we must remind them daily that we Americans are in a rage, and we will not rest until we have avenged our dead, we will not be sated until we have had the blood of every miserable little tyrant in the Middle East, until every leader of every cell of the terror network is dead or locked securely away, and every last drooling anti-Semitic and anti-American mullah, imam, sheikh, and ayatollah is either singing the praises of the United States of America, or pumping gasoline, for a dime a gallon, on an American military base near the Arctic Circle.[...]

Don't kid yourself. We can still blow this thing, big-time. Every few days we show alarming signs of being "reasonable," and "evenhanded," apparently because somebody forgot that that's what got us into this mess in the first place. We must be imperious, ruthless, and relentless. No compromise with evil; we want total surrender. Once the ink's dry on the surrender documents, then we can start thinking about the best way to build theme parks in underground-tunnel networks.

Back at the beginning of our war, when I insisted that this was going to be a vast revolutionary war, and that we would transform the entire Middle East, few were inclined to agree. Now it is just barely over the horizon, but the tyrants, who are always looking as far ahead as they can, can already see it, and they are very frightened. The latest word from Tehran is that the mullahs are afraid that they will have the same destiny as the Taliban.

And why not? They even look the same. [emphasis added]

-Michael Ledeen (hat tip: praktike in both instances)

Considering today's political realities, with various geopolitical hotspots, crises and conflicts simmering and bubbling over, proclaiming that one supports the spread of democracy is a loaded statement to say the least. With almost every political faction and niche greedily carving up the rhetorical trappings of democracy promotion and trying to horde them for their own, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ascertain a consensus position on what exactly "spreading democracy" entails.

Given the borderline sadistic, and blatantly militaristic, waxings of Right wing ideologues like Michael Ledeen (as cited above), Norman "World War IV" Podhoretz, Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol, David Frum, Richard Perle and others, who are beating their own bellicose drum of democracy it is understandable that many on the Left in America have become increasingly uncomfortable in the political skin that has been their traditional legacy: the championing of democracy, human rights, justice, the rule of law, an end to the tyranny of the few, and powerful, and respect and dignity for all persons.

With these lingering misgivings in mind, allow me to state emphatically that I support the promotion of democracy, or perhaps more accurately, the empowerment of people to create a more dignified, responsive and just political life through a democratic system of government.

In coming to this position, I rely on a few philosophical foundations - a very rudimentary summary of which follows. First, I believe that humans require a sovereign of some sort. In the absence of some organizing principle and force, the state of anarchy that follows leads to a chaotic application of force to achieve various competing goals, with those groups most willing to rely on brute strength exerting their will on others. Rather than adopt a Hobbesian pessimism or a Lockeian optimism, I think that human beings are fundamentally good...and bad. That is, depending on the cumulative effect of genetic predispositions, incentives and environmental stimuli, human beings will behave in ways that cut across the spectrum of good and evil so no one answer, philosophy, religion or system can adequately respond to all human exigencies. On top of that, power corrupts even the most noble of spirits, and when power is concentrated in the hands of a few, oppression inevitably follows.

As such, some external restraint, or government, is necessary. To date, and through the evolution of the political process, liberal democracy has emerged as the optimal form in terms of preserving the rule of law, human rights, justice, dignity and personal liberty through the clever diffusion of political power to various epicenters and institutions, the creation of effective checks and balances and the establishment of controlling documents enshrining human rights and a system of laws to enforce these precepts without arbitrary whim. Liberal democracy is not perfect by a long shot and, contra-Fukuyama's End Of History thesis, the process of political and economic evolution is probably far from over, but in terms of political systems thus devised, I defy the reader to name one better.

The fear in making such a conclusory statement from my vantage point in a liberal democracy is that the I may come across as hopelessly politically ethnocentric - so buttressed by my own cultural bias as to arrogantly assume I know best. These concerns are real, and many a disaster has been wrought at the hands of those with an excess of certainty who thought they had discovered "the way," but this circumspection should not deter us from embracing the general premise. This skepticism must, however, inform the decisions we make when adopting strategies to enable other people to realize their own political autonomy, freedom and representation. It is the difference between imposing these views in a bloody, high death toll campaign and exerting pressure and influence to allow others to express these sentiments for themselves.

Paving The Road With Good Intentions

Now that I sound like a card carrying, American Enterprise Institute endowed, neo-conservative, let me take it one step beyond: Michael Ledeen was right when he said that toppling tyrannies is what we do best - or at least very very well. Our unrivaled military might, the quality of our soldiers and the expertise of our military leaders have secured for the United States the ability to take down almost any governing regime in the world should the necessity arise. Unfortunately, too many people, like Ledeen, focus on this might and assume that the mastery of this half of the equation is enough to make up for our inability to adequately address the second half: nation building. After all, it's more exhilaratinging to spend time doting on this military prowess and planning near-certain battlefield exploits than it is to trudge through the mundane tedium and endless labyrinth of the war's aftermath - especially when the creation of democracy is the goal.

This isn't necessarily a weakness that is unique to the United States, however. Trying to create, establish or enable democracies requires patience, a generous allotment of time measured in decades, careful planning with the ability to cede control when necessary, cultural sensitivity (and knowledge), enormous amounts of money, cooperation from allies, neighbors and the indigenous population, a dash of salt, the kitchen sink and a whole lot of luck. More often than not, the emergence of successful and lasting democracies must be preceded by, or at least arise concomitantly with, strong institutional undergirdings like moderately healthy economic institutions and a decent distribution of wealth, a free press, an independent judiciary, an informed public, a vibrant civil society, etc. Absent these factors, and even when these conditions are present, democratic transformation is a violent, unpredictable and often temporary phenomenon. Nadezhda, as usual, adds to the discussion:

It's one thing for Bush/Cheney to appropriate the liberation=freedom=democracy theme for political purposes. They and the neocons seem, however, to have bought their own propaganda. Do they truly fail to grasp that major liberalization in the economic sphere and democratization in the political sphere are revolutions -- with all the turmoil and violence (socially and economically if not physically) that comes with revolutions. These liberalizing events are not orderly, sequential transfers of power from one group to another who then operate, going forward, under a new, coherent set of "rules of the road".

As more and more people recognize explicitly, the creation of new institutional structures or transformation of old ones is a much longer process -- generational turnover required at the least. But what much of the discussion about democratization seems to ignore is that institutional structures don't simply grow according to the original genetic code they are given at their initial creation. They arise in response to their environment (which at least at the start is a revolutionary one), are shaped by revolutionary outcomes, and in turn shape the environment to come.

Given how complex, difficult, tumultuous and fragile the process is, even under optimal conditions, there is little wonder that our track record for success has been relatively abysmal when we attempt to democracy-build at the barrel of a gun. As is my habit, I turn to Fukuyama:

America has been involved in approximately 18 nation-building projects between its conquest of the Philippines in 1899 and the current occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the overall record is not a pretty one. The cases of unambiguous success-Germany, Japan, and South Korea-were all ones in which U.S. forces came and then stayed indefinitely. In the first two cases, we were not nation-building at all, but only re-legitimizing societies that had very powerful states. In all of the other cases, the U.S. either left nothing behind in terms of self-sustaining institutions, or else made things worse by creating, as in the case of Nicaragua, a modern army and police but no lasting rule of law.

Now that the justifications for the invasion of Iraq have shifted from imminent threats, non-existent nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and illusory ties to Al Qaeda and other international jihadist organizations, many Bush supporters contend that the real reason for the invasion was to establish a democracy in Iraq that would serve as the first toppled domino in a pending chain reaction. With this in mind, Iraq offers a case study of why democracy promotion through military campaign is so difficult to effectuate.

Part of the problem lies with the particular condition of Iraq as a nation before the invasion: there was, contra Paul Wolfowitz' assurances to Congress, a real history of ethnic animosity in Iraq arising from decades under which the Shiite and Kurdish populations suffered the often brutal and murderous repression of Saddam Hussein's predominately Sunni Baath party. On top of that, as Wolfowitz acknowledged in an interview recounted in the most recent edition of The Atlantic, "the institutions [were] rotten to the core." Trying to build instant institutions out of a vacuum, and instill in a people the notions of mutual respect, restraint and respect for minority rights overnight within the context of decades of pent up rage, as was required in Iraq and would be in most democracy building projects that result from invasion, makes an already difficult endeavor seem nearly impossible - or at least monumentally costly.

Factor into this the fact that any military campaign results in collateral damage and the death and disfigurement of thousands of members of the local population (in the present case over 100,000 dead and counting and many times that number injured. Keep in mind, these tragedies are felt by relatives and friends greatly magnifying the number effected), and that occupation and counterinsurgency are intrinsically brutal, alienating, and violent, and it is easy to see that the indigenous population rarely supports such a mission wholeheartedly for a long duration of time. Suffice to say, there has been a considerable crisis in legitimacy for the occupation forces all along. To quote publius:

This is why the idea of legitimacy is so important. It's not some hippie idea that we espouse because we love flowers and freedom. Legitimacy is important because it promotes stability, prevents chaos, and keeps people from getting killed. Remember that the goal of a political or legal system is to get people to give up violence. But people won't do this if they see the system as illegitimate or unresponsive to their needs. If people don't have an investment or some say-so in the workings of government, it is impossible for that government to channel and defuse the desire for force. The disaffected will reject it and pursue force outside of the system.

The Iraq campaign suffered from a two-fold lack of legitimacy: there was no support from international law or any major international organization such as NATO or the UN (not to mention the overwhelming opposition of public opinion throughout the globe), and on top of that, the US occupation in Iraq itself is viewed with mistrust, suspicion and forced tolerance from our ostensible allies (the Shiites and Kurds) and open hostility and violence from the Sunni population that felt isolated from the process (and revanchist in their aspirations). As such, stability and peace have been hard to come by.

Nevertheless, some would be democracy-philes on the Right were quick to seize on the elections this January as a sign that democracy had taken root. I would counsel such pollyanna's to take measure of Nadezhda's warnings above, and to realize the folly of equating one election (or even many) with such a mutlifaceted creature as liberal democracy. Note Paul Wolfowitz's response to a question on the subject:

"Was the election an expression of a desire for democracy," I asked, "or was it primarily tribal - the Shiites finally getting the chance to assert their majority status?"

"Well, that is not undemocratic," Wolfowitz said.

No, it's not undemocratic per se, but it very likely will end up being such without the proper institutional protections and without the embrace of the concept of respect for minority rights that should accompany any functioning democracy that exists within ethnically diverse societies. It is possible that Iraq will develop these institutional foundations, as well as a nationalistic spirit that can supersede the pull of sectarian and ethnic identification - thus avoiding a protracted civil war and political uncertainty. For this to occur, however, the United States must continue to dedicate tremendous sums of money and a large portion of our military assets over several years, more likely to be measured in decades than months - the latter being the metric of time preferred by Vice President Cheney when making rose-tinted, pre-war predictions about American commitment in the theater.

And I haven't even mentioned the reckless neglect of comprehensive post-war planning that so greatly hindered an already daunting task. Again Nadezhda:

This misunderstanding of "nature vs nurture" and the timing mismatch between letting the genie out of the bottle and building reliable, predictable, orderly institutions, seems to have been at the heart of much of the CPA bungling. Some of them indeed recognized that institutions take time to build -- hence their plans for a 4-5 year CPA control period with gradual handover of authority to Iraqis as they became "ready" to manage specific functions. But Bremer and the CPA were slow to realize they wouldn't have the luxury of time. Rather than create an orderly transformation, they added to disorder by getting rid of the old regime's arrangements and starting down a path of planned sequences of eventually having a good set of "rules of the road" and modern, efficient ministries, legal and political institutions. And when it became clear their days as official controllers were numbered, their priorities were on leaving behind a set of immutable rules and marginalizing/destroying the "anti-order" revolutionary forces. They were creating more vacuums rather than encouraging the Iraqis in favor of establishing an orderly system to start filing vacuums that were already created by the overthrow of the regime and the CPA's activities for a year.

Bang For The Buck

The lessons to be drawn from both the successful nation building exercises (Japan, Germany) and those of less tangible success, is that accomplishing such a Herculean task as establishing a credible, functioning democracy through a post-invasion nation building effort requires decades of hard work, commitment and a ton of money. But as Nadezhda pointed out in the paragraph above, the luxury of time is not always with an occupying force, especially in a region of the world where there is an inherent hostility to our presence, nor is the luxury of time always afforded by the American electorate who might lose patience with so many revenue draining, troop exhausting, long term projects. As such, nation building in the aftermath of military expedition is not a cost effective or realistic policy to embrace from a military, economic or political point of view.

Nevertheless, the usual suspects on the Right are clamoring for such actions in Syria, Iran and, depending on the ideologue, many other points in between. Further, as Fukuyama and others have pointed out, Japan and Germany had pre-existing institutions that needed rehabilitation more than creation ex nihilo, and as such were easier to transform than the countries currently in the crosshairs of the crusading democrats - making those analogies even less applicable. As if that wasn't enough, the current unilateralist posturing of the Bush administration has left us with few cooperative allies when so many are needed for our current commitments, let alone any future endeavors. Put in stronger terms, I don't think our plummeting worldwide image could withstand the blow that would result from the public outcry over yet another pre-emptive invasion - no matter how it were justified.

So then, absent military action, what can aspiring democracy proponents turn to? The only plausible solutions reside in the somewhat nebulous world of soft power and the assorted carrots and sticks of diplomacy. The good news is, these strategies have enjoyed greater success than the militaristic approach. As Michael Lind points out:

The record is clear--most of the democratic transitions that have taken place in the world in the past two centuries have had nothing to do with foreign military intervention or military pressure, while most US military interventions abroad have left dictatorship, not democracy, in their wake....The Soviet bloc democratized itself from within in the 1990s, even though the United States did not bomb Moscow, impose a martial-law governor on the Poles or imprison former Hungarian Communist officials without charges in barbed-wire camps. In Latin America, Mexico became a multiparty democracy instead of a one-party dictatorship without US Marines posing for photos in the presidential mansion in Mexico City, and it was not necessary for American soldiers to kill tens of thousands of Argentines, Chileans and Brazilians for democracy to take root in those countries.

...[It] is likely that, if and when liberal democracy comes to the Muslim world in general and to the Arab world in particular, the gradual, largely bloodless transition will resemble those in Soviet Europe and Latin America and will not be the result of US military action or intimidation. The neocons--and the humanitarian hawks on the left--are simply wrong about how best to spread democracy.

The diplomatic/soft power approach enjoys the advantage of encouraging the growth of institutions, and popular will, conducive to the successful establishment of democracy before such a cataclysmic event as a sudden regime change imposed by an outside force. It is a more natural evolution, and as such, these institutions emerge organically with the "DNA" of the particular culture out of which it grows - not the oft harsh imposition of a foreign system on a native population. This creates a stronger skeletal structure to be fleshed out by a culture-specific form of liberal democracy.

Unfortunately, these approaches have been largely ignored by the Bush administration with the military and rebuilding campaigns in Iraq absorbing the lion's share of attention, resources and thought. The few diplomatic efforts made - the Al Hurrah television station and the politicization of the Voice of America radio broadcasts for example - have been underfunded, poorly designed and almost completely ineffectual.

Thus, to correct these shortcomings, and more effectively address our goals, we should provide incentive and to the extent possible buttress those movements that struggle from within tyrannies to realize the spoils of liberal democracy. That being said, not all approaches along these lines are equal. There has recently been some intelligent criticism of the efforts to fund civil society programs in the Muslim world as a means to induce democratic change from the likes of Marc "Abu Aardvark" Lynch, Dan Drezner and Steven Cook.

The criticisms fall into three main camps: First, the groups who receive this funding begin to cater their programs to the donors, often targeting issues that appeal more to foreign sensibilities than to the local populations. Thus, they have not been able to build strong consensus from the peoples they are supposed to be targeting. Second, the governments in the region have been able to manipulate the system through an alternating strategy of cooptation and repression. Where possible, the governments take these civil society NGOs under their wing (as well as the possibly destabilizing entrepreneurial class), which in turn neuters their criticisms and efficacy as agents of change. Alternatively, if a group grows too strident, powerful or independent, it is shut down swiftly. Third, the image of the United States (which has never been too well thought of in the region) has grown so poisonous that any group or organization associated with us instantly loses credibility with the local populations. We end up hurting the very people we are trying to help merely by virtue of our assistance. It's as if we would be better served by making a series of charitable donations under the "anonymous" designation.

Then of course, there is the problem of NGOs and civil society groups that are hostile to US interests, like Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Should we also fund these groups and would our attempt to isolate them fuel their image as the independent, authentic and attractive alternative to the ruling regime.

At this point I must interject this bit of advice because I would be remiss to omit it from the overall equation. As a backdrop to any and all democracy promotion policies, we must take pains to improve our image, legitimacy and credibility worldwide. Without such progress, we abandon one of the more potent democracy-inducing weapons in our arsenal: our own country as an advertisement of what liberal democracy can create. On the one hand, this might mean actually altering certain policies, and on the other it might mean toning down the gratuitously confrontational, dismissive, triumphalistic and unilateralist rhetoric that has been the mainstay of the Bush administration and its supporters over the past four years and before. At the very least, we shouldn't go out of our way to insult allies and international organizations by, say, appointing John Bolton to the ambassadorship of the UN. As I have argued numerous times before, the legitimacy of our actions in they eyes of the world, or the lack thereof, will either provide great assistance to our grand designs or frustrate them continuously depending on which side of the coin is facing up. Bush ally John Lewis Gaddis offers some sage advice:

It is always a bad idea to confuse power with wisdom: muscles are not brains. It is never a good idea to insult potential allies, however outrageous their behavior may have been. Nor is it wise to regard consultation as the endorsement of a course already set. The Bush administration was hardly the first to commit these errors. It was the first, however, to commit so many so often in a situation in which help from friends could have been so useful.

Another lesson relates to language. The president and his advisers preferred flaunting U.S. power to explaining its purpose. To boast that one possesses and plans to maintain "strengths beyond challenge" may well be accurate, but it mixes arrogance with vagueness, an unsettling combination. Strengths for what purpose? Challenges from what source? Cold War presidents were careful to answer such questions. Bush, during his first term, too often left it to others to guess the answers. In his second, he will have to provide them.

Funding NGOs and civil society programs, coupled with improving our image and the perception of our legitimacy, are not magic bullets unto themselves, but they are an important piece of the puzzle.

Let's Talk Turkey

Stephen Cook, in an article in Foreign Affairs, offers an intriguing suggestion for realigning our priorities in terms of strategy to effect change. Instead of continuing with the dysfunctional system of NGOs and civil society groups that have been watered down, outwardly directed and ineffectual, Cook suggests that we should switch to a system of carrots and sticks akin to what the EU offered Turkey in order to gain admission to the EU:

Perhaps the best example of a successful incentive-based approach is with Turkey, which has long sought to join the European Union. When Turkey petitioned the EU for membership, Brussels responded by setting clear political, economic, legal, and social standards for Ankara to meet first. The huge benefits offered by EU membership created a vast constituency for reform in Turkey. As a result, the Turkish parliament has been able to pass eight reform packages in the last three years. Turkey's Islamists have come to support the program, which they see as their best chance for securing formal political protections. The Islamists have cleverly recognized that, since the EU demands that its members institutionalize freedom of religion, Turkey, to become a candidate, will have to loosen government control on religious expression and Islamist political participation. Meanwhile, Turkey's long-dominant military has also signed on to the reform project. Although some of the changes demanded by Brussels will reduce the military's influence, Turkey's general staff has realized that it cannot oppose the project without looking like an enemy of modernization--something the inheritors of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's legacy cannot afford.

While the US cannot offer membership to the EU, we can offer, or use our influence to produce offers, for membership in other attractive international organizations and treaty groups. Such incentivized systems must be tailored on a country by country basis depending on the particular needs, goals and aspirations of the ruling regime:

To be realistic, there are limits to what incentive-based policies can achieve. Offering new military aid will be more effective with Egypt and Jordan than with Morocco or Saudi Arabia, for example. Saudi Arabia needs the money much less and has such a critical strategic position that it can better resist pressure from the United States. As for Morocco, it is one of the few Arab states that has a viable alternative to the United States as a patron: Europe...

In the multilateral arena, the United States could offer to sponsor Arab participation in clubs such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), NATO's Partnership for Peace, or a new Community of Democracies--if, that is, Arab states first agreed to conduct serious political liberalization and economic reform. With the WTO, for example, the United States, in concert with its European allies, could require potential Arab members to embrace specific reforms--beyond what the WTO already requires--in return for U.S. and European support for their candidacies.

The advantage of this approach, if adopted, is that it forces the ruling regime to create political space, an opening into which home-grown movements can emerge. Instead of NGOs looking to the West for funding, and making decisions from a top-down perch, they can turn their gaze inward, and free speech and press measures will allow for the natural birth of political movements, bottom up, from within. This will solve the American-stigma issue, and the problem of provoking rejectionist postures from people who resent being told what to do. We offer a framework for liberalization, and let the country in question craft the particulars - should they choose to do so. By improving on this "connectivity" as per Thomas Barnett, we can provide a network for peaceful engagement and mutual improvement. In addition to these type of incentive based models, we can begin to structure our foreign aid packages to provide more weight to the decisions taken to move toward real democratic change or not.

In summary, we should eschew the calls to impose democracy on others through the use of military force because the success rate for such ventures is low, and even when successful it is far too costly in terms of the drain on economic and military assets, coupled with the commitment of time required. And of course, imposing democracy in such a fashion inevitably results in death and injury to tens of thousands (though probably more) of the people you are intending to help - a part of the equation which undermines the moral arguments for attempting to create liberal democracy as a way of improving lives (death is not an improvement). Thus, we should continue to employ our diplomatic and soft power tools, while making a deliberate effort to repair our image and the perception that we act with legitimacy on the world stage. In order to accomplish these tasks, we should be open to creative suggestions and acknowledge that such is an imperfect process and one that contains its own daunting complexities and difficulties. But the alternative is clearly worse.

In my post yesterday, I took a glance at how some of the more principled denizens of the Conserva-sphere were handling the Amnesty International gulag-flap as well as the issue of detainee torture, rape and murder in general. Today I want to cast a glance at conservative pundit land - what James Wolcott might call attack poodleville. In particular, two recent columns by two separate pundits provide for an interesting contrast in hacktacularity.

First, and by all means foremost, is right leaning but reasonable Anne Applebaum with an honest appraisal of the situation in Guantanamo Bay and abroad, especially in relation to the Newsweek mini-scandal and related media firestorm (via publius). Her point is a valid one, and one that makes all the hand wringing about Newsweek and Amnesty International seem like the empty show of political theater that it is.

Now, it is possible that no interrogator at Guantanamo Bay ever flushed pages of the Koran down the toilet, as the now-retracted Newsweek story reported -- although several former Guantanamo detainees have alleged just that. It is also possible that Newsweek reporters relied too much on an uncertain source, or that the magazine confused the story with (confirmed) reports that prisoners themselves used Korans to block toilets as a form of protest.

But surely the larger point is not the story itself but that it was so eminently plausible, in Pakistan, Afghanistan and everywhere else. And it was plausible precisely because interrogation techniques designed to be offensive to Muslims were used in Iraq and Guantanamo, as administration and military officials have also confirmed. For example:

· Dogs. Military interrogators deployed them specifically because they knew Muslims consider dogs unclean. In a memo signed by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez in September 2003, and available online, the then-commander in Iraq actually approved using the technique to "exploit Arab fear of dogs."

· Nudity. We know (and the Muslim world knows) from the Abu Ghraib photographs that nudity has been used to humiliate Muslim men. More important, we know that nudity was also approved as an interrogation technique by Donald Rumsfeld himself. He signed off on a November 2002 policy memo, later revised but also available online, that specifically listed "removal of clothing" as a permissible, "category II" interrogation technique, along with "removal of facial hair," also a technique designed to offend Muslims who wear beards.

· Sexual harassment. The military's investigation of U.S. detention and interrogation practices, led by Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III, stated that at Guantanamo there were "two female interrogators who, on their own initiative, touched and spoke to detainees in a sexually suggestive manner in order to incur stress based on the detainees' religious beliefs." Although the report said both had been reprimanded, there is no doubt, again, that the tactic was designed for men whose religion prohibits them from having contact with women other than their wives.

· Fake menstrual blood. When former detainees began claiming that they had been smeared with menstrual blood intended to make them "unclean" and therefore unable to pray, their lawyers initially dismissed the story as implausible. But the story has been confirmed by Army Sgt. Erik Saar, a former Guantanamo translator, who told the Associated Press that in a forthcoming book he will describe a female interrogator who smeared a prisoner with red ink, claimed it was menstrual blood and left, saying, "Have a fun night in your cell without any water to clean yourself."

There is no question that these were tactics designed to offend, no question that they were put in place after 2001 and no question that many considered them justified. Since the Afghan invasion, public supporters of "exceptional" interrogation methods have argued that in the special, unusual case of the war on terrorism, we may have to suspend our fussy legality, ignore our high ideals and resort to some unpleasant tactics that our military had never used. Opponents of these methods, among them some of the military's own interrogation experts, have argued, on the contrary, that "special methods" are not only ineffective but counterproductive: They might actually inspire Muslim terrorists instead of helping to defeat them. They might also make it easier, say, for fanatics in Jalalabad to use two lines of a magazine article to incite riots.

Good point. When viewed in a list format, it becomes hard to deny that there was a consistent pattern of using Islam as a lever to get recalcitrant detainees to speak - or so was the plan at least for some. Perhaps this was part of a tactic known as Pride and Ego Down, a term used by a civilian Defense Department employee in sworn statements given to Pentagon investigators last summer. Recounting a conversation with an Abu Ghraib interrogator:

"I gave him examples of approaches including Pride and Ego Down where an interrogator [in Afghanistan] took a Koran, threw it on the floor and stepped on it ...

No matter the ultimate source of this questionable strategy which unwisely utilizes religion as a weapon, you can imagine my shock and awe when I came across a recent column in the June 2 edition of the New York Post by conservative hack Michelle Malkin, dubiously entitled, The Truth About Guantanamo Bay, with the subtitle, An Excess of Sensitivity (note: the NY Post did not put this column up online, and the subtitle does not appear in the linked mirror). Let that sink in for a moment. An Excess of Sensitivity. The biggest flaw in our stewardship of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, according to Malkin, is actually too much sensitivity to Islam.

Amazing. Malkin goes on to cite one of the same sources Anne Applebaum relies on, but to different ends:

Erik Saar, who served as an army sergeant at Gitmo for six months and co-authored a negative, tell-all book about his experience titled "Inside the Wire," inadvertently provides us more firsthand details showing just how restrained, and sensitive to Islam - to a fault, I believe - the officials at the detention facility have been. [emphasis added]

Nevermind Saar's story about the fake menstrual blood incident, or the other examples Applebaum points to, because Saar also tells of halal meals, the provision of a prayer mat, cap and Koran, calls to prayer five times a day and an arrow painted in each cell pointing to Mecca. Well then, I'd say on balance we're being too sensitive to the religious proclivities of these captives. To a fault in fact. Malkin's advice to Rumsfeld and Bush: get tough on these Muslims already and stop pampering their every religious whim. These are the views, she would have us believe, of the true and patriotic Americans - not those treasonous "liberals" who carry on about human rights, due process and have such soft stomachs when it comes to torture. Malkin's final salvo:

Guantanamo Bay will not be the death of this country. The unseriousness and hypocrisy of the terrorist-abetting Left is a far greater threat.

Really? I think Malkin's recipe for human rights and the rule of law would make a pretty interesting omelette.

I think Praktike is right, that Amnesty International made a strategic blunder by evoking the Soviet-run network of prisons ranging throughout the "gulag" archipelago to describe the detention facility at Guantanamo. Yes, there are certain similarities in the sense that both are extra-judicial prison systems. There is at least the specter of indefinite detention without due process at Guantanamo (though the Supreme Court will eventually intercede to halt this in my opinion) and thus far Guantanamo, and other facilities, have been the sites of incidents of violence, torture and homicide delivered at the hands of US officials. But the difference in the magnitude of horrors at the Soviet helmed gulags (millions killed, millions more suffered heinous conditions and abuse that exceed most of the more damning reports from Guantanamo) makes the comparison so strained as to render it devoid of meaning - or so wanting in clarifications of nuance that it becomes an unwieldy analogy that requires extensive unpacking every time it is trotted out.

Then again, Amnesty did end up drawing the media's attention to a report on conditions at Guantanamo that would have otherwise gone unnoticed and ignored in favor of the ongoing Jackson trial, a runaway bride, and/or the child abduction/amber alert du jour. I'm not sure whether such sensationalist human rights campaigning is a net positive, but it has sparked a conversation for better or for worse. My fear is that the overreach provides an out for the Bush administration and its supporters. As Praktike points out, the Amnesty flap allows the Bush team and its allies to jump up and down crying foul while distracting everyone's attention from the real story: that there is an unsettling pattern of widespread prisoner abuse, torture, sexual assault, rape, sodomy and murder occurring in US detention facilities spanning the globe from Guantanamo to Bagram (note: that is a more complete list of incidents that often gets redacted to the more neutral sounding "abuse" or the slightly more negatively connotative "torture" while in reality, the particulars are more damning than the chosen euphemisms). Point in fact: Bush actually called the entire Amnesty report absurd based on the "gulag" comment, despite the fact that some of the allegations in the report have been confirmed by military reports and investigations.

This post-modernist tap dance is an all too familiar one for the Bush administration - look here at this shiny distraction rather than those uncomfortable facts and that nasty story. The basic schemata: 1) If an administration insider and/or lifelong Republican makes statements that run counter to the Bush administration's outlook, personally attack the messengers and paint them as ideological foes to discredit the story as the product of bias while ignoring the particulars and facts of the allegations (see: Paul O'Neill, John DiIulio, Richard Clarke, Joe Wilson, etc.); 2) If possible, seize on some erroneous or dubious reporting of a story to discredit the veracity of the underlying events despite the fact that the truthfulness of said story stands independent of the shoddy reporting (see: Koran desecration, incidents of which have been acknowledged and reported in military inquiries/Newsweek's improper sourcing, Bush's spotty National Guard service documented by the papers released by the White House/forged "Dan Rather" memos); and finally, 3) Latch on to some statement, advertisement, image, or gesture by some group loosely aligned with some of your political opponents to tar the entire opposition with the same brush, and if possible discredit an entire line of critique or particular story (see: Ward Churchill, ad submitted for a MoveOn.org reader contest equating Bush with Hitler, etc.). The Amnesty gaffe, to the extent it is one, falls into category three.

This tripartite represents a vein of coal mined to fuel the furnaces of cognitive dissonance - the granite quarried to construct the impermeable citadel of groupthink. Undoubtedly, the pull of groupthink and the siren's song of cognitive dissonance are powerful seducers that everyone, including and especially myself, fall victim to from time to time. That is why it is that much more impressive to see some on the Right break ranks with their fellow ideological brethren to forcefully, and unequivocally, condemn the torture, murder, rape, etc., that has been committed by US intelligence and military personnel in US run detention facilities worldwide - despite the President's attempt to run interference. The fact that such condemnations would represent a break from the norm is depressing to no end, but such is the profoundly disappointing state of discourse in American politics.

Despite the occasionally gratuitous jab at the Left, Greg Djerejian sums up the importance - and more importantly lack thereof - of Amnesty's gulag comment in this commendable post. In a separate post, though, he draws attention to two very worthwhile endeavors. First, Phil Carter, along with two co-authors, has compiled an interactive, searchable database covering the full parameters of this ongoing scandal - complete with copies of documents and commentary on the legal justifications for torture, military inquiries into the abuse, charts outlining chain of command, and much much more. I would recommend that you bookmark this site as a one-stop resource on this subject. I did.

Next, is this breath of fresh air from a group of right leaning libertarians that Greg links to in order to cure the feelings of "loneliness" he's been battling with as a result of his being on the Right politically and, oddly enough, opposed to the torture, rape, sodomy and murder of detainees. Something of a novelty these days. But alas, even the authors of that site have felt the sting of sharp criticism from their ideological fellow travelers which caused one of the site's authors, McQ, to pen an articulate response to the "outraged at the outrage" crowd.

According to McQ, the criticisms fall into these major categories:

1.The terrorists are worse
2.The GC doesn't apply
3.It's not enough deaths to be a problem
4.War is hell
5.People are dying in other parts of the world
6.The anti-war crowd thinks it's bad

He does a fine job of dismantling all six of these relatively weak defenses/rationalizations, but I wanted to focus on his responses to number 1:

"The terrorists are worse". By condoning torture and abuse by our soldiers, it becomes a matter of degree and not principle. Principle is thrown right out of the window with the acceptance that our torture isn't as bad or as widespread as theirs. Because their's is "worse", ours, apparently, is then acceptable. It's the same sort of rationalization which occurs in other arguments in which people are driven by anger to abandon principle for vengeance. We're upset by what the terrorists do. It's a natural human phenomenon to want vengeance for acts of terrorism. We want to punish and get even with those who perpetrate such atrocities. But then, when we indulge ourselves in such behavior, we abandon the moral high ground for the same fetid pit in which our enemies exist. We become no better than them.

It's not that I disagree with the general message in this paragraph, because I don't, my critique lies with the fact that it is written on the basis of a faulty premise. Unfortunately, the author accepts the terms of the debate of the critics, but in so doing is conceding far too much ground. The fallacy is that not all detainees are "terrorists" - not by a long shot. Thus, by debating whether or not to condone or excuse the torture of these detainees because the "terrorists" are worse ignores the fact that what the apologists are really saying is that torturing people that share a common language, culture and/or appearance with certain terrorists is acceptable because those culturally/geographically/linguistically related terrorists do worse.

This error in logic is regrettably ubiquitous and serves as the accepted starting point for many such debates. But the heart of the matter is that our legal system is built on the presumption of innocence for a reason - many people abducted in any context are actually innocent so you don't treat arrest as proof of guilt. This principle should not be disregarded so lightly. Under the Bush administration's execution of the War on Terror, this presumption has been hollowed out.

Some facts. Many of the detainees at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and the myriad other facilities are not, in fact, "terrorists." A very large number of them are innocent bystanders swept up in massive raids, innocent civilians turned in by bounty hunters seeking monetary rewards and/or the victims of score-settling neighbors who fingered them for revenge purposes. Also, keep in mind, many of the detainees at Guantanamo are Afghani which increases the likelihood that they are either mistaken identities or Taliban, though its very unlikely they are Al Qaeda. As a general rule, Afghanis themselves almost never join groups like Al Qaeda or other Salafist jihadi organizations. Instead, most recruits come from Europe, North Africa, and core Arab countries. But Taliban are not terrorists, and deserve to be treated more like POWs than "illegal combatants."

In some cases such as Abu Ghraib, according to US Army and Red Cross reports, the vast majority of detainees (70-90%) were innocent of ALL violations. In the area of extraordinary renditions, we know of the case of Maher Arar the Canadian citizen seized by American agents in NYC and shipped off to Syria to be tortured over the course of a year because the brother of a co-worker was on a suspect list. Was it acceptable to subject Arar to torture because terrorists do worse?

When you establish a priori that many of the detainees, suspects and victims are innocent civilians, it becomes harder to justify systematic torture, abuse, rape and murder on the basis of comparative morality between terrorists and us (should you wish to sully our principles and standards by measuring them on their scale in the first place).

Day job permitting, I will return to posting today but first I wanted to offer my gratitude to Jonny and TTN for going well above and beyond the call of duty to write such thought provoking and intelligent pieces in my absence. If anything, they were both a little impolite - not remembering that a guest is not supposed to outshine the host.

In either case, thank you both and thank you to TIA's readers for stopping by (traffic numbers didn't dip a bit!) and engaging the conversation. For those who want to follow TTN, I encourage you to check him out on his own site (I know I do), and Jonny can be found semi-regularly here, although, as many TIA readers have come to realize, he is fast becoming a regular contributor around these parts. Now (after my own pause for a commercial break) back to your regularly scheduled program....

For about the last 10 years or so, I've been involved with a sport known as Ultimate. Never heard of it? Well, that's a damn shame. It's a fantastic sport that never seems to get the attention it deserves. It's exciting and fast-paced, requires a tremendous amount of conditioning and athleticism, and doesn't require $500 worth of equipment to get in the game -- all you really need is a pair of cleats. Over the years, I've played this sport that all different levels -- from the sloppiest weekend pickup games to the intense National Club Series tournaments. Once, I even traveled to Italy just to play in the Paganello Beach Ultimate tournament. So, it's fair to say that I've been around the block, Ultimate-wise.

You're probably asking yourself why I'm talking about this. Hang on -- we're getting to it.

One of the things that makes Ultimate unique (besides the fact that no one has ever heard of it) is the following. From Ultimate in 10 Simple Rules:

9. Self-Officiating: Players all responsible for their own foul and line calls. Players resolve their own disputes.

10. Spirit of the Game: Ultimate stresses sportsmanship and fair play. Competitive play is encouraged, but never at the expense of respect between players, adherence to the rules, and the basic joy of play.

Because of these two rules, Ultimate is played without independent officiating. No umpires, refs, or zebras of any kind. The participants make their own calls and resolve disputes using a system not unlike the "do-over" of your childhood. And, believe it or not, it works incredibly well. In all the time that I've played the game, there have been but a handful of occasions where the system failed to resolve disputes in a manner amicable to all involved parties. Moreover, because of the so-called Spirit of the Game ethic, the inter-competitor animosity so common in other sports rarely materializes during Ultimate competitions. I have never witnessed a physical altercation on the Ultimate field. I can't say the same for any other sport that I have been involved with.

However, while I'm a good player, I'm not great. Therefore, I've never played on a team that had a reasonable shot at the national championship. In fact, I've never even qualified to play in the regional tournaments. But, I've been a spectator on several occasions and I can tell you that things start to change once the stakes go up. I wouldn't say that players start to cheat, but it does begin to get complicated. The number of disputes increases dramatically and each one takes much longer to resolve, necessitating a tremendous number of the aforementioned "do-overs." The system still works, but the games can get really bogged down.

To handle this problem, these tournaments have begun to employ impartial "observers" who are responsible for making line calls (i.e. calling a player in or out of bounds) and for acting as a tie-breaking vote in other dispute situations. These observers aren't able to resolve every conflict, but they definitely help to move the game along.

Now, let's shift gears slightly. Of all the major American sports, pro basketball is unquestionably my favorite. Though it is definitely a contestable point, I believe that the greatest athletes on earth are found out on the hardwood. For me, there are few things more exciting than a playoff basketball game. If you doubt me, just ask my wife who must gracefully endure my obsession at the end of each season.

That said, I understand many of the criticisms that are leveled against the game. Leaving aside the complaints about off-court shenanigans, the issue most frequently raised is that of poor sportsmanship. And it's true, NBA basketball players do whatever they can to gain an advantage, no holds barred. They push and shove each other, throw elbows, and deliberately trip opposing players as they run down the court. They do these things with the intent of getting away with it. No need to be charitable about it -- it's cheating, plain and simple. And even some of the things that are legal are ethically questionable. Sure, you're allowed six fouls in a game, but does that really mean that it's OK to deliberately foul someone just to prevent an easy layup. Yet, such play is de rigueur during the playoffs.

In these three examples, we see three different manifestations of, for lack of a better term, sportsmanship. At one end, low-stakes Ultimate, we find high levels of sportsmanship and rule adherence. At the other, pro basketball, we find low levels of sportsmanship, with the rule adherence maintained through direct coercion. Clearly, behavior is starkly different in each situation.

To explain this, people generally propose one of two theories. One is that the people playing low-level ultimate are simply morally superior individuals compared to those playing pro basketball. The other is that the environment that these athletes experience pushes them to behave the ways that they do. If this sounds like the old nature/nurture debate -- you're right. It is.

Of course, to a certain degree, both answers are correct. Here's the thing though.

It doesn't matter!

We often like to sit in judgment and point out the failings in other situations or in other people. In this context, people like to bash pro basketball for creating and coddling bad apples. The thing is, though, it doesn't get you anywhere. You can demand that these athletes behave better, or that we choose to only promote those of a certain character, or that the pro manifestation of the game was somehow different and didn't encourage such play. However, unless the structure of the game is dramatically changed -- to something akin to low-stakes Ultimate -- it won't make any difference at all. And, if you did somehow make those changes, you would lose a fair amount of the game's essence. It's a good bet that it wouldn't be the event that it is today. For those of us who enjoy the game the way it is, that's a bad thing.

If you actually want to improve rule adherence, without wrecking the game itself, there's really only one option: enforcement. You add more refs and/or video technology so that it's harder for players to break the rules without getting caught. Of course, players will adapt and identify new extralegal opportunities to gain an advantage, which will require a new adaptation from the officials. And so on. It's a never ending battle, but a battle that must be waged if you care about the rules.

OK -- let's bring this discussion back to the political sphere.

A lot of people, on both sides of the political spectrum, like to point fingers at the other side and call foul. This has been especially true with respect to the last two presidential elections. The left, having been on the losing side in both of these contests, have certainly been more vocal in making these accusations. And, of course, a lot of these accusations are completely legitimate.

But, too often, I think, the accusations revolve around the bad character of the involved actors. Karl Rove is accused of playing dirty (and he does). Katherine Harris illegitimately ended the Florida recounts (agreed). The Swift Boat Veterans were a bunch of stinking liars (testify, my brother!). I could go on (and on, and on...).

However, there comes a point in time went you actually want to do something about it. Demonizing the opposition may serve to solidify your coalition, but it persuades few new voters to take your side -- even when the accusations are undeniably true. It just doesn't work that way.

Rove may be an unscrupulous character, but he is so only because of the nature of the game. If the game were different, he would be different or he would be replaced by someone who was. It's that simple.

And like pro basketball, you can't change the stakes of the game. As long as it's about power, the players are going to reach for every advantage that they can get away with -- no holds barred. There's only one solution -- empowering the refs.

This is the strategy that I would like to see employed much more than it currently is. Pelosi, Reid, and any other representatives of the Democratic Party should make this a central theme of every major address that they give. Not labeling Republicans as cheaters. Not identifying specific instances of wrongdoing. Simply hammering home again and again the need to empower independent enforcement of the rules. And where the rules fail to prohibit counterproductive behavior, the need to enhance the rules themselves.

Honestly, I would love to see any politician take a stand against such changes. If the changes truly reflect a nonpartisan attempt to stiffen lax enforcement, who could stand against them. It's a winning strategy, productive strategy, and, most importantly, it would actually make a difference.

PostScript: This is it for me at TIA. Let me just once again say thank you to Eric for allowing me to stand on his platform. It has been a real privilege. And, I'd like to thank everyone out there who has put up with me in Eric's absence. I'll be back over at my traditional haunt starting tomorrow and (shameless plug)you will all be welcome there(/shameless plug).