Total Information Awareness

Blogger Praktike is keeping tabs on the back and forth public debate between neoconservative thinkers Francis Fukuyama and Charles Krauthammer, which I have cited frequently in this space.

His critique of Krauthammer's most recent argument is well worth the read, as are the other articles he cites.

I have a little confession to make. It is easier for me to perform my civic duty than probably 99.9% of Americans. The reason being: my particular election day polling station happens to be in the lobby of the apartment building I call home. All I have to do is stop off at the station on my way to work, flash my ID, sign the book, step into the booth, flip the switches and pull the lever. It's that easy. Better still, from this position of comfort, I can sanctimoniously lecture other Americans, for whom voting might represent much more of a disruption from their otherwise busy day, about the virtues of casting a ballot on election day.

In an effort to capitalize on the inconvenience factor, apparently, certain Republican operatives have circulated plans to create "snarls" at polling stations by frequently challenging credentials of potential voters in certain Democratic-friendly neighborhoods in swing states in order to increase the size of lines. They are banking on the fact that voters will be too busy, or discouraged, to wait around long enough to cast their ballot. Call it disenfranchisement by delay. Which reminds me how ludicrous it is that the world's greatest democracy does not consider election day to be worthy of consideration for a national holiday - which would allow voters the luxury of taking time out to vote without interfering with their livelihoods.

So, I got a little jolt of excitement as I returned home from the office yesterday to see those two metal encased booths closed tight in my lobby, like presents waiting to be opened by an eager child on Christmas morning. I openly admit that I am a bit obsessed with all things political, and not everyone would have this reaction to the presence of voting booths - but humor me. I also felt a sense of security because these two machines represent "old reliable" to me, especially in light of Florida 2000, and all the recent "glitches" that the dubiously effective electronic voting machines have been experiencing, as reported by Mick Arran and others. I am confident that when I take the time to pull the lever on Tuesday morning on my way to the subway, my vote will count. Not every American can share such assuredness or convenience. If it were only this easy everywhere.

In a recent post, I briefly discussed the phenomenon that Americans tend to view violence as a manifestation of strength. This of course is almost the opposite of what is true - violence is the act of a desperate, threatened and frightened being, believing that no other recourse exists. It is also one of the least effective means of achieving the desired outcome. Violence begets violence, a cycle of revenge, and a poisonous atmosphere not conducive to the resolution of conflicts. As an example, compare the approaches of leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King with the recently infirmed Yasser Arafat. It is hard to argue with the comparative results.

In foreign policy terms, this concept is translated into the belief that being "strong" on issues of national security means possessing a hawkish willingness to use the military over "weaker" diplomatic options. Again, this interpretation is misguided and exclusionary of the vast amount of evidence detailing the enormous successes of diplomacy. Despite all the public bluster and macho image, the "strongest" thing that Reagan ever did was agree to engage Mikhail Gorbachev in a paradigm shifting series of summits that culminated in the end of the Cold War.

Building on the success of this approach with the former Soviet Union, American foreign policy has made great strides with other erstwhile enemies like China, Vietnam and many of the nations of Easter Europe. By opening diplomatic ties, and establishing an economic and cultural exchange, we have helped to spur the democratic progress in countries that were previously entrenched in Communist totalitarianism.

Ironically, as I have argued before, we have taken the obsolete belligerent posture with Cuba, and have thus strengthened the hand of the intractable Castro. Instead of weakening his control over thought and ideas through economic and cultural relations, we have consolidated his grip on power by cutting off the Cuban people from our sphere of influence. Our policy vis a vis Cuba has more to do with the desires of a single issue voting bloc in Florida than on the accepted wisdom of the strategy of engagement.

There are obviously scenarios that call for military action, but such situations are not laudable for the strength they afford the actors. Military might is an example of a breakdown in diplomacy, a failure of better means, and the loss of options. The dearth of viable alternatives is a weakness, not a strength, because wars almost always have unintended consequences that spiral out of the control of the primary actors. Lack of choice and lack of control are the realities, strength is the illusion.

Iraq is the perfect example of the limitations, risks and weakness of elective warfare. Far from securing our objectives through this display of strength, we have hindered our progress on almost every front. Instead of dealing a blow to al-Qaeda, we have improved their position, influence, recruitment, popularity and appeal. Instead of spreading democracy throughout the Middle East, we have undermined the reformers and moderates, while strengthening the hand of the fundamentalists and zealots. We ourselves have lost much respect and esteem.

Recent revelations about looting at nuclear facilities and weapons depots bring home the realization that dangerous materials that were under seal prior to the invasion, are now dispersed to unknown locations and could end up in the hands of terrorists in an unfortunate twist of irony.

Contrary to the claims by certain Bush supporters, our involvement in Iraq has not served as a deterrent or warning to other regimes - in fact it has exposed the limitations of our manpower, economic capacity, and ability to control and pacify a target country. Instead of retreating in fear, Iran is emboldened by the knowledge that we could never attack them at this juncture. In essence, we squandered the perception of our strength fostered by the lightning quick toppling of the Taliban accomplished through minimal ground presence and use of resources. Now we look like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians.

Finally, despite the claims by certain right-leaning bloggers, Iraq did not help us regain "the geopolitical momentum," nor is a policy of shaking things up in as volatile a region as the Middle East a wise approach. War has a way of triggering events beyond what is intended, and attempting to stir the pot in such a manner is ill advised if not foolhardy.

Given this track record of over-eager hawkishness, it is understandable why many are not as sanguine as Gregory Djerejian about the future makeup of a potential second term George Bush foreign policy apparatus. Middle East expert Ronald Bruce St John made the following observations of current Bush policy in terms of pursuing diplomatic solutions to problems:

The Bush administration does not appear to have learned any lessons from the Iraq imbroglio. The White House is now busy pursuing the same bellicose policies in Iran and Syria that led to the invasion of Iraq. While some commentators argue that the results of the Iraq War invalidate the preemptive strike strategy, this may prove to be more a reflection of wishful thinking than of Bush administration practice...

The Bush administration's current policy toward Iran, like its policy toward Syria, mixes condemnation, threat, and intimidation. The overall aim of the policy is isolation, not engagement.

As I pointed out above, the lessons of the past half a century lean strongly in favor of engagement over isolation, negotiation over brinksmanship. Communism is undermined by the exchange of commerce, ideas and ideology. Similarly, sensitive foreign policy aims should be pursued vigorously in such a manner, saving the more war-like tactics for the last resort.

The recent breakthrough signified by Libya's agreement to abandon its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction is the quintessential example of the success of the diplomatic approach of negotiation and engagement over military action. Under the pressure of sanctions, Libya has inched closer to the world community over the past 15 years, including, among other things, renouncing terrorism and accepting the role of its operatives in the Pan Am 103 bombing.

The prolonged negotiations which eventually led Libya in December 2003 to renounce unconventional weapons of its own "free will" offer a more productive model for dialogue with Iran and Syria than the "take no prisoner" approach being pursued by the Bush administration. Talks with Libya began in mid-1999 at a time when the United States was indicating it sought policy change but not regime change in Libya. In this initial stage, the involved parties agreed to tone down the rhetoric and begin a meaningful dialogue in pursuit of a step-by-step process.

These early negotiations with Libya were based from the outset on an explicit quid pro quo as Ambassador Martin Indyk, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State who opened talks with Libya in mid-1999, later indicated in a Washington Post op-ed article. The talks aimed at Libya satisfying all of its obligations under applicable UN resolutions and were predicated on two conditions: Libyan agreement both to keep the negotiations quiet and to cease lobbying to have the UN sanctions permanently lifted. The Clinton administration elected not to pursue the unconventional weapons question at this time because its priority remained resolution of the Pan Am flight 103 issue.

As the prolonged negotiations with Libya suggest, the United States needs to engage Iran and Syria on a broad range of interrelated issues, taking one step at a time. Narrow contact on the highly charged nuclear issue in the case of Iran or Syria's occupation of Lebanon, tied to the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and Israel-Syria peace talks, is unlikely to work. On the contrary, Washington needs to engage Teheran on a basket of related issues, like Iranian fears of regime destabilization, a regional security architecture that includes Iran and its neighbors, and Iranian support for radical groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. In turn, U.S. talks with Syria need to expand to include border and water issues with Israel and support for militant Palestinian groups as well as alleged unconventional weapons programs, support in stabilizing Iraq, and ongoing cooperation in the war on terrorism.

But the Bush administration seems bent on using the rhetoric of isolation to support the stature of disengagement. Far from a change in strategy from the handling of Iraq, the Bush administration seems intent to travel the same path, as evidenced by statements made by senior officials as recently as two months ago.

In a Hudson Institute speech on August 17, 2004, Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton said "Iran's actions and statements do not bode well for the success of a negotiated approach to dealing with this issue." He then quoted National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice who had remarked two weeks earlier on Fox News: "The Iranians have been trouble for a very long time. And it's one reason that this regime has to be isolated in its bad behavior, not quote-unquote 'engaged'." Not surprisingly, the Bush administration's approach sparked a strong reaction from Iran, prompting more bellicose rhetoric all around.[emphasis added]

As St John points out, the issues entangled with Iran and Syria are not insignificant, nor do they require light treatment. Military options might be required at a certain point in time, but only after an exhaustive attempt to explore other options. That effort is lacking.

This is not to suggest that many of the policies of both Iran and Syria are not cause for concern. Damascus needs to withdraw from Lebanon, cooperate in the stabilization of Iraq, support the war on terrorism, abandon alleged unconventional weapons programs, and cease its support for militant Palestinian groups. Syria should also be encouraged to pursue much needed domestic economic and political reforms.

Teheran needs to cooperate in the stabilization of Iraq, support the war on terrorism, and abandon any unconventional weapons programs. Most especially, any Iranian efforts to build a nuclear weapon must be stopped. Consequently, its recent announcement that it intends to process 37 metric tons of raw uranium into uranium hexafluoride is a special concern. Uranium hexafluoride, when spun in centrifuges, produces enriched uranium which can be used both to generate power and to make nuclear warheads. This issue of enrichment is a highly sensitive one for an international community seeking to determine if Iran is using its nuclear program for peaceful purposes, as Teheran insists, or building nuclear weapons, as the United States maintains.

There is general agreement on the need for policy change in Damascus and Teheran. The contentious issue is how best to encourage and foster the desired change. Reminiscent of the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration has been strong on rhetoric but absent a comprehensive, coherent plan to shape future events in either Iran or Syria. The United States has also failed, once again, to secure the full coordination and support of interested allies, like France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

Just like the invasion of Iraq itself, our current policy posture with respect to Iran and Syria is having the opposite effect of what is intended. Far from bringing these two nations closer to meeting our demands, we are increasing the resistance. This is not an encouraging sign in light of the many assurances these days that the Bush team has realized the error of their ways and are on the verge of a major transformation in worldview.

The Bush administration seems intent on polishing its macho image in the final weeks before the November presidential elections. Occasional reports of a lack of policy consensus within the administration on either Iran or Syria, which might suggest future room for engagement, lack credible foundation. White House policies toward both Iran and Syria, reflecting a failure to learn from the Iraqi experience, remain closely tied to Israeli interests in the region, specifically its policy of not allowing any Middle East neighbor to challenge its nuclear monopoly.

Where a process of engagement with Tripoli led to its renouncing unconventional weapons and rejoining the international community with no loss of life, Washington's belligerent policy of isolation is provoking the opposite reaction in Damascus and Teheran. Both states have hunkered down under the verbal onslaught from the White House and shown little inclination or ability to cooperate on Washington's terms. Unfortunately, if such pre-election antics prove a reliable guide, meaningful dialogue with either Damascus or Teheran would also appear unlikely in a second Bush administration. That brings us to the frightening prospect of a return to the Bush Doctrine and its preemptive strike strategy if President Bush is reelected.

Strength truly lies in the results of one's policies, not their tendency to include violence and warfare. This is one lesson that the Bush team does not seem to get.

The Bush campaign, and the right-wing punditry, has been scrambling to perform some last minute damage control over the debacle of the missing 380 tons of high grade explosives from the infamous Al Qaqaa weapons cache in Iraq. The underlying logic of the defensive maneuvers is curious to me because I believe that it, in itself, admits the weaknesses of the Bush presidency.

When the story first broke, there was speculation that the site had been looted in the aftermath of the invasion. Since then, the exact timeline of when the materials disappeared from the site has become a vaguer issue. Today's New York Times reported:

The last time that international inspectors saw the explosives was in early March 2003, days before the American-led invasion. It is possible, inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency say, that Saddam Hussein's forces may have tried to move the material out of the 10 huge bunkers at the Al Qaqaa facility where it was stored to save it if the facility was bombed.

President Bush was quick to seize on this uncertainty in a campaign appearance yesterday:

"One of [Kerry's] top foreign policy advisors admits he doesn't know the facts," Mr. Bush said. "He said, 'I don't know the truth.'

Bush is right to some degree. No one can be certain when the explosives disappeared, but that fact alone condemns Bush's leadership as commander in chief, and Donald Rumsfeld's as Secretary of Defense. The reason Bush can claim this uncertainty is precisely because he failed to send troops to secure the site immediately after the invasion. This should have been done with all haste, considering what was known about the Al Qaqaa facility. If he had sent troops to secure the site, as any competent commander concerned with so dangerous an arsenal would have, then we would know when the materials disappeared. We could say definitively that they were spirited out before our arrival, or we would have the material under lock and key today. Because Bush failed to direct his forces to this site, he can now plead ignorance as his defense. That is not exculpatory.

The Bush campaign and the right-wing punditry is also trying, speciously, to claim that troops were sent to secure the site, pointing out that a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, with an embedded NBC reporter present, went to Al Qaqaa soon after the fighting began. Unfortunately, that was little more than a pit stop on the way to Baghdad, and the commander of those troops was not briefed or instructed as to the significance of Al Qaqaa.

The commander of the troops that went into the Al Qaqaa facility on the way to Baghdad in early April, Col. Joseph Anderson, of the Second Brigade of the Army's 101st Airborne Division, has said he was never told the site was considered sensitive, or that international inspectors had visited it before the war began.

That he was never told of the known contents of the bunkers at Al Qaqaa is, as Andrew Sullivan and Gregory Djerejian put it, "criminal negligence" of the highest order. Unfortunately, under Bush's leadership, this is not the only sensitive facility in Iraq to be left unguarded post-invasion. There was also the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center that was picked clean by looters who carried off radioactive material that could wind up as the basis for a dirty bomb. The pattern is the same: the facility had been contained and monitored by international inspectors for years, the Bush administration (and all interested parties) were well aware of the contents of the site and the dangers they posed, yet inexplicably, the site was left unguarded.

Considering that this war was justified on the grounds that Saddam could pass dangerous materials on to terrorists, I think that protecting these sites from looting should have been the absolute top priority. The reasons for the failure probably lie in Donald Rumsfeld's folly. His insistence on using the minimum amount of troops necessary, against the advice of the Army War College, State Department, and even the Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki, amongst a chorus of other voices, has had far reaching and devastating ramifications. The failure of his leadership in this regard, and that of the President's, his boss, is evident in the chaotic and unraveling situation in Iraq.

Which brings me to the second part of Bush's countermeasures. In typical Bush fashion, he refuses to take any responsibility for his actions, and in the process accuses Kerry of the very crime he is guilty of. Bush had this to say about Kerry's remarks concerning the missing explosives:

"The senator is denigrating the actions of our troops and commanders in the field without knowing the facts."

"You might remember that - he kept repeating that in the debates," Mr. Bush said at the Hancock County Fairgrounds in Findlay, Ohio. "Well, this is unjustified criticism of our military commanders in the field. This is the kind of, worst kind of Monday-morning quarterbacking."

Think about that statement for a moment. Bush is attributing the decision to leave those sites unguarded to the military, the men and women in uniform. Bush is blaming the military again for his mistakes, and then claiming it is Kerry who is committing such heresy. Kerry is saying no such thing. He, rightly, blames Bush's leadership and that of his closest advisors. Bush, once again, points his finger at the military as if he has no part in their operation - a victim of circumstances.

Rmember, this is the same man who boasted about being a "war time president." This is the same man who claims that his leadership in war is what qualifies him for being president, and makes his opponent and unacceptable option. Well Mr. President, aren't you the commander in chief? Doesn't the buck stop with you? Are you only a war time president for photo ops, or are you really an engaged commander? At the very least, don't you think Donald Rumsfeld should lose his job for yet another example of failure? It wasn't a strategic decision by commanders in the field to leave these sites unguarded, it was a failure of senior leadership in the administration make this a priority, and to inform the commanders, like Col. Joseph Anderson, that Al Qaqaa was an important site that needed to be guarded.

[Update: Josh Marshall is diligently running down the many different versions of events surrounding the Al Qaqaa saga emanating from the White House and the right-wing punditry. He's getting quite a workout considering that they are floating a new rendition daily - if not more frequently. One such recent twist is the abandonment of the story of the NBC accompanied visit of the 101st Airborne that I cited above. I guess Col. Joseph Anderson's statement made that narrative a non-starter. Now they are floating a story about an even earlier visit by American troops, the Army's 3rd Infantry Division appearance at Al Qaqaa on April 3rd (the NBC visit was on the 10th of April). Unfortunately for the Bush administration, the commander of that force is, again, on record contradicting the White House's claims:

Col. Dave Perkins, then the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, said the immediate concern when his troops reached the Al Qaqaa site on April 3, 2003, was to defeat a couple of hundred Iraqi troops who were firing from the compound as the Americans surged toward Baghdad...

Perkins said the key concern at the time was whether there were any weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons, and that a white powdery substance found at the site proved to be a WMD false alarm.

Perkins' account is consistent with news accounts written at the time. Quoting Josh Marshall, himself quoting from the Washington Post article:

In the first of yesterday's discoveries, the 3rd Infantry Division entered the vast Qa Qaa chemical and explosives production plant and came across thousands of vials of white powder, packed three to a box. The engineers also found stocks of atropine and pralidoxime, also known as 2-PAM chloride, which can be used to treat exposure to nerve agents but is also used to treat poisoning by organic phosphorus pesticides. Alongside those materials were documents written in Arabic that, as interpreted at the scene, appeared to include discussions of chemical warfare.

This morning, however, investigators said initial tests indicated the white powder was not a component of a chemical weapon. "On first analysis it does not appear to be a chemical that could be used in a chemical weapons attack," Col. John Peabody, commander of the division's engineering brigade, told a Reuters reporter with his unit.

And what was the white powder? Here's what the Associated Press was told the same day ...

A senior U.S. official familiar with initial testing said the powder was believed to be explosives. The finding would be consistent with the plant's stated production capabilities in the field of basic raw materials for explosives and propellants.

RDX and HMX are white powders.

So, to recap, we have a military unit at Al Qaqaa on April 3rd, who were primarily concerned with fighting Iraqi soldiers and looking for WMDs, who then conducted a test for biological and chemical weapons and found none. They did find a white powder believed to be explosives, and we know that RDX and HMX are white powders. Is this the best the White House could come up with? This is starting to look bad. This story actually makes it look like at least some quantity of the explosives were in fact at the site post-invasion, giving credence to the looting theory. Marshall provides further support for the looting theory, as well as a refutation of another White House argument. In response to the claim that the looting would have required a convoy of trucks, and that these could not have been using the roads after the invasion, Marshall quotes David Kay:

I must say, I find it hard to believe that a convoy of 40 to 60 trucks left that facility prior to or during the war, and we didn't spot it on satellite or UAV. That is, because it is the main road to Baghdad from the south, was a road that was constantly under surveillance. I also don't find it hard to believe that looters could carry it off in the dead of night or during the day and not use the road network.[italics added]

I think the Bush administration is starting to overreach on this one. This could get interesting.]

[Update II: Tim Dunlop at The Road to Surfdom links to a site with some pictures from Al Qaqaa taken by embedded journalists with the 101st Airborne. While certainly not conclusive evidence that the explosives were there after the fall of Saddam, it doesn't exactly look good either.]

A few weeks back I called attention to a movement taking place on college campuses nationwide that amounts to a form of neo-McCarthyism against professors and faculty. The movement, spearheaded by conservative pundit and think tank veteran David Horowitz, is based largely on the Orwellian sounding Academic Bill of Rights and Student Bill of Rights. These innocuous sounding manifestos are not just theoretical mandates, they form the backbone of legislation that is being introduced in most state legislatures across the country at this very moment, in addition to the US House of Representatives - and they are anything but harmless.

The main thrust of the legislation is to mandate hiring practices at universities that result in an even split of Democrats and Republicans, as well as some other measures that serve to stifle discussion in the classroom that students could perceive as advocating a certain partisan view. The details of how the legislation operates is much more nefarious - especially when you consider the evidence that Horowitz used/created in order to justify such measures in the first place.

Apart from the legislative efforts, Horowitz has been encouraging students to take matters into their own hands, providing instructions for spotting "liberal" professors and targeting them for elimination.

Horowitz's Students for Academic Freedom provides students with a manual that gives an example of a poster asking, "Is Your Professor Using the Classroom as a Political Soapbox?" The manual also provides "advice on how to create Web sites, get publicity, file complaints, and spot abuses of academic freedom, such as using university funds to hold one-sided, partisan conferences, and inviting speakers to campus from one side of the political spectrum."

The long term effects of Horwotiz's campaign will be catastrophic if not curbed. The real danger is that excellence in academic and scholarly pursuits would be subsumed to partisan beliefs. We would sacrifice much in terms of rewarding achievement and individual prowess in order to create this bizarre sense of balance, by obliging this modern day witch hunt. America would soon lose its position of dominance in the realm of higher education because our standards for scholarship will have shifted from a measurement of competence to an assessment of political affiliation. We would no longer attract the best and the brightest from around the world, both among students and teachers, because our system would be so saddled with illogical and backwards permutations.

I will not provide a full accounting of the background of this movement, or the parameters of the problems we face, in this post because I have done so already in my prior piece. What I do want to do, is call attention to two examples of Horowitz's brainchild in action that have recently come to my attention.

Two of the campaign's first victims are Ball State's Professor Alves and David Gibbs, an Associate professor of History and Sociology at the University of Arizona, who last spring taught a course entitled "What is Politics?"

On the Ball State University campus, posters "announcing that history professor Abel Alves was 'WANTED'" was put up by Amanda Carpenter, a senior, who said she put up the posters in order to attract attention to her website, the Muncie, Indiana Star Press reported. The professor's "alleged offenses include indoctrinating freshmen with liberal books, such as Fast Food Nation, and guest lectures by the Humane Society."

The use of the "wanted" poster connotes some type of criminality on the part of the professor, but in truth, the attention that professors like Abel Alves have received has been criminal in nature. It is not unusual for a professor so targeted to receive death threats and threats of violence, in addition to coordinated campaigns aimed at depriving the professor of his or her livelihood. The next example is of Associate Professor David Gibbs:

On September 27, David Gibbs told Amy Goodman, the host of Democracy Now! that his largely freshmen class "focuses on propaganda and deception," and he "emphasize[s] incidents of the government lying and things like that." When he taught the class last spring, "the Independent Women's Forum... put into the local student newspaper, an advertisement that basically argued that there's a kind of left wing domination of the universities and students should fight that with the strong implication they should monitor their professors and report them, at least that's how I read it."

When Gibbs received student evaluations, "a student who said I'm anti-American communist who hates America and is trying to brainwash young people into thinking that America sucks," said that "I should be investigated by the FBI, and the FBI has been contacted."

Later on, "another student on a web log during the summer said he took my class and also said that he didn't like my politics and suggests that students shouldn't take my class but should drop by and try to disrupt it. There have been a number of instances like that which I hadn't had before."

Although Gibbs said that he wasn't sure or worried about whether the FBI was contacted, he acknowledged that he thought it was "indicative of a larger national trend, which is conservative activist groups with lots of money and connections to the Republican Party trying to encourage and even to some extent orchestrate students and local conservative groups like those at the University of Arizona to go and basically harass faculty if they don't like their politics."

Other examples abound, and in many instances, the threats and intimidation tactics extend to the professor's spouse and extended family. This represents a pernicious strain of political thought and action that has been slowly gaining momentum on the political right in this country, and it is beyond disturbing. While Horowitz himself has publicly condemned such extreme actions, he notes, "When you deal with students, you're dealing with students." He seems to acknowledge that students are prone take these ideas too far, but that hasn't caused him any pause for concern. He knows what he is doing when he instructs students how to take matters into their own hands, and he is well aware of what his movement is seeking to achieve. Victory at all costs always trumps the means. But victory for Horowitz and his minions means defeat for America's standing in the world, as well as the degradation of our educational backbone that supports so many other aspects of our society.

Now I'm not the biggest Eminem fan in the world. To be honest, I think he is pretty overrated, and I have stated as much before. That being said, he is starting to win me over. He has just released a scathing rant against George Bush that shocked me by its forcefulness entitled Mosh. At one point in the song, Eminem actually refers to Bush as a "weapon of mass destruction." Obviously, his irreverence is in full force.

Juan Cole had this to say about the politicization of Slim Shady:

I don't know what Marshall Mathers's politics are. But I do know that they could be of consequence for the youth vote, and his loud pleas for everyone to vote may also have an impact at the margins (this election is about the margins).

That he is issuing a song, Mosh, which directly attacks Bush on the Iraq war may be a sign of the times:

Rebel with a rebel yell, raise hell/
We gonna let him know/
Stomp, push, shove, mush, fuck Bush!/
Until they bring our troops home...

Let the president answer on higher anarchy/
Strap him with an AK-47, let him go fight his own war/
Let him impress daddy that way...No more blood for oil.

In a forthcoming Rolling Stone interview, Mathers says:

"[Bush] has been painted to be this hero, and he's got our troops over there dying for no reason...I think he started a mess...He jumped the gun, and he fucked up so bad he doesn't know what to do right now...We got young people over there dyin', kids in their teens, early twenties that should have futures ahead of them. And for what? It seems like a Vietnam 2. Bin Laden attacked us, and we attacked Saddam. Explain why that is. Give us some answers."

What's more, the imagery in the video is almost as strident as the lyrical content. You can watch the video and hear the song here (note: it takes a while to download because of the richness of the media). This represents yet one more reason why the youth vote will turn out for Kerry.

Amidst a listing of empirical evidence, Publius at Legal Fiction indulges in a little faith-based analysis of why he believes Kerry will prevail one week from today:

But the real reason I'm increasingly confident has nothing to do with the polls or Electoral College calculations. If you'll allow me to step outside the reality-based community for a moment, I want to share with you my "hunch." And I learned it from my father.

My father has been a local elected official (Republican, though) in my hometown for over thirty years. Perhaps I'm biased, but I consider him a political genius at reading people and assessing the mood of the man on the street. And he once taught me an important political lesson - an angry man always votes. He explained, "It doesn't matter if it's raining or snowing. If they're pissed off at you, they'll always go vote against you." I think there's a lot of wisdom in that. Just look at 1994, or the 1998 secular backlash in the midterm elections. Angry people turn out.

I share his hunch. It sure looks like Marshall Mathers is angry, and if there really are a million Slim Shadys just like him....

[Hat tip to reader D-Wall]

It strikes me as deeply disingenuous to hear the Bush/Cheney campaign accusing Kerry of running on a message of fear. I would say I am surprised by this line of attack, except nothing in the political realm surprises me these days, especially the willingness of Karl Rove to accuse his adversaries of manifesting his own campaign's deepest pathologies. According to Rove, Kerry's warnings about the very real goals of the conservative leadership to undermine Social Security and Medicare are nothing but rank scaremongering. If you don't believe Kerry is on to something, read this.

Regardless, even if Rove is to be believed (a concept that should give most objective readers a pause), does the Bush/Cheney campaign really have standing to level such a charge? This is the campaign that is almost exclusively fear-based. If you vote for Kerry, al-Qaeda will attack us again, Vice President Cheney famously warned the American people. Al-Qaeda wants Kerry to win, echoed Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, despite evidence suggesting the opposite is true. In the most recent GOP TV ad, the viewer is served a healthy dose of fear in the form of a menacing wolfpack (a metaphor for terrorists) nipping at the borders of America, just waiting for Kerry to win in November.

And that's just the terrorism angle. They have also spared no scare-tactic on the domestic front. Kerry will tax us all into poverty, the line goes. He will ruin health care by creating a buy in system similar to the one that the members of Congress currently enjoy (funny, don't remember any of them refusing their plan on those grounds). His repeal of the tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans will lead to a loss of jobs and cause the economy to falter (funny, seemed like Bush's policies were accomplishing that). And the list goes on.

In Friday's column in the Washington Post, Charles Krauthammer touched on a new fear nerve: Israel. Here is the relevant excerpt from Krauthammer's latest edition of doom and gloom foreboding:

[Kerry] really does want to end America's isolation. And he has an idea how to do it. For understandable reasons, however, he will not explain how on the eve of an election.

Think about it: What do the Europeans and the Arab states endlessly rail about in the Middle East? What (outside of Iraq) is the area of most friction with U.S. policy? What single issue most isolates America from the overwhelming majority of countries at the United Nations?

The answer is obvious: Israel.

In what currency, therefore, would we pay the rest of the world in exchange for their support in places such as Iraq? The answer is obvious: giving in to them on Israel.

Krauthammer is suggesting that Kerry intends to present Israel's head on a platter to European and Arab nations in order to mend fences with our erstwhile allies and garner broader support for the continuing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This claim by Krauthammer is beyond ridiculous, but just to clue you in on the level of hysteria on his part, here is how he parses Sandy Berger's recent comments on a return to the peace process:

Do not be fooled by the euphemism "peace process." We know what "peace process" meant during the eight years Berger served in the Clinton White House...

I don't remember the Clinton peace process being a sell out of Israel. The effort failed but it was a noble one, and one that, if successful, would have gone a great distance in assuring the safety, security, and longevity of the state of Israel. To me, the term "peace process," especially as used in the Clinton White House, is a good thing. I won't waste any more time on Krauthammer's column, but if you want to read further, Publius at Legal Fiction has a pretty thorough take-down of the Washington Post's resident neoconservative.

At first I dismissed Krauthammer's rant as an isolated incident of last minute scaremongering in order to rile up certain segments of the Jewish American vote. But then, via Praktike's Place, I noticed that this meme was being repeated elsewhere.

New York Times columnist William Safire broached the neo-con/paleo-con divide by penning his own cautionary tale for Jewish American voters. Here is Safire's take:

You have to give credit to Arab-Americans, and to the overlapping category of American Muslims, for knowing what side they are on in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - and for voting for those they believe would address their concerns.

Four years ago, they voted almost two to one for George W. Bush, thinking he would act like his father. Today, according to the Zogby poll, American Muslim voters are going 10 to 1 in the opposite political direction - for John Kerry over Bush. Not only do they see Bush's Patriot Act as discriminatory, most of these Americans dislike the president's unwavering support of Israel - including his backing of Ariel Sharon's security fence and the diplomatic isolation of Yasir Arafat....

Kerry can legitimately point to dozens of pro-Israel votes. But the essence of his foreign policy - to rely on alliances with France, Germany, Russia and the U.N. to combat terror and enforce the peace - requires accommodation with the central demand of these Arab-influenced entities to lean heavily on Israel to make the very concessions Kerry now says he's against. No Kerry heat on Israel, no grand new global alliance.

In yet another display of coordination amongst the notoriously well disciplined right wing punditry and political class, more voices joined the choir seeking to use Kerry's support amongst Muslim and Arab Americans as a means to scare Jewish American voters, and again, to cast doubt on Kerry's intentions vis a vis Israel. This item was picked up in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz:

Republican Jewish Coalition Executive Director Matthew Brooks is also rallying Jews for Bush - noting that Kerry has the support of Arab and Muslim groups.

"You can judge political candidates by who their friends are," he said.

Do not think me crazy when I say that this latest round of attacks on Kerry is actually a cause for optimism for Kerry supporters. It signifies the fact that the Bush/Cheney campaign has all but abandoned its efforts to court Muslim and Arab American voters, a crucial voting bloc in many swing states which Bush carried, as Safire pointed out, by nearly a 2 to 1 margin in 2000. If they are really leaning toward Kerry, even by less than the 10 to 1 mark that Safire claims, this represents a very significant gain for Kerry in some of the most important states in this election. Arab/Muslim Americans make up a substantial minority first and foremost in Michigan, but also in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa and Ohio. They very well could spell the margin of victory for Kerry in at least three of those states.

The Bush/Cheney rhetoric of fear on this issue is also an attempt by the Bush team to shore up support in states like Florida and New Jersey that have large Jewish American minorities. This shift in strategy could mean that Bush/Cheney views Florida as their best chance for victory, considering the changing dynamic in places like Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Again, it is an encouraging sign to see Bush/Cheney putting all of their eggs in one basket, especially because the chances of Bush/Cheney making serious inroads into the Jewish American vote are slim.

As the Haaretz article notes:

While publicly optimistic, administration officials are realistic about what they can achieve. In spite of outreach efforts, 69 percent of Jews are still expected to vote for Kerry and only 24 percent for Bush, according to an American Jewish Committee survey. This would compare with near 20 percent for Bush in 2000, but Republicans say they still hope to win more than 30 percent of the Jewish vote.

Safire himself laments:

Four years ago, candidate Bush received 20 percent of the "Jewish vote," about halfway between the low point for a Republican candidate (5 percent for Goldwater) and the high point (39 percent for Reagan). Today, it appears that Bush is getting only slightly more than the 20 percent of last time...

Despite the fact that this president has firmly backed Israel's vigorous self-defense - and time and again vetoed or denounced lopsided U.N. votes to ostracize Israel - 8 out of 10 Jewish American voters will still vote as a bloc to oust him.

...most Jewish Americans quite properly base their vote on issues like social justice, civil liberty, economic fairness and not primarily on what may be good for Israel. That's been especially true when democratic Israel, like the U.S., has had a close hawk-dove split.

But Safire pleads with Jewish Americans to put aside those other issues, and vote solely on the basis of Israel. The problem is, he conflates Israel's best interests with those of Ariel Sharon and the Likud Party. The two are not always one and the same, and in my opinion, Likud's policies have done more to make Israel less safe in the long run than before Likud took power. Jewish American voters who place the interests of Israel in a position of prominence in their voting calculus, should lean toward a candidate who understands this reality.

Exploring this concept further, I think that Krauthammer and Safire's columns are cause for optimism beyond presidential campaign watchers. If they're right, that Kerry stands a chance at making significant progress in resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict using the Clintonian model, then I think the world would benefit enormously. Mind you, I am not suggesting anything like Krauthammer's "abandonment" of Israel, and neither would Kerry. No American president would ever consider such a course of action, and with good cause.

That being said, nowhere is it written that all American presidents have to agree with every Israeli policy or action, regardless of whether it is Labor or Likud, peace overture or heavy-handed military strikes and dubiously termed "security fences." Maybe Safire and Krauthammer are right, that Kerry is paying lip service to Sharon and Likud in order to win the election, and once elected he would urge the parties to rein in their most belligerent elements and return to the negotiation table. What an opportunity that would present. Far from an abandonment of Israel, forging a lasting peace through negotiation, not militaristic and punitive solutions, is the only hope for a peaceful and fruitful Israel. Unwavering support for Likud does not always further this goal.

Like it or not, victory in the struggle to win the soul of the Muslim world from the extremists and fundamentalists like al-Qaeda and the Wahhabists, must include a dignified peace in Israel/Palestine. There is no other way. Contrary to the Bush team's most fantastical pipe dreams (spread in part by Ahmed Chalabi), the road to peace in Israel does not run through Baghdad, the road to peace in Baghdad runs through Jerusalem.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser in the Carter administration, offers the following insights in a column appearing in yesterday's New York Times:

Both candidates have become prisoners of a worldview that fundamentally misdiagnoses the central challenge of our time. President Bush's "global war on terror" is a politically expedient slogan without real substance, serving to distort rather than define. It obscures the central fact that a civil war within Islam is pitting zealous fanatics against increasingly intimidated moderates. The undiscriminating American rhetoric and actions increase the likelihood that the moderates will eventually unite with the jihadists in outraged anger and unite the world of Islam in a head-on collision with America.

Brzezinski lays out the plan that has so raised the ire of Krauthammer and Safire:

In fact, in the Islamic world at large as well as in Europe, Mr. Bush's policy is becoming conflated in the public mind with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's policy in Gaza and the West Bank. Fueled by anti-American resentments, that policy is widely caricatured as a crude reliance on power, semicolonial in its attitude, and driven by prejudice toward the Islamic world. The likely effect is that staying on course under Mr. Bush will remain a largely solitary American adventure...

To get the Europeans to act, any new administration will have to confront them with strategic options. The Europeans need to be convinced that the United States recognizes that the best way to influence the eventual outcome of the civil war within Islam is to shape an expanding Grand Alliance (as opposed to a polarizing Holy Alliance) that embraces the Middle East by taking on the region's three most inflammatory and explosive issues: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the mess in Iraq, and the challenge of a restless and potentially dangerous Iran.

In opposition to the admonitions of Krauthammer and Safire, Brzezinski offers an alternate interpretation, that is nothing like foresaking Israel. It looks more like a sensible first step in tackling what has been a problem that has stubbornly resisted resolution for over half a century:

While each issue is distinct and immensely complex, each affects the others. The three must be tackled simultaneously, and they can be tackled effectively only if America and Europe cooperate and engage the more moderate Muslim states.

A grand American-European strategy would have three major prongs. The first would be a joint statement by the United States and the European Union outlining the basic principles of a formula for an Israeli-Palestinian peace, with the details left to negotiations between the parties. Its key elements should include no right of return; no automatic acceptance of the 1967 lines but equivalent territorial compensation for any changes; suburban settlements on the edges of the 1967 lines incorporated into Israel, but those more than a few miles inside the West Bank vacated to make room for the resettlement of some of the Palestinian refugees; a united Jerusalem serving as the capitals of the two states; and a demilitarized Palestinian state with some international peacekeeping presence.

Nothing in that prescription for peace spells doom for Israel. I, like Safire, hope that Jewish Americans consider the safety, stability and security of Israel, in addition to the progressive social issues Safire enumerated, when they cast their ballots one week from today. If they do, I think they will understand that unconditional support for every action and policy of Ariel Sharon is not the best way to achieve those ends, and the results make Israel, America, and the rest of the world a more dangerous place.

[Update: Richard Cohen in the Washington Post offers some interesting insights that supports some of my position:

"No doubt George Bush is a true friend of Israel. But so was Bill Clinton and so would be John Kerry. This is an American political reality -- a reflection of sturdy Democratic and Republican positions, plus a national affinity for a fellow democracy. The issue is not who cares more for Israel but who can be effective in reducing the violence and bring about a peaceful solution. So far, that's not been George Bush."]

In Part III of a three-part series on the comparative foreign policy outlook of each presidential candidate, I made the case that the image of John Kerry as "weak" on national security is a case built more on propaganda than on fact, especially when viewed in comparison to president Bush's dubious record in this arena. Yes, Bush did choose to launch a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq, but this should not be confused with "strength" nor should its opposition be viewed as "weakness," although it should be noted that Kerry did not oppose the invasion per se, just the time and manner under which it was carried out.

That is a common flaw in our own human nature: the perception that violence is the equivalent of strength, while diplomatic and measured solutions are weaker - for example, in foreign policy jargon, the former is called "hard power" while the latter is termed "soft." What is more important than "hardness" or "softness" is effectiveness. Strong or not, the invasion of Iraq has been anything but effective vis a vis the effort to stave off the appeal and support for radical anti-American jihadist ideology - not to mention recent revelations that nuclear facilities and dangerous explosives were left unguarded to looters after the invasion. In another sense, President Reagan was not "weak" because he never invaded the Soviet Union - and, similarly, such a military action should not have been considered "strong" had he or any of his predecessors decided on that foolish course of action. That is because wars are messy things, with myriad unintended, and often deliterious, consequences. They destabilize regions, breed more violence, and often sow the seeds for future conflicts. What's so right about that kind of might?

Still, Bush supporters persist in their contention that Kerry does not understand the post-9/11 world (whatever that is supposed to mean), that he is too weak to wage an effective war on terror, and that his instincts are too frequently in opposition to the use of military force. His votes authorizing such force in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq do nothing to assuage those fears because military force is "strong" (apparently Afghanistan wasn't "strong" enough).

In that context, I wonder what Bush's supporters would say about a leader who nixed three different Pentagon plans to launch strikes on known terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi before the invasion of Iraq. Would that be considered "strong" or "weak?" Would such a decision indicate a firm grasp of the new post-9/11 world or a weak caving to political concerns?

A story which first broke in March, that I first covered in May, has been given new life by a recent article appearing in, of all sources, the not-so-liberal Wall Street Journal.

Fred Kaplan, writing for Slate.com, provided the following synopsis of the three missed opportunities, and what were the immediate motivations for drafting the plans:

As far back as June 2002, U.S. intelligence reported that Zarqawi had set up a weapons lab at Kirma in northern Iraq that was capable of producing ricin and cyanide. The Pentagon drew up an attack plan involving cruise missiles and smart bombs. The White House turned it down. In October 2002, intelligence reported that Zarqawi was preparing to use his bio-weapons in Europe. The Pentagon drew up another attack plan. The White House again demurred. In January 2003, police in London arrested terrorist suspects connected to the camp. The Pentagon devised another attack plan. Again, the White House killed the plan, not Zarqawi.

Journalist and blogger Laura Rozen ponders why this story has resurfaced, quoting from the Wall Street Journal article:

Why is this story coming out now? Because the fearmongerer in chief Cheney ordered a review of Zarqawi that points out how criminally incompetent his White House has been:

Questions about whether the U.S. missed an opportunity to take out Mr. Zarqawi have been enhanced recently by a CIA report on Mr. Zarqawi, commissioned by Vice President Dick Cheney. Individuals who have been briefed on the report's contents say it specifically cites evidence that Mr. Zarqawi was in the camp during those prewar months. They said the CIA's conclusion was based in part on a review of electronic intercepts, which show that Mr. Zarqawi was using a satellite telephone to discuss matters relating to the camp, and that the intercepts indicated the probability that the calls were being made from inside the camp.

Another reason this story appears to be re-emerging is the fact that the Wall Street Journal has received acknowledgement of its veracity from Pentagon officials and Bush administration insiders. Tim Dunlop, of The Road To Surfdom, excerpts some key paragraphs of the story:

As the toll of mayhem inspired by terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi mounts in Iraq, some former officials and military officers increasingly wonder whether the Bush administration made a mistake months before the start of the war by stopping the military from attacking his camp in the northeastern part of that country.

The Pentagon drew up detailed plans in June 2002, giving the administration a series of options for a military strike on the camp Mr. Zarqawi was running then in remote northeastern Iraq, according to generals who were involved directly in planning the attack and several former White House staffers...

Senior Pentagon officials who were involved in planning the attack said that even by spring 2002 Mr. Zarqawi had been identified as a significant terrorist target, based in part on intelligence that the camp he earlier ran in Afghanistan had been attempting to make chemical weapons, and because he was known as the head of a group that was plotting, and training for, attacks against the West. He already was identified as the ringleader in several failed terrorist plots against Israeli and European targets. In addition, by late 2002, while the White House still was deliberating over attacking the camp, Mr. Zarqawi was known to have been behind the October 2002 assassination of a senior American diplomat in Amman, Jordan.

But the raid on Mr. Zarqawi didn't take place. Months passed with no approval of the plan from the White House, until word came down just weeks before the March 19, 2003, start of the Iraq war that Mr. Bush had rejected any strike on the camp until after an official outbreak of hostilities with Iraq. Ultimately, the camp was hit just after the invasion of Iraq began.

Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, who was in the White House as the National Security Council's director for combating terrorism at the time, said an NSC working group, led by the Defense Department, had been in charge of reviewing the plans to target the camp. She said the camp was "definitely a stronghold, and we knew that certain individuals were there including Zarqawi." Ms. Gordon-Hagerty said she wasn't part of the working group and never learned the reason why the camp wasn't hit. But she said that much later, when reports surfaced that Mr. Zarqawi was behind a series of bloody attacks in Iraq, she said "I remember my response," adding, "I said why didn't we get that ['son of a b-'] when we could." [emphasis added throughout]

The reasons for rejecting all three of the Pentagon's plans of attack are contested by members of the Bush administration, but many close to the operation offer their own insights. As reported by MSNBC.com:

"People were more obsessed with developing the coalition to overthrow Saddam than to execute the president's policy of preemption against terrorists," according to terrorism expert and former National Security Council member Roger Cressey.

Military officials insist their case for attacking Zarqawi's operation was airtight, but the administration feared destroying the terrorist camp in Iraq could undercut its case for war against Saddam.

Fred Kaplan offers the following observations regarding the rationale for postponing the strikes until after the invasion:

But the problem, from Bush's perspective, was that this was the only tangible evidence of terrorists in Iraq. Colin Powell even showed the location of the camp on a map during his famous Feb. 5 briefing at the U.N. Security Council. The camp was in an area of Iraq that Saddam didn't control. But never mind, it was something. To wipe it out ahead of time might lead some people - in Congress, the United Nations, and the American public - to conclude that Saddam's links to terrorists were finished, that maybe the war wasn't necessary. So Bush let it be.

The logic of the Bush administration's response to these charges is thin at best:

Administration officials say the attack was set aside for a variety of reasons, including uncertain intelligence reports on Mr. Zarqawi's whereabouts and the difficulties of hitting him within a large complex.

Another reason cited was a fear of collateral damage. Several high ranking military personnel take issue with certain elements of the Bush team's version of the risks and prospects for success:

Some former officials said the intelligence on Mr. Zarqawi's whereabouts was sound. In addition, retired Gen. John M. Keane, the U.S. Army's vice chief of staff when the strike was considered, said that because the camp was isolated in the thinly populated, mountainous borderlands of northeastern Iraq, the risk of collateral damage was minimal. Former military officials said that adding to the target's allure was intelligence indicating that Mr. Zarqawi himself was in the camp at the time. A strike at the camp, they believed, meant at least a chance of killing or incapacitating him.

Gen. Keane characterized the camp "as one of the best targets we ever had," and questioned the decision not to attack it. When the U.S. did strike the camp a day after the war started, Mr. Zarqawi, many of his followers and Kurdish extremists belonging to his organization already had fled, people involved with intelligence say. [emphasis added]

Fred Kaplan backs up General Keane's account with other factors that favored action:

This camp was in the Kurdish enclave of Iraq. The U.S. military had been mounting airstrikes against various targets throughout Iraq - mainly air-defense sites - for the previous few years. It would not have been a major escalation to destroy this camp, especially after the war against al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The Kurds, whose autonomy had been shielded by U.S. air power since the end of the 1991 war, wouldn't have minded and could even have helped.

How can the Bush administration's version of events be trusted? What exactly changed after the invasion that made a strike on the Zarqawi's camp more palatable? Was the intelligence of his whereabouts suddenly more trustworthy - even though he wasn't there by the time they got around to attacking? Was the risk of collateral damage magically mitigated? I find these arguments implausible, especially considering our willingness to launch so many poorly informed "decapitation strikes" against Saddam Hussein and his underlings immediately after the invasion. As the New York Times reported in June of this year:

The United States launched many more failed airstrikes on a far broader array of senior Iraqi leaders during the early days of the war last year than has previously been acknowledged, and some caused significant civilian casualties, according to senior military and intelligence officials...

An unclassified Air Force report issued in April 2003 categorized 50 attacks from March 19 to April 18 as having been time-sensitive strikes on Iraqi leaders. An up-to-date accounting posted on the Web site of the United States Central Command shows that 43 of the top 55 Iraqi leaders on the most-wanted list have now been taken into custody or killed, but that none were taken into custody until April 13, 2003, and that none were killed by airstrikes.[emphasis added]

If the Bush team was willing to move on shaky intelligence to launch airstrikes in heavily populated urban areas, causing significant civilian casualties, in order to take out senior Baathist leaders, why were they so reluctant to target Zarqawi in a sparsely populated area? The answer appears to be that the man who is supposedly "tough on terror" was so preoccupied with the impending invasion of Iraq that, in addition to drawing away valuable resources from the hunt against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and abroad, he let known terrorists remain at large for fear of undermining his case for war. That's not tough, that's distracted. I am more than confident that John Kerry would have listened to the military personnel in his Pentagon, if for no other reason than most presidents do. It is the the Bush administration that has shown a near unprecedented pattern of hostility and confrontation with the military leadership in the Pentagon. How, exactly, is that a position of strength?

In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king - or when speaking of this country, president. Such are the troubling findings from a series of polls conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). What the findings suggest is that the majority of Bush's supporters are ignorant regarding several of the key foreign policy realities that exist and affect the positions of each candidate. Please note that I am not saying that all Bush supporters are ignorant. Quite clearly that is not the case, especially in the blogosphere which tends to attract hyper-informed watchers from all political camps. That being said, there is a disturbing trend:

Even after the final report of Charles Duelfer to Congress saying that Iraq did not have a significant WMD program, 72% of Bush supporters continue to believe that Iraq had actual WMD (47%) or a major program for developing them (25%). Fifty-six percent assume that most experts believe Iraq had actual WMD and 57% also assume, incorrectly, that Duelfer concluded Iraq had at least a major WMD program. Kerry supporters hold opposite beliefs on all these points.

Similarly, 75% of Bush supporters continue to believe that Iraq was providing substantial support to al Qaeda, and 63% believe that clear evidence of this support has been found. Sixty percent of Bush supporters assume that this is also the conclusion of most experts, and 55% assume, incorrectly, that this was the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission. Here again, large majorities of Kerry supporters have exactly opposite perceptions. [emphasis added]

Some of these numbers are quite startling, and some are easier to explain. Part of the blame for the confusion lies with Bush administration officials themselves. On numerous occasions, both President Bush and Vice President Cheney have declared that we have found WMD's in Iraq, only to have their bold statements qualified and spun later by press secretaries and media liasons (Cheney being the more frequent offender of the two). Unfortunately for the public, and fortunate for Bush/Cheney, many Americans do not have the time or interest level to search out the subsequent corrections and qualifications, especially if their only news source is a less than fair or balanced one. Cheney has also been stubbornly persistent in misinforming the public about the illusory connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam, continuing to parrot information that has been proven unreliable and false - even in the face of stern rebukes from bi-partisan sources like the 9/11 Commission. Looking at the results, it is hard to argue with the strategy - unless you appeal to the more noble sense of democracy and respect for the public. Apparently Bush and Cheney do not.

Part of the problem can also be attributed to cognitive dissonance - or the ability of human beings to ignore or disregard facts or realities that contradict a pre-conceived notion of the world or a particular series of events. As George Lakoff and others have noted, facts don't always carry the day, especially in a political context. Human nature and our physical makeup are not always a facts-friendly landscape. Here is an excerpt from his book Don't Think Of An Elephant!:

Neuroscience tells us that each of the concepts we have - the long-term concepts that structure how we think - is instantiated in the synapses of our brains. Concepts are not things that can be changed just by someone telling us a fact. We may be presented with facts, but for us to make sense of them, they have to fit what is already in the synapses of the brain. Otherwise facts go in and they go right back out. They are not heard, or they are not accepted as fact, or they mystify us: Why would anyone have said that? Then we label the fact as irrational, crazy, or stupid. [p. 17, emphasis added]

Lakoff makes a compelling case, especially when you consider all the evidence of hostility to the facts, which does not end with WMDs and al-Qaeda connections:

This tendency of Bush supporters to ignore dissonant information extends to other realms as well. Despite an abundance of evidence--including polls conducted by Gallup International in 38 countries, and more recently by a consortium of leading newspapers in 10 major countries--only 31% of Bush supporters recognize that the majority of people in the world oppose the US having gone to war with Iraq. Forty-two percent assume that views are evenly divided, and 26% assume that the majority approves. Among Kerry supporters, 74% assume that the majority of the world is opposed.

Similarly, 57% of Bush supporters assume that the majority of people in the world would favor Bush's reelection; 33% assumed that views are evenly divided and only 9% assumed that Kerry would be preferred. A recent poll by GlobeScan and PIPA of 35 of the major countries around the world found that in 30, a majority or plurality favored Kerry, while in just 3 Bush was favored. On average, Kerry was preferred more than two to one.

The director of PIPA, Steven Kull, takes a position similar to Lakoff's when he weighs in on the effects of cognitive dissonance amongst Bush supporters:

"The roots of the Bush supporters' resistance to information," according to Steven Kull, "very likely lie in the traumatic experience of 9/11 and equally in the near pitch-perfect leadership that President Bush showed in its immediate wake. This appears to have created a powerful bond between Bush and his supporters--and an idealized image of the President that makes it difficult for his supporters to imagine that he could have made incorrect judgments before the war, that world public opinion could be critical of his policies or that the President could hold foreign policy positions that are at odds with his supporters."

While I appreciate the psychological roots of this almost willful ignorance, cognitive dissonance alone is not the only factor. As I mentioned above, the Bush/Cheney administration has been deft at manipulating public opinion on several of these issues of fact by releasing misinformation, stubbornly defending it, and then leaving it to impartial fact-checkers to parse truth from propaganda after many Americans, and most Bush supporters, have tuned out. But there is also another factor: the right wing media and punditry have created a cocoon of sorts, that shields Bush supporters from the nastiness of facts that run contrary to pre-conceived notions. In this sense, entities like Fox News, enable the ignorance that cognitive dissonance initiates. Journalist Eric Alterman describes the findings of another PIPA study:

An in-depth study undertaken for the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes and published around the time of the second anniversary of the attacks found that over sixty percent of Americans believed one of the following misperceptions:

1. There's clear evidence that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein worked closely with the Sept. 11 terrorists.
2. U.S. forces found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
3. People in foreign countries generally either backed the U.S. - led war or were evenly split between supporting and opposing it.

Moreover, the researchers discovered a direct correlation between these misperceptions and the consumption of television news as opposed to newspapers or National Public Radio. According to its figures, 80 percent of Fox News' audience and 71 percent of CBS's bought into at least one of the above falsehoods. Meanwhile only 47 percent of newspaper and magazine readers and just 23 percent of those who said they relied on PBS or NPR found themselves similarly misled. And lest we forget, phony ideas have consequences. Support for Bush's war reached 53 percent among those who believed one of the lies, 78 percent among those who accepted two of them and a full 86 percent among those who embraced all three. Meanwhile fewer than a quarter of people who understood the truth of the situation--rejecting all three phony canards - were willing to take a trip on Bush and Cheney's not-so excellent adventure. [emphasis added]

With this in mind, I am a little pessimistic that the latest bombshell of bad news emanating from Iraq will sway any die-hard Bush supporters - despite the implications of what conservative pundit Andrew Sullivan described as "criminal negligence." I am referring to the article which appears in today's New York Times which contains the startling revelation that "380 tons of powerful conventional explosives - used to demolish buildings, make missile warheads and detonate nuclear weapons - are missing from one of Iraq's most sensitive former military installations."

This is one more bit of evidence which lends credence to the assertion that the Bush team's plan for post-war Iraq is a model of incompetence and poor judgment. There never were enough troops in Iraq to perform all of the necessary tasks post-invasion: providing security, creating lawful order, preventing looting, patrolling the borders, and quelling the insurgency. That this facility was not considered enough of a priority to receive adequate protection is either a testament to the dearth of adequate forces, or just plain reckless negligence. Take your pick.

The huge facility, called Al Qaqaa, was supposed to be under American military control but is now a no man's land, still picked over by looters as recently as Sunday. United Nations weapons inspectors had monitored the explosives for many years, but White House and Pentagon officials acknowledge that the explosives vanished sometime after the American-led invasion last year.

What is most discouraging is the fact that these facilities, and the materials they stored, were known about before the war, and were in fact policed and safeguarded by weapons inspectors and nuclear watchdogs. Our invasion of Iraq has actually unleashed a threat that was previously contained - a self-fulfilling prophecy of Iraq's danger to the world.

The International Atomic Energy Agency publicly warned about the danger of these explosives before the war, and after the invasion it specifically told United States officials about the need to keep the explosives secured, European diplomats said in interviews last week. Administration officials say they cannot explain why the explosives were not safeguarded, beyond the fact that the occupation force was overwhelmed by the amount of munitions they found throughout the country....

Earlier this month, in a letter to the I.A.E.A. in Vienna, a senior official from Iraq's Ministry of Science and Technology wrote that the stockpile disappeared after early April 2003 because of "the theft and looting of the governmental installations due to lack of security."

And they had good reason to be concerned about these particular munitions. Here is a brief summary of the destructive capacity of some of the materials looted from the site:

American weapons experts say their immediate concern is that the explosives could be used in major bombing attacks against American or Iraqi forces: the explosives, mainly HMX and RDX, could produce bombs strong enough to shatter airplanes or tear apart buildings...

The explosives could also be used to trigger a nuclear weapon, which was why international nuclear inspectors had kept a watch on the material, and even sealed and locked some of it. The other components of an atom bomb - the design and the radioactive fuel - are more difficult to obtain....

More worrisome to the I.A.E.A. - and to some in Washington - is that HMX and RDX are used in standard nuclear weapons design. In a nuclear implosion weapon, the explosives crush a hollow sphere of uranium or plutonium into a critical mass, initiating the nuclear explosion.

Think about the implications for a moment. The United States invaded Iraq because Saddam supposedly had vast "stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons" (to quote Donald Rumsfeld), but we didn't plan ahead to provide the necessary troop presence to secure even the most sensitive of sites? What if the Bush administration was right about Saddam's WMDs? What if his arsenal was extensive and far flung, what position would we be in now? In a sense, we should all be thankful that the Bush team was so spectacularly wrong and dishonest about the WMD threat that Iraq posed. If they had been right, is there any doubt that Saddam's WMDs would be disseminated throughout the world, ending up in the hands of terrorists - which was the pre-invasion worst case scenario.

While that is cause for some comfort, the weapons that have already escaped present their own unique threats.

A special property of HMX and RDX lends them to smuggling and terrorism, experts said. While violently energetic when detonated, they are insensitive to shock and physical abuse during handling and transport because of their chemical stability. A hammer blow does nothing. It takes a detonator, like a blasting cap, to release the stored energy.

Experts said the insensitivity made them safer to transport than the millions of unexploded shells, mines and pieces of live ammunition that litter Iraq. And its benign appearance makes it easy to disguise as harmless goods, easily slipped across borders.

Those properties, and the destructive capacity of HMX and RDX, might explain the meaning of "an internal I.A.E.A. memorandum [which] warned that terrorists might be helping 'themselves to the greatest explosives bonanza in history.'"

Rather than viewing this latest revelation concerning the bgreathtaking dimensions of the Bush administration's gross incompetence in the planning and execution of the war, the forces of cognitive dissonance will likely push these unfortunate facts out of the reasoning of Bush's staunchest supporters. That being said, there is hope that news such as this will help to inform and influence moderates who are not so firmly entrenched in either camp and whose minds are more apt to process information impartially. One week from tomorrow, we will behold whether truth or ignorance prevails.

[Update: Cyndy at MouseMusings has concocted a telling timeline of the looting of various sensitive facilities in Iraq and the subsequent release, or leaking, of that information to the public.]

Spurred on by the good natured ribbing of Mick Arran, I am inching closer to actually inserting a bit more of my own wry sense of humor into posts on this site - which should provide a much needed balance to my dry lawyerly tone. In the meantime, I will take advantage of this one I swiped from Altercation

What's the difference between Vietnam and Iraq?

Bush had a plan for getting out of Vietnam.

That would be funny if it weren't so utterly tragic.

It is shocking: The Bush administration is suppressing a CIA report on 9/11 until after the election, and this one names names. Although the report by the inspector general's office of the CIA was completed in June, it has not been made available to the congressional intelligence committees that mandated the study almost two years ago.

"It is infuriating that a report which shows that high-level people were not doing their jobs in a satisfactory manner before 9/11 is being suppressed," an intelligence official who has read the report told me, adding that "the report is potentially very embarrassing for the administration, because it makes it look like they weren't interested in terrorism before 9/11, or in holding people in the government responsible afterward."

So begins an article written by Robert Scheer appearing in the L.A. Times on Tuesday. While this story has been circulating throughout the blogosphere (hat tips to Mick Arran and Tim Dunlop), I wanted to make sure that it receives maximum exposure, attention, and a measured dose of outrage - or for the more jaded amongst us, stern condemnation. In addition, there are some aspects of this controversy that I wanted to address, which have gone unmentioned thus far.

First, let's establish the parameters of what is going on with this report. The CIA conducted "an exhaustive 17-month investigation by an 11-member team within the agency" in order to determine what went wrong within the various branches of the government in the run-up to the tragic attacks of 9/11. The report was finished in June of this year, or roughly five months ago, yet that information is being withheld from Congress and the American people despite efforts from both Republicans and Democrats:

Rep. Jane Harman, D-Calif., ranking Democratic member of the House Intelligence Committee, said she and committee chairman Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., sent a letter 14 days ago asking for it to be delivered.

The release of the report was first quashed by acting CIA director John McLaughlin and now President Bush's appointee, Porter J. Goss, has continued to withhold the documents. There is no reason beyond pure partisan politics to deny the American people access to the findings of their own government.

By law, the only legitimate reason the CIA director has for holding back such a report is national security. Yet neither Goss nor McLaughlin has invoked national security as an explanation for not delivering the report to Congress.

The reticence regarding the rationale for withholding the information on the part of Goss and McLaughlin is not an accident. According to the sources Scheer cites, "[the report] surely does not involve issues of national security." This is more than likely the case, especially since they plan on releasing the report after the election. Are we to assume that the national security concerns magically vanish on November 3rd? Scheer's source provides further evidence that the Bush administration is trying to manipulate the release of information to the American people:

"No previous director of CIA has ever tried to stop the inspector general from releasing a report to the Congress, in this case a report requested by Congress."

I do not think I am overstating the case when I say that this is an outrageous circumvention of our very democracy. The administration is taking the position that the less the American people know about the incumbent, the better. In truth, democracy depends on a well informed population. But this case is even more egregious because of the rhetoric emanating from Bush's camp.

Remember, it was Vice President Cheney who warned that al-Qaeda would attack America again if the people decide to elect John Kerry. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert insisted that al-Qaeda would rather Kerry get elected, citing no evidence of his own, and despite actual evidence to the contrary. The Republican Convention, and indeed the entire breadth of Bush's campaign, has been predicated on the notion that Bush's team is the one to trust in the "war on terror," and that John Kerry will expose us to danger. Given all of that, it is that much more crucial that the American people are provided with as accurate a picture as possible of Bush's actual performance in that war on terror? Apparently the Bush administration doesn't think so.

From a tactical point of view, they are probably wise to sit on this report:

It most certainly will detail how the Attorney General himself chastised his staff to stop bothering him with all those pesky reports on terrorist activities. Or maybe it would mention the fact that before 9/11, John Ashcroft proposed slashing counterterrorism funding by 23 percent. It might also point out that, despite her protestations to the contrary, the National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, is actually supposed to coordinate intelligence from various agencies. One can only speculate that the CIA's findings might take the view that the daily briefings provided the president pre-9/11 were sufficiently specific to raise the level of alarm in relevant areas of the government - especially if George Tenet's hair really was on fire. It's safe to say that the report might also go harder on the administration than even Richard Benveniste did during the hearings - for which he was accused of partisan grandstanding.

But from the point of view of responsible leadership in a democracy, this is inexcusable. I anticipate some on the right will respond with one of the most bizarre memes that has begun making the rounds in the conservative punditry: that the CIA is dominated by leftists. That's right, that was not a typo, I have seen it now on more than one occasion - we are supposed to believe that the CIA is now a left-wing organization. Apparently the right wing in this country has drifted so far to the extreme of the poles that they consider the CIA of all places to be overrun by Democrats with a partisan axe to grind. I can think of no other time in history that a Republican administration has had so openly hostile and contentious a relationship with the CIA - not to mention their own State Department. Trust me when I say this, it is not the notoriously slow to change CIA that has undergone a radical re-alignment of political affiliations, it is that this administration has embraced a radical ideology that defies traditional conservative and right wing values.

Speaking of which, didn't Porter Goss assure the skeptics that he would be a non-partisan CIA director - an honest broker and straight shooter. Wasn't the whole point of the reforms suggested by the 9/11 Commission to remove the influence that partisan politics would have over intelligence gathering and dissemination in light of the Iraq debacle and 9/11 breakdowns? So in his first significant act as director of the Agency, Goss decides to go out of his way to suppress a document in the furtherance of base partisan politics - to the detriment of the American policy and our increasingly fragile democracy.

I don't know about you, but I'm impressed.

In Part I of this series, I attempted to provide a frame work for discussing the terrorist threat we face by describing the identity, motivations, goals and nature of our enemies - specifically al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations. In the second Part, I outlined the major components of the theory of democracy promotion as a means of combating the spread and appeal of anti-American jihadist thinking - and how the Bush administration has put this theory into action through the controversial means of pre-emptive invasion in Iraq.

In this Part, I want to discuss the differing strategies for combating the terrorist threat put forward by each presidential candidate, as well as analyze the impact of Bush's policies over the past three years, and further explore alternative strategies for encouraging the promotion of democracy that do not involve the relatively ineffective means of militaristic intervention.

The motivation for this three part series was to address some questions and attitudes that have been expressed in the comments section at this site, elsewhere in the blogosphere, and in the mainstream media. The ideas in question pertain to an agnosticism regarding John Kerry's grasp of the terrorist threat, and whether or not the policies he employs to confront such a threat will be sufficiently muscular in size and scope.

Spencer Ackerman, in an article in The New Republic, describes the dilemma that John Kerry and his supporters are grappling with:

Not even clear, declarative sentences--"I will hunt down and kill the terrorists wherever they are"--have saved John Kerry from the perception that he is too weak to fight the war on terrorism. An Annenberg poll released last week found that, by a 14-point margin, respondents trusted President Bush more than the Massachusetts senator to protect the nation from Al Qaeda. And it's not just Kerry's strength that is in question--it's his judgment.

In discussing the increasing likelihood that he will cast a vote in favor of John Kerry this November, right-leaning blogger Daniel Drezner echoes these concerns:

[H]ow can I trust that John Kerry gets the post-9/11 world? How can I be sure that Kerry's policymaking process will be sufficiently good so as to overwhelm Kerry's instinctual miscues?

I admit to being a bit perplexed by statements like these. First of all, why assume that John Kerry or any other politician in Washington, DC doesn't "get the post-9/11 world" - whatever that nebulous statement is supposed to mean anyway. Rest assured Mr. Drezner, and all other skeptics, John Kerry has the wit and intellect to fully grasp the dangers we face, and he has an impressive plan to deal with this unique threat, which I will discuss below. What is even more puzzling, though, is that while Drezner acknowledges the confounding lack of policymaking process in the Bush White House, one that turns empiricism on its head by assuming the conclusion and then seeking evidence to support it, Drezner admits to preferring Bush's foreign policy "instincts" over Kerry's. Publius at Legal Fiction expresses my issue with such arguments from intelligent minds such as Drezner's:

I mean, good Lord. Foreign policy instincts?! Trustworthiness in the war on terror?! These are reasons to consider voting for Bush? George W. Bush? The same Bush who spearheaded the biggest strategic military blunder in American history? The same Bush who presided over the most incompetently run post-war operation in American history? The same Bush who pissed away the goodwill of the entire world - and brags about doing so? I, for one, consider the invasion itself to show (1) a fundamental misunderstanding of the post-9/11 world; and (2) a woeful ignorance of the most basic history of Iraq and the Middle East. But people can disagree about the wisdom of the invasion in good faith. They cannot do the same with respect to the occupation. It's been a disaster - just a disaster. The KnightRidder article summed the whole thing perfectly with the image of an empty slide that read "To be provided." Foreign policy instincts - give me a friggin' break.

Bush's Record

I am familiar with the old adage that people prefer the devil they know over the one they don't, but in the present context the devil we know has been so staggeringly incompetent in all aspects of his foreign policy that it is hard to imagine John Kerry, or any other Republican or Democrat for that matter, being any worse. It is a testament to the campaign management of Karl Rove that so many Americans are so quick to parrot their mistrust of Kerry's ability to secure the nation when the evidence of Bush's failure is so overwhelming. The constant repetition of an idea serves to solidify that notion as perceived truth in the mind of the public without any further analysis required. James Fallows describes the magnitude of the fiasco - which, judging by the polls, is the best kept secret in the Beltway:

Over the past two years I have been talking with a group of people at the working level of America's anti-terrorism efforts. Most are in the military, the intelligence agencies, and the diplomatic service; some are in think tanks and nongovernmental agencies. I have come to trust them, because most of them have no partisan ax to grind with the Administration (in the nature of things, soldiers and spies are mainly Republicans), and because they have so far been proved right. In the year before combat started in Iraq, they warned that occupying the country would be far harder than conquering it. As the occupation began, they pointed out the existence of plans and warnings the Administration seemed determined to ignore.

As a political matter, whether the United States is now safer or more vulnerable is of course ferociously controversial. That the war was necessary - and beneficial - is the Bush Administration's central claim. That it was not is the central claim of its critics. But among national-security professionals there is surprisingly little controversy. Except for those in government and in the opinion industries whose job it is to defend the Administration's record, they tend to see America's response to 9/11 as a catastrophe. I have sat through arguments among soldiers and scholars about whether the invasion of Iraq should be considered the worst strategic error in American history - or only the worst since Vietnam. Some of these people argue that the United States had no choice but to fight, given a pre-war consensus among its intelligence agencies that Iraq actually had WMD supplies. Many say that things in Iraq will eventually look much better than they do now. But about the conduct and effect of the war in Iraq one view prevails: it has increased the threats America faces, and has reduced the military, financial, and diplomatic tools with which we can respond.

"Let me tell you my gut feeling," a senior figure at one of America's military-sponsored think tanks told me recently, after we had talked for twenty minutes about details of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. "If I can be blunt, the Administration is full of shit. In my view we are much, much worse off now than when we went into Iraq. That is not a partisan position. I voted for these guys. But I think they are incompetent, and I have had a very close perspective on what is happening. Certainly in the long run we have harmed ourselves. We are playing to the enemy's political advantage. Whatever tactical victories we may gain along the way, this will prove to be a strategic blunder." [emphasis added]

It is becoming increasingly difficult to refute Fallows' sources. The epicenter of Bush's failures in the war against the spread of anti-American jihadism is his decision to invade Iraq, and the flawed execution of such an audacious objective. In this sense, the failures in Iraq can be broken down into two categories: practical application and theoretical strategy.

On the practical side, there is little more that can be said on the dearth of postwar planning than what James Fallows described in his seminal piece entitled Blind Into Baghdad. In a display of counter-intuitive arrogance, and plain old bad instincts, the Bush team disregarded years of planning and expert input from the State Department, CIA, Army War College, and others as well as the counsel of the Pentagon's top military personnel, in favor of the predictions of con-man extraordinaire Ahmed Chalabi. This last minute scuttling of the Future of Iraq Project and its annexes left the Pentagon with relatively no time to come up with their own plan, which meant we were going in "blind" to Baghdad. The Knight Ridder article captures the moment well:

In March 2003, days before the start of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American war planners and intelligence officials met at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina to review the Bush administration's plans to oust Saddam Hussein and implant democracy in Iraq.

Near the end of his presentation, an Army lieutenant colonel who was giving a briefing showed a slide describing the Pentagon's plans for rebuilding Iraq after the war, known in the planners' parlance as Phase 4-C. He was uncomfortable with his material - and for good reason.

The slide said: "To Be Provided." [emphasis added]

Add to the decision to forego the planning of the experts in favor of the assurances of the "trustworthy" Chalabi, Bush's "instincts" led him to the wrong conclusions on just about every major decision in Iraq: insufficient troop levels designated for post-invasion support, disbanding the Iraqi Army, widespread de-Ba'athification, appointing novices with no experience to the CPA because of their ideological credentials, attempting to implement an experiment in extreme free-market/supply side economics instead of giving the local economy room to grow (which I posted about here), etc. To this volatile mixture of flawed reasoning and instincts gone awry, the Bush administration began to explore the legality of suspending the Geneva conventions on the use of torture in interrogation methods that led, in part, to the devastating Abu Ghraib torture scandal - which according to Army documents involved multiple murders, rapes, sodomies, and severe beatings - even for children detainees. To the horror of the world, after so singular a breakdown in policy, not one person of consequence was held accountable.

The results have been disastrous, and the future of Iraq remains cloudy at best, as insurgencies and ethnic tensions continue to simmer below the surface, poised to erupt into full blown conflict. Just look at the conclusions in three reports released recently from various well respected and non-partisan foreign policy think tanks: the Center for Strategic and International Studies (the group that Bremer and Rumsfeld used for studies on the progress of Iraq last July), the International Crisis Group and the Chatham House (part of the Royal Institute of International Affairs), which I summarized here. These are not liberal media organizations. They are in the business of realism - not pessimism or partisanship - and they are not interested in campaign slogans. The picture they paint is grim.

From a strategic point of view, Iraq has been an even larger debacle. First and foremost, as Fallows noted, which I pointed out in Part II of this series, the nation building and democracy promotion efforts in Afghanistan have been left to wither on the vine as resources, personnel, intelligence, and attention have been sucked into the vortex of Baghdad. The elections held during the past couple of weeks were an encouraging sign, but in reality, the prospects for a democratic Afghanistan remain dubious as well armed warlords continue to rule their fiefdoms, the central government remains ineffectually weak, opium production is surging, and hostile forces regroup in the southeast of the country.

Second, while many Bush supporters have cited the invasion of Iraq as a means by which we have shown our strength to other regimes and provided a deterrent for their future cooperations with terrorists, the Bush administration has in fact squandered the perceived military deterrent that the invasion of Afghanistan provided them. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, there were dire warnings about the fate of the Soviets, the hostility of the Afghan people, and the quagmire that would ensue. Instead, the US military was able to use superior air power and technology to bring about a lightning fast military victory, routing the Taliban and sending them fleeing to the hills. At that moment, the world trembled at the might of the United States military that could accomplish so daunting a task with minimal manpower and time. Iraq has changed all that. James Fallows notes:

Before America went to war in Iraq, its military power seemed limitless. There was less need to actually apply it when all adversaries knew that any time we did so we would win. Now the limits on our military's manpower and sustainability are all too obvious.

Although the military victory in Iraq was equally impressive, we have exposed our weaknesses and limitations to the entire world. We appear increasingly incapable of pacifying the insurgency, large portions of the country are unsafe for journalists and aid workers, not to mention military convoys, and there is no end in site. Our forces are bogged down and overstretched. Contrary to a deterrent, other nations such as Iran realize that our capacity to launch additional military forays has been severely compromised. Iran, strengthened by the United States' toppling of two longtime adversaries (Saddam and the Taliban), has been fearlessly advancing toward acquiring a nuclear weapon, safe in the belief that the United States could not begin a two front war, especially considering the likely reaction of the Shiite majority in Iraq should we invade its Shiite neighbor, Iran. North Korea is similarly aware of our hamstrung military. At a time when we are most in need of our military stick to wield in negotiations with these two regimes, it is sorely missing. Fallows describes the situation thusly:

President Bush began 2002 with a warning that North Korea and Iran, not just Iraq, threatened the world because of the nuclear weapons they were developing. With the United States preoccupied by Iraq, these other two countries surged ahead. They have been playing a game of chess, or nerves, against America - and if they have not exactly won, they have advanced by several moves. Because it lost time and squandered resources, the United States now has no good options for dealing with either country. It has fewer deployable soldiers and weapons; it has less international leverage through the "soft power" of its alliances and treaties; it even has worse intelligence, because so many resources are directed toward Iraq.

Grasping at straws, the Bush administration has been quick to point to Libya's agreement to renounce its WMD programs as a victory stemming from the military action in Iraq. In fact ( I posted about here), Libya's move was the result of over a decade of painstaking negotiation that Libya was pursuing in order to get out from under the onerous demands of the sanctions they were facing. Te progress with Libya was an example of the success of sanctions not pre-emptive warfare.

There are a host of other strategic setbacks that have been caused or exacerbated by the invasion of Iraq: our alliances have been strained, homeland security has been perilously underfunded, the economy is struggling due to war-born deficits, broader strategies for addressing the problem of terrorism, such as focusing on the Arab/Israeli peace process have been ignored, etc. But the most grievous result from the invasion of Iraq might be the losses we have suffered in the ideological battle with al-Qaeda. Ackerman notes:

Bush insists he understands that winning the war on terrorism involves, as he told Time in August, "a long-lasting ideological struggle" to mute Al Qaeda's allure. Yet the president's chief contribution to the ideological struggle has been the occupation of Iraq, which has horrified the very Muslims it was supposed to draw to America's side.

As I pointed out in Parts I and II of this series, winning the war of ideas with al-Qaeda is the only way to truly defeat our foes. Far from gaining an edge in this conflict, the invasion of Iraq has been the best case scenario for Bin Laden: expanding his recruitment efforts, giving rise to copycat groups, validating his propaganda, spreading his ideology like a virus, and causing his popularity and esteem to surge as America's plummets. While democracy promotion is an effective tool to make gains in the ideological war, Iraq was the wrong setting at the wrong time and, above all, military invasion was the wrong tactic. According to Fallows:

Regime change in Iraq, [Bush] said, would have a sweeping symbolic effect on worldwide sources of terror. That seems to have been true - but in the opposite way from what the President intended. It is hard to find a counterterrorism specialist who thinks that the Iraq War has reduced rather than increased the threat to the United States.

Unfortunately, Bush characteristically remains stubborn in his resolve that actions in Iraq, and other foreign policy decisions, do not inspire more terrorism or the appeal of that ideology:

Bush, of course, rejects this assessment. After Kerry gave an interview in August warning that Bush's policies were "actually encouraging the recruitment of terrorists," Bush fumed that Kerry's "logic is upside down...We don't create terrorists by fighting back. We defeat the terrorists by fighting back."

The evidence belies Bush's simplistic assessment. So do the off-the-cuff remarks of members of his own administration:

Last October, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wondered aloud in an internal Pentagon memo: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?... How do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassa schools?"

Bush's efforts at democracy promotion outside of his one-dimensional approach have been anemic at best - except for the creation of a few media assets that are largely disregarded as American propaganda by the target audience. Ackerman describes the situation thusly:

Beyond Iraq, the president has done little to promote Middle Eastern democracy beyond giving speeches to domestic audiences. In its final report, issued this July, the 9/11 Commission practically begged the Bush administration to "engage the struggle of ideas" in order to "prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism." Little wonder, then, that the perpetrators of the Madrid train bombings, the Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades, proclaimed themselves "very keen that Bush does not lose the upcoming elections" in a March statement to an Arabic newspaper.

Despite the wishful thinking of some of his supporters, exasperated at the approach he has doggedly clung to over the past three years, there is no indication that Bush will "change the course" in terms of his overall strategy and the tactics he has used to achieve those ends. Undaunted by the realities in Iraq, and with his neoconservative advisors close to him and the vice president, there is no telling what the next target for pre-emptive invasion and regime change would be. But we know what to expect in terms of policy.

Kerry's Approach

Although some have questioned his past national security record, it is important to parse fact from campaign fiction. John Kerry does not have the atrocious voting record on weapons systems and intelligence funding that the Bush/Cheney campaign would have you believe. John McCain even came out and stated that they were distorting Kerry's record and that he was, in fact, strong on defense. To put it in context, Kerry's votes came during a period in which Congress and the Republican presidency at the time were cutting defense spending across the board - taking advantage of the peace dividend. It is also worth noting that, according to his favorite fact-checking site, factcheck.org, Vice President Cheney himself, in his role as Secretary of Defense to the first President Bush, was in favor of cutting all the weapons programs Kerry voted to cut, and Cheney's proscribed budget would have reduced even more from the Pentagon's coffers than Kerry's votes.

Regarding Kerry's campaign rhetoric on the virtues of diplomacy and multilateral actions, this position has been greatly exaggerated. Far from requiring world approval for using force, Kerry is simply highlighting the Bush administration's deliberate failure to involve enough of our allies in as meaningful a role as was necessary to succeed in Iraq. This should come as no surprise though. Most of the President's closest advisors have very strong beliefs that multilateral approaches should be avoided and that international organizations, such as the UN, should be shunned. Is it any wonder that's the stance Bush took? In reality, the US military is capable of winning any military campaign on its own (more or less).

The international organizations and mutilateral involvement assist in the peacekeeping efforts. The robust, not symbolic, military involvement of other nations can reduce troop burdens on the US in the aftermath, and the expertise of NGO's and humanitarian groups from international organizations and foreign countries are invaluable to stabilizing the population. Not to mention the often underappreciated impression of legitimacy that the imprimatur of the UN provides. This matters when trying to win over hearts and minds.

Kerry has certainly been on the wrong side of some national security votes. He voted against Gulf War I, and against US involvement in the Balkans. While these are relevant, I caution against making too much out of them. More recently, he voted in favor of using force in Afghanistan and in authorizing the president to use force in Iraq. He is not a knee-jerk dove as some would have you believe. He understands the need to use military force, or at least have that option as a diplomatic tool, and is not hesitant to use it. His recent voting record indicates that he understands the stakes post-9/11.

More importantly, he has a better approach for actually winning the war against the spread and appeal of anti-American jihadism. He believes in the promotion of democracy as a means to that ends, but he believes that there are more efficient and successful ways to achieve the objectives other than pre-emptive military invasion.

Kerry would take the exact opposite tack. Far from imposing democracy from the top down, Kerry told a Los Angeles audience in February, "We must support human rights groups, independent media, and labor unions dedicated to building a democratic culture from the grassroots up." In this, Kerry has increasingly echoed Senator Joseph Biden, a leading candidate to be Kerry's secretary of state. Biden says he will tell regimes whose repression has indirectly bred terrorism, "I want to see you at least squint toward democracy.... John Kerry would have been funding openly, and supporting any way he could, democratic movements in these countries."

As Biden argues, "Kerry has a much broader notion of national security" than either his caricature or his opponent--a notion that recognizes that only an ideological campaign against Al Qaeda can protect the United States in the long run.

Kerry understands that the United States must be respected, admired and perceived as a moral force in order to inspire the people of these Muslim nations that our way is the best way - or at the very least that we are not seeking to annihilate them in some neo-crusade. He knows that we must undo the toxicity of America's image that has so undermined the work of pro-democracy reformers in the region in order to pave the way for organic change - which is a healthier transition that instantaneous upheaval. The Bush administration, on the other hand, seems oblivious as to the effects that its policies are having on the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims. Instead they have taken to targeting sensible voices like Professor Tariq Ramadan who was denied a visa by the Department of Homeland Security despite the University of Notre Dame's offer for him to teach at their institution. This is counterproductive to say the least.

In terms of overall appraisal of the threat, I think that John Kerry's instincts are a lot closer to reality than Bush's. For example, John Kerry grasps the fact that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups are small, transnational, loosely affiliated organizations that get their funding and support largely from the private sector or from failed states that they can hijack or bleed for resources. Bush is stuck in the pre-9/11 Cold War paradigm of nation states:

Ever since his September 20, 2001, address to Congress, and especially in his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush has emphasized the need to attack state sponsors of terrorism at least as much as actual terrorists. "One of the principal strategic thoughts underlying our strategy in the war on terrorism is the importance of the connection between terrorist organizations and their state sponsors," Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith explained to Nicholas Lemann of The New Yorker shortly before the invasion of Iraq. "Terrorist organizations cannot be effective in sustaining themselves over long periods of time to do large-scale operations if they don't have support from states. They need a base of operations. They need other types of assets that they get from their connection with their state sponsors--whether it's funding, or headquarters, or, in some cases, the use of diplomatic pouches and other types of facilities."

Simply put, this does not remotely describe Al Qaeda. When bin Laden lived in Sudan and Afghanistan from the mid-'90s until 2001, Al Qaeda effectively propped up the ruling regimes rather than the other way around. Nor did Al Qaeda's jihadists require sympathetic governments to support them as they planned and executed attacks: The September 11 hijackers proved murderously productive during their stays in Germany and the United States. Bin Laden and Zawahiri are believed to be in the lawless Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, but the presence of a hostile regime in Islamabad hasn't prevented them from inspiring attacks in places like Bali, Riyadh, Istanbul, and Madrid. Even if the United States overthrew every regime that so much as batted an eyelash at bin Laden, Al Qaeda's lethality in the three years after losing its Afghanistan sanctuary proves that a policy focused on ending "state sponsorship" will never destroy the network.

Kerry, by contrast, understands that the threat from Al Qaeda is not state-centric. Asked where the "center" of the war on terrorism is, Beers immediately replies, "There isn't one." He explains, "What Al Qaeda did during its Afghan period was to create a jihadist movement on a global basis. While Al Qaeda certainly has the financial wherewithal, the organizational skills, the tactical wherewithal to conduct significant operations à la the dual embassy bombing in Africa in 1998 or the World Trade Center-Pentagon attack in 2001, the fact that the major events since then have been conducted by organizations which were able to operate at a distance from and, to at least some degree, independent of central direction from Osama bin Laden is an indication. I wouldn't say that it's Al Qaeda 2.0, I'd say it's Global Terrorism 2.0. That means we're going to have to have a much broader and a much more comprehensive campaign that goes beyond the decapitation strategy that seems to excite George Bush."

In terms of specifics, Kerry also has a better more focused plan. He has measures to ease the strain on the military, he has plans to create a more effective fighting force, he considers homeland security to be a regime worthy of full attention and funding, he knows that the peace process in Israel must be restarted and urged on with our full diplomatic resolve, and he understands that repairing alliances and improving our image and standing in the world is necessary for success. Here are just a few examples:

Kerry and his advisers intend to refocus the nation's military and intelligence efforts on eliminating Al Qaeda directly. To achieve that, Kerry has endorsed the 9/11 Commission's plans for intelligence reform and has proposed enlarging the regular Army by 40,000 soldiers and doubling the Army's Special Forces capacity. Presently, Army Special Forces units--which include agile and innovative forces best trained and equipped to operate deep behind enemy lines and in nontraditional combat situations--total about 26,000 active and reserve personnel, or only 2 percent of the entire Army. Expanding Special Forces would expand the range of military options available when confronting jihadists in nations where large or conspicuous U.S. incursions are politically impossible--i.e., most of the approximately 60 countries where Al Qaeda operates. (Though Rumsfeld has increased U.S. Special Operations Command responsibility for counterterrorism operations, he plans to expand the Army's Special Forces by fewer than 800 soldiers by 2008.)

In closing, I urge the reader to look beyond the campaign spin and distortion, to what is the true nature of the ideas and programs that each candidate has put forward. With President Bush, we have a known quantity - but what exactly is "known" about it? There is a lengthy record of incompetence, poor judgment, and counterproductive actions that, according to most non-partisan observers, have made us less safe and cost us valuable ground in the ideological showdown for the soul of the Muslim world. His "instincts" have been proven wrong at every turn. Kerry on the other hand, has embraced the counsel of experts and specialists who have been observing these threats for years, with no ulterior ideological agenda to forward. While he might not have any magic bullets to solve the Iraqi situation, because the situation itself is a labyrinth of Catch-22s, at least we can be assured that he will use empiricism to make his decisions, and rely on expertise over loyalty or ideological homogeneity. It was Kerry, after all, who was urging for the course of action that President Bush has reluctantly, and with much delay, begun charting in Iraq. Maybe if he had listened to Kerry earlier, the situation would be better. There is no doubt in my mind that Kerry's presidency will be strong, pragmatic, balanced, reality-based, empirical, and effective. He will right the ship of state that has been listing for the past three years, seduced by the utopian siren's song of think tank veterans and confidence men. Simply put, there is nothing to fear in President Kerry.

In response to the libelous charges by Mick Arran that I am humorless and wooden in my fact-heavy analysis, I offer you all this little bit of film for your comedic pleasure. I am told that some people laugh when viewing such material. Either that, or get inspired to vote for the incumbent. Depends on your perspective I suppose.

[More: Here is the link to the much talked about Jon Stewart-Tucker Carlson clash on Crossfire. Pretty amusing stuff. Again, feel free to laugh.]

Here is an interesting perspective for any and all conservative fence-sitters (courtesy of Science and Politics):


"The Conservative Case For Kerry "
Clyde Prestowitz
Washington, DC


As a former Reagan-administration official, registered Republican, born-again Christian, and traditional conservative, I am going to vote for John Kerry. So are many other old-line Republicans. Here's why.

While the Bush administration calls itself "conservative," its use of the term is frankly Orwellian. It not only deprives the word of meaning, but also presents the administration's philosophy as the opposite of what it actually is.

Conservatives have always believed in fiscal responsibility: in being sure you could pay your way and in providing for the future. Conservatives pay down debt, rather than adding to it. This doesn't necessarily mean balancing the budget every year, but at a minimum it means striving toward balance as a top priority.

The Bush approach is completely at odds with such thinking. If any proof were needed, it was amply provided in the president's acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention. With Congressional Budget Office projections showing oceans of red ink for the indefinite future, President Bush promised more tax cuts. His audience cheered.

Conservatives are often well off, but they understand that the best way to preserve the society in which they are doing so well is to ensure that all its members can survive at a reasonable standard of living. It was the conservative Otto von Bismarck, after all, who first introduced social-security programs in 19th Century Germany for just that reason.

Conservatives do not loot the Treasury or bet the future health of their society on the chance that the best-case scenario will actually materialize. They provide for the worst case. So a conservative would have expected that the president's tax cuts and promises of more to come would at least have been accompanied by plans for cutting expenditures.

That expectation would have been disappointed, however, as the president promised about $1 trillion of new spending programs that, given his tax cuts, can be paid for only with red ink.

Which brings us to a second fundamental principle of conservatism: small government. From the founding of the Republic until now, conservatives have feared the threat to liberty posed by big government. Conservative icon Ronald Reagan came to power primarily by focusing on big government as the source of most of the country's problems. But the Bush administration has presided over a steady increase in the size of government, as federal expenditure has risen as a percentage of gross domestic product, after declining in the late 1990s.

Conservatives have never been enthusiastic about foreign adventures or about messianic undertakings. John Adams made the point early in our history when he emphasized that "America does not go abroad to slay dragons."

It was the liberal Democrats Woodrow Wilson and John Kennedy who committed the United States to making the world safe for democracy and to "bearing any burden and paying any price to assure the success of liberty." These are fine-sounding words, but they are not the words of conservatives. Thus, when President Bush promises to democratize the Mideast, conservatives cringe. So much so, in fact, that several former high-ranking officials of the Reagan and first Bush administrations have told me that they are not supporting the president for re-election.

This is because they know that, administration rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, we are not safer today than we were three years ago. Far from destroying al-Qaida and cutting its alleged links with Saddam Hussein, we have made Iraq into a magnet for terrorists. Worse, there is a real possibility that Osama bin Laden could gain control of our ally Pakistan, with its nuclear weapons and operational long-range missiles. Safe? Not on your life.

Nor are we freer. Conservatives are nothing if not steadfast defenders of individual rights, rule of law, and due process. Yet the Patriot Act and the procedures at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere have visibly infringed on all of these. It is ironic that even as it preaches about widening the circle of freedom abroad, the administration is reducing it at home.

Before the current campaign, it might have been argued that at least in affirming the importance of faith and respecting those who profess it the administration had embraced traditional conservative views. But in the wake of the Swift Boat ads attacking John Kerry, even this argument can no longer be maintained. As an elder of the Presbyterian Church, I found that those ads were not at all in the Christian tradition. John McCain rightly condemned them as dishonest and dishonorable. The president should have, too. That he did not undermines his credibility on questions of faith.

Some say it's just politics. But that's the whole point. More is expected of people of faith than just politics."

The fact is that the Bush administration might better be called radical or romantic or adventurist than conservative. And that's why real conservatives are leaning toward Kerry

In Part I of this series, I provided the background for the discussion of the war on spread of radical anti-American jihadism - identifying the enemy, the nature of the struggle and the enemy's goals and motivations. I also introduced, at the end, one of the most controversial aspects of Bush's strategy in what he calls the "war on terror": spreading democracy through regime change achieved through the use of military force - and the resulting affect this would have in the battle of ideas between the West and Bin Laden.

I discussed many aspects of this subject in a post entitled, The Best Laid Plans. I will borrow liberally from that piece, so please excuse the repetition, as I think the points are still salient, and are necessary to revisit in this context.

The Theory

There are many aspects of this overall theory that are disputed, but it is meaningless to discuss the theory of democracy promotion in the abstract, absent a very specific context. It would be foolish, even for the theory's most ardent proponents, to say that democracy promotion would be the right thing in every context no matter the potential ramifications, and regardless of what means were used to accomplish the transformation. For example, if too rapid a transition is forced on a nation such as Saudi Arabia, the resulting democratically elected regime might take a stance that is even more hostile to U.S. interests. Similarly, Russia may have moved too swiftly to embrace a representative government, before the necessary democratic institutions such as a free press, independent judiciary, and civic society, were established - which has imperiled that country's democracy going forward. In any case, using the military to impose democratic reform is a risky endeavor with a track record of many failures and few successes.

Therefore, we must look to the specific policies used to effectuate the objectives, and the context in which those policies operate. In determining these factors, a series of questions must be addressed.

First, is spreading democracy even a laudable goal, or is it some form of cultural imperialism and ethnocentricity writ large? Furthermore, even if it is a worthy objective, are the societies in the Middle East conducive to the eventuality of such change? Assuming it is possible to democratize the Middle East, will it impact on the popularity and support for radical Islamist ideology?

The next set of questions assume the answer to the first three all fall in favor of spreading democracy to the Middle East: Most importantly, is military invasion and forced regime change a legitimate means to use in order to achieve the goals of spreading democracy to the Middle East? Is it likely to succeed even if justifiable, and further is it the best way to achieve those ends? If so, was Iraq the right place to start and was it the right time to begin such an endeavor ?

Personally, I believe that spreading democracy, or at the very least encouraging its growth and appeal, is a positive foreign policy objective, in almost any context. I also believe that the Middle East is capable of embracing democracy, and that democracy itself would be a moderating force. Free expression, human rights, voting privileges, economic opportunity, and all the other accompaniments of a democratic society would serve to take the momentum and appeal away from the merchants of martyrdom. Free societies, it is said repeatedly and with some validity, do not spawn terrorism. The questions raised in the second paragraph above are not as easily answered.

In support of democracy promotion, and its impact on the spread of terrorist ideologies, conservative pundit Max Boot, in a column in the Los Angeles Times, quotes Alan Krueger, a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton (and a Clinton administration veteran), and Jitka Maleckova, a professor of Middle Eastern studies in Prague on this part of the strategy:

"Apart from population - larger countries tend to have more terrorists - the only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with more freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists. Poverty and literacy were unrelated to the number of terrorists from a country. Think of a country like Saudi Arabia: It is wealthy but has few political and civil freedoms. Perhaps it is no coincidence that so many of the Sept. 11 terrorists - and Osama bin Laden himself - came from there."

Paul Wolfowitz couldn't have said it better. Of course, even admitting that democracy promotion is in U.S. interests, there will be differences over how to go about it. Anyone not on the administration's payroll would concede that its performance has been far from flawless. But President Bush is on the right track because he recognizes the democracy imperative that too many of his critics unfairly dismiss as neocon nuttiness.

As Boot points out, many policymakers and scholars on both sides of the political spectrum agree that promoting democracy is a laudable goal with tangible benefits in the war to stave of the spread of anti-American radicalism. The only difference among this bipartisan consensus, then, is the strategy employed to effect the changes desired.
Before I proceed with the next phase, it is important to note that the Boot editorial was written in the context of a dispute between two camps of economics experts that weigh in on the subject of democracy promotion. It is essentially a chicken and egg question. Boot believes that democracy can be implemented absent a favorable economic climate, whereas others argue that certain economic prerequisites must exist before a healthy democracy can take root. Each side claims the one set of conditions brings about the other. Publius at Legal Fiction has discussed these arguments in more than one post:

The point is that democracy – as a system of government – rests upon a specific type of underlying economic arrangement. Democracies tend to emerge successfully only where a society’s wealth is fairly evenly distributed. Francis Fukuyama (if I’m remembering "End of History" correctly) explained that democracies have traditionally emerged organically when a nation's average (or perhaps median?) individual income rises above a certain level.

Sadly, money is power – it always has been. Thus, when the early urban centers in Renaissance Europe gave rise to a new urban middle class (which had new wealth, and thus new power), it made sense that democratic reforms soon followed. It also makes sense that democracy worked so well in America, where land was so plentiful. Democracy in America reflected the underlying economic arrangements, which were more egalitarian than feudal Europe. But you must understand – the economics came first. If America had ever existed as a feudal society where wealth was extremely concentrated, then democracy would have developed much more slowly, if at all. So that’s Lesson #1 for democracy promotion in the Middle East – without the proper underlying economic structures, democracy is a pipe dream.

For now, I will table this debate, without declaring a victor. These considerations should at the very least enter into the calculus when determining the right conditions for encouraging democratic reform, but for now, I will not make them an absolute necessity.

The Application Of The Theory

Returning from this economic diversion, I was discussing the fact that many on the right and left agree about the worthiness of the goal of democracy promotion, with the only divergence being the tactics chosen and destinations and times selected. By way of background, I quote from The Best Laid Plans (please excuse the conceit in quoting myself - it's just easier this way):

After the events of September 11, 2001, what had previously been argued primarily in the neoconservative camp, became firmly entrenched in the group think permeating broader foreign policy circles: that the status quo in U.S. foreign policy vis a vis the Muslim world was no longer an acceptable norm. Change was required, and a vast realignment of priorities was deemed necessary to counter the virulent anti-Americanism that was manifesting itself in brutal terrorist attacks and belligerent ideologies. Although tactical and strategic differences remained among the various foreign policy cliques, the need for re-evaluation was almost unanimous.

The most strident voices, those belonging to the neoconservatives in the Pentagon and the White House, were the ones that dominated the debate and shaped the policies adopted by the Bush administration. As such, these iconoclastic purveyors of their own version of the "new approach" became synonymous with the movement for change itself. Unfortunately, the other models for change were ignored, and opponents to the prevailing strategies (manifested in the doctrine of pre-emptive war) were labeled reactionaries who sought a return to the old failed policies. This has stifled the discourse, and obscured the many reasonable propositions that have been put forward as an alternative to the neoconservative narrative.

In essence, the neoconservatives hijacked two emerging strains of thought: 1) Something needed to change or at least be tweaked in terms of our Middle East foreign policy, and 2) Democracy promotion was a legitimate goal to achieve the goal of combating terrorism. The neocons succeeded in subsuming these two objectives under the unitary policy of regime change through the military invasion of Iraq and forcible ouster of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist leadership. But there are many problems with this approach, and it is wrong to think these various strategies are one in the same. There were other ways to address both points raised above outside of the invasion of Iraq - which I will address in the third part of this series.

For one, it has been argued that military intervention has rarely been utilized successfully in the past. Therefore, the use of such a tactic should be greeted with a healthy dose of skepticism. Again, I quote from my previous post:

History is on the side of those that caution against the use of military means to achieve these ends, however praiseworthy they may be. Author Michael Lind weighs in on the subject from the left:

The record is clear--most of the democratic transitions that have taken place in the world in the past two centuries have had nothing to do with foreign military intervention or military pressure, while most US military interventions abroad have left dictatorship, not democracy, in their wake. The two cases that neocons constantly return to, Germany and Japan, are among the few cases where democracy has been restored (not created ex nihilo) as the result of a US invasion. The Soviet bloc democratized itself from within in the 1990s, even though the United States did not bomb Moscow, impose a martial-law governor on the Poles or imprison former Hungarian Communist officials without charges in barbed-wire camps. In Latin America, Mexico became a multiparty democracy instead of a one-party dictatorship without US Marines posing for photos in the presidential mansion in Mexico City, and it was not necessary for American soldiers to kill tens of thousands of Argentines, Chileans and Brazilians for democracy to take root in those countries.

One must hope that American soldiers leave behind a functioning democracy in Iraq--rather than the dysfunctional autocracies and kleptocracies that were the legacy of US military occupations in the Philippines, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti and Mexico. But it is likely that, if and when liberal democracy comes to the Muslim world in general and to the Arab world in particular, the gradual, largely bloodless transition will resemble those in Soviet Europe and Latin America and will not be the result of US military action or intimidation. The neocons--and the humanitarian hawks on the left--are simply wrong about how best to spread democracy.

Dissenting neoconservative author, scholar and professor Francis Fukuyama offers these observations from the right:

Of all of the different views that have now come to be associated with neoconservatives, the strangest one to me was the confidence that the United States could transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy, and go on from there to democratize the broader Middle East. It struck me as strange precisely because these same neoconservatives had spent much of the past generation warning - in The National Interest's former sister publication, The Public Interest, for example - about the dangers of ambitious social engineering, and how social planners could never control behavior or deal with unanticipated consequences. If the United States cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores in Washington, DC, how does it expect to bring democracy to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is virulently anti-American to boot?

Krauthammer picks up this theme in his speech. Noting how wrong people were after World War II in asserting that Japan could not democratize, he asks, "Where is it written that Arabs are incapable of democracy?" He is echoing an argument made most forthrightly by the eminent Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, who has at several junctures suggested that pessimism about the prospects for a democratic Iraq betrays lack of respect for Arabs. It is, of course, nowhere written that Arabs are incapable of democracy, and it is certainly foolish for cynical Europeans to assert with great confidence that democracy is impossible in the Middle East. We have, indeed, been fooled before, not just in Japan but in Eastern Europe prior to the collapse of communism.

But possibility is not likelihood, and good policy is not made by staking everything on a throw of the dice. Culture is not destiny, but culture plays an important role in making possible certain kinds of institutions-something that is usually taken to be a conservative insight. Though I, more than most people, am associated with the idea that history's arrow points to democracy, I have never believed that democracies can be created anywhere and everywhere through sheer political will. Prior to the Iraq War, there were many reasons for thinking that building a democratic Iraq was a task of a complexity that would be nearly unmanageable. Some reasons had to do with the nature of Iraqi society: the fact that it would be decompressing rapidly from totalitarianism, its ethnic divisions, the role of politicized religion, the society's propensity for violence, its tribal structure and the dominance of extended kin and patronage networks, and its susceptibility to influence from other parts of the Middle East that were passionately anti-American.

But other reasons had to do with the United States. America has been involved in approximately 18 nation-building projects between its conquest of the Philippines in 1899 and the current occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the overall record is not a pretty one. The cases of unambiguous success-Germany, Japan, and South Korea-were all ones in which U.S. forces came and then stayed indefinitely. In the first two cases, we were not nation-building at all, but only re-legitimizing societies that had very powerful states. In all of the other cases, the U.S. either left nothing behind in terms of self-sustaining institutions, or else made things worse by creating, as in the case of Nicaragua, a modern army and police but no lasting rule of law.

Despite the bi-partisan warnings of Lind and Fukuyama regarding the limited efficacy of the United States' use of military interventions to successfully nation build, there are occasions when regime change and nation building are necessary to preserve our safety, security and well-being. This was the case in World War II era Japan and Germany, and this was the case in Taliban-led Afghanistan. Even Fukuyama and Lind concede this. Similarly, the invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent nation building efforts have received widespread support from both Democrats and Republicans. Ironically, the major critique emanating from the left is not that the invasion was undertaken in the first place, but that too few troops were used, the tactics were not thoroughly confrontational with more parties in the country, and not enough resources were committed to the subsequent rebuilding efforts. Both Senators Kerry and Edwards have been vociferous supporters of the invasion of Afghanistan, although they have voiced many of the concerns often cited on the left.

Afghanistan was still a risky endeavor considering the sensitivities in the Muslim world regarding the history of U.S. foreign policy - a checkered past that has included the support of despots (including Saddam), the destabilization of leaders and nations, and in the case of Mossadegh in Iran, even spearheading a CIA coup to topple a democratically elected leader in favor of imposing a dictator - the Shah. The Iranians did not forget this, and the Ayatollah Khomenei was the result of a society radicalized by a despots rule, which, ironically, had been relatively moderate and progressive before the overthrow of their democracy at the hands of the U.S. We are still paying for this ugly chapter in our history.

Add to this, the long list of current grievances, some justified some imagined, that Osama so effectively evokes, distorts, and propagandizes, and it becomes clear that invading Afghanistan was a very delicate matter, and one that could serve to inflame passions in the Muslim world - which would in turn have greatly aided al-Qaeda's efforts.

But much to the chagrin of Osama Bin Laden, Afghanistan did not spark the showdown with the West that he had sought. As Michael Scheuer pointed out in his book, Imperial Hubris, Bin Laden was deeply disappointed that the toppling of the Taliban was not a watershed moment for his movement to inspire widespread revolt in the Muslim world. So what went right about Afghanistan? The Ackerman article I cited in my prior post quoted Senator Joe Biden:

"Remember all the talk that the Muslim street was going to rise up if we went into Afghanistan?" One reason it didn't was the near-unanimity of the international community in support of the invasion.

The importance of this near-unanimity in the international community cannot be overstated - especially in the Muslim world. Contrary to the designs of Bin Laden, most Muslims were outraged, shocked and disgusted by the outrage of 9/11. The mayor of Teheran condemned the attacks, there were candlelight vigils across that country, leaders of various nations as well as religious leaders were vocal in their condemnations. Ackerman describes the reaction at Cairo's Al Azhar mosque, "the closest thing Sunni Islam has to a Vatican."

Days after September 11, 2001, Al Azhar's university rector, Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, issued a Koranic condemnation of the attacks: "Attacking innocent people is not courageous, it is stupid and will be punished on the Day of Judgment."

In addition to these Muslims, many of those that rejoiced at the outcome realized that America was justified in invading Afghanistan (of course there were many hard-liners and al-Qaeda supporters who remained steadfast in their opposition to U.S. involvement, but these aren't the ones we can reach anyway). The general perception in the world was that the United States was justified, al-Qaeda needed to be dealt with, and the United States had no ulterior motives. In fact, the United States did have an ulterior motive of sorts, but it is one that was not unpopular: the concept that Afghanistan could be made more democratic, and through this, change the shape of the region. In this sense, Afghanistan did not hinder our efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim population we are trying to reach in order to isolate and marginalize the radicals. Still, the democracy promotion part of the equation is not so clear a victory.

Afghanistan was less than an ideal destination to attempt nation building and democracy promotion - and that is an understatement. The nation had been racked by decades of conflict, the economy was in shambles (which many in the economic precondition camp warned was a non-starter), the population consists of myriad disparate ethnicities and languages with competing interests, armed militias and warlords control various fiefdoms within the borders, there were none of the attendant democratic institutions or even precursors, and many other reasons. Given the size of the task, success would require enormous effort on the part of the United States and the international community. Decades of dedication, nurturing, aid, security personnel, focus and attention were needed to midwife this long suffering nation into modernity and democracy.

That being said, the stakes were high and the outcome was worth fighting for. If the U.S. could pull this off, the world - and more importantly the Muslim world - would be watching. This would have served to restore the image and credibility of the U.S. in the region of the world where our image was most in need of rehabilitation. We could erase the bitter memories of abandonment that many Afghanis and other Muslims harbor following our withdrawal from our first stint in Afghanistan during that nation's revolt against the Soviets. It would have gone a long way toward undercutting the ideological appeal of al-Qaeda - the U.S. would be seen as a force for good.

It was literally a matter of life or death. Which made our next decision that much more confounding. With the future of Afghanistan hanging in a precarious balance, the U.S. began withdrawing its resources, focus and attention from Afghanistan and immediately redirecting them to Iraq. In fact, many argue that we did not have enough troops in Afghanistan in the first place because of our preoccupation with Iraq. Here is James Fallows on the subject:

Because of that shift, the United States succeeded in removing Saddam Hussein, but at this cost: The first front in the war on terror, Afghanistan, was left to fester, as attention and money were drained toward Iraq. This in turn left more havens in Afghanistan in which terrorist groups could reconstitute themselves; a resurgent opium-poppy economy to finance them; and more of the disorder and brutality the United States had hoped to eliminate. Whether or not the strong international alliance that began the assault on the Taliban might have brought real order to Afghanistan is impossible to say. It never had the chance, because America's premature withdrawal soon fractured the alliance and curtailed postwar reconstruction. Indeed, the campaign in Afghanistan was warped and limited from the start, by a pre-existing desire to save troops for Iraq.

The rationale supporting democracy promotion in Iraq through the use of pre-emptive military invasion can be challenged on two broad fronts (for now I will leave aside the discussion of WMDs, oil acquisition, general deterrence, etc.). The first being, that the use of military force is rarely an effective tactic in pursuing these objectives. Relying on Lind and Fukuyama, I argue that success has been the exception not the rule in this regard, therefore making it a highly dubious strategy to begin with. While the military approach was suspect in Afgahnistan as well, it was seen as a necessary evil because of al-Qaeda's presence. Beyond that, however, attempting this grandiose design in Iraq at the time we elected to do so was an even bigger mistake for a number of reasons.

The first being timing. I remember feeling shock at the notion that the U.S. would be considering an elective war with yet another Muslim nation while the battle was still raging in Afghanistan. What myopia, I thought. How could we even consider such an action when one of our main objectives was improving our image in the Muslim world and winning the war of ideas against Bin Laden. Michael Scheuer had this to say:

Our choice of timing, moreover, shows an abject, even willful failure to recognise the ideological power, lethality and growth potential of the threat personified by Bin Laden, as well as the impetus that threat has been given by the US-led invasion and occupation of Muslim Iraq...

All Muslims would see each day on television that the United States was occupying a Muslim country, insisting that man-made laws replace God's revealed word, stealing Iraq's oil, and paving the way for the creation of a "Greater Israel." The clerics and scholars would call for a defensive jihad against the United States, young Muslim males would rush from across the Islamic world to fight U.S. troops, and there--in Islam's second holiest land--would erupt a second Afghanistan, a self-perpetuating holy war that would endure whether or not al-Qaeda survived.

The second paragraph of Scheuer's rebuke is relevant to another reason Iraq was a poor target in comparison to Afghanistan. Unlike Afghanistan, the U.S. did not enjoy the support of the world - again most importantly the Muslim world. The invasion was not seen as a legitimate act of national defense, while the ulterior motives seemingly abounded (oil, bases, influence, religious indoctrination, etc.). Osama, still smarting from his ideological and physical defeat in Afghanistan, was given what Scheuer termed a "Christmas gift he never thought he’d get." Consider the reaction to 9/11 from the Sunni Al Azhar mosque in Cairo that I cited above, and now the reaction to the invasion of Iraq.

Yet fury over the invasion of Iraq turned Al Azhar's denouncement of bin Laden into approval of his ideology. On the eve of the war, the mosque's scholars wrote, "According to Islamic law, if the enemy steps on Muslims' land, jihad becomes a duty on every male and female Muslim."

That was not, by any means, an isolated incident, and bin Laden has maximized the advantages we have bestowed upon him through the invasion. As James Fallows noted in the Atlantic Monthly article I cited in Part I

"I have been saying for years, Osama bin Laden could never have done it without us," a civilian adviser to the Pentagon told me this summer. "We have continued to play to his political advantage and to confirm, in the eyes of his constituency, the very claims he made about us." Those claims are that the United States will travel far to suppress Muslims, that it will occupy their holy sites, that it will oppose the rise of Islamic governments, and that it will take their resources. "We got to Baghdad," Michael Scheuer said, "and the first thing Rumsfeld said is, 'We'll accept any government as long as it's not Islamic.' It draws their attention to bin Laden's argument that the United States is leading the West to annihilate Islam." The Administration had come a long way from the end-of-Ramadan ceremony at the White House.

Understand, that I am not saying that in all scenarios our foreign policy should be tailored so as to receive the best possible reaction on the Muslim street. Afghanistan was necessary no matter what the eventual reaction - even though it was largely favorable or mixed. That being said, if you are going to attempt nation building and democracy promotion, and the goal of that democracy promotion is to win the war of ideas with Bin Laden and his ilk, then the perception of such moves among the demographic you are seeking to impact is of the utmost importance. It also increases the prospects for success. As Fareed Zakaria noted, "Spreading democracy requires allies, particularly among the targets of one's affection [emphasis added]."

The results have been disturbing. Well respected non-partisan groups like the International Institute for Strategic Studies have noted that al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations have experienced a surge in recruitment. In many nations across the regions Bin Laden and Hussein are more popular than Bush himself - while the opinion of America has sunk to all time lows. The insurgency in Iraq itself has been gaining momentum rather than petering out. The frequency of attacks and casualties sustained have been mounting not receding. Reformers across the region have been undermined as the fundamentalists have gained in notoriety and support. The war in Iraq has helped Bin Laden more than it has hurt him, and spreading democracy has become more elusive and harder to advocate for the region's reformers. Again to quote Zakaria:

Bush does not seem aware that the intense hostility toward him in every country in the world (save Israel) has made it very difficult for the United States to be the agent of freedom. In every Arab country that I have been to in the last two years, the liberals, reformers and businessmen say, "Please don't support us. American support today is the kiss of death." [emphasis added]

Thus, the invasion of Iraq as an example of the doctrine of democracy promotion as a tool to counter the spread of radical anti-American jihadism has been a failure on many levels. First of all, the use of military power to achieve these ends was ill-advised from the start, as history has proven, and the present examples offer little in the way of refutation. Second, such force was not perceived as legitimate or justified, which endangered the mission and enraged the very people we were trying to appeal to. Further, the timing could not have been worse because of our commitments in Afghanistan and how such a distraction jeopardized that mission. Not to mention the propaganda coup it provided Bin Laden to have the U.S. simultaneously occupying two Muslim nations at once, one of which being the nation only second to Saudi Arabia in its number of significant holy sites. As for the choice of locations on other levels, I once again rely on the words of Fukuyama to describe the negatives:

...the fact that it would be decompressing rapidly from totalitarianism, its ethnic divisions, the role of politicized religion, the society's propensity for violence, its tribal structure and the dominance of extended kin and patronage networks, and its susceptibility to influence from other parts of the Middle East that were passionately anti-American.

Add to this volatile mixture, the astounding levels of incompetence the Bush team has shown in handling the reconstruction. While Bush supporters have been quick to label the difficulties as inevitable, or the result of "catastrophic success," and chastise the critics for enjoying the vantage point of 20/20 hindsight, the fact is that many of the problems were predicted in advance, planned for, and anticipated. Unfortunately, those experts, planners, generals, and career policymakers were ignored because of their perceived pessimism. The Future of Iraq Project was castoff. The work by the CIA, State Department, and Army war college utterly disregarded. In those reports, the various agencies consistently warned of looting, lawlessness, insurgencies, the perils of de-Ba'athification, disbanding the army, border security, the need for more troops, etc.

Although some have tried to spin the lack of manpower as a good strategy (limiting casualties), even Paul Bremer proclaimed that the lack of troops has endangered the mission. The truth is, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld didn't anticipate an insurgency, and didn't plan for border protection and looting - and if they did, they sure had a funny way of showing it. In truth, they were under the spell of the pollyannic predictions of con-man Ahmed Chalabi who proclaimed the troops would be greeted with flowers and candies. Remember, Woflowitz told Congress that the American presence in Iraq would be down to 30,000 troops by August 2003. Was he lying or just wildly off the mark? Almost all of the planning was based on a best case scenario appraisal. As a result, the future of Iraq remains in doubt, with the likelihood of a peaceful transition to a representative democracy appearing as likely as civil war and regional conflict on the one hand, or theocratic or other despotism on the other.

In conclusion, even if you favor active promotion of democracy on the part of the United States, military means are a flawed and ineffective tactic. But if you disagree with that contention, and believe that military invasion is a viable means, Iraq was a poor choice of targets considering the logistical realities in that country and how the invasion would be received amongst the targets of our "goodwill" and how this goodwill would impact on the spread and appeal of Bin Laden's ideology - which is the justification du jour for the invasion of Iraq amongst Bush supporters. Still, if you disagree with my first two conclusions, the timing of the invasion of Iraq was tragic because of the propaganda implications for Bin Laden, and more importantly the fact that Afghanistan has been recklessly ignored as a result. Finally, even if you disagree with all of these arguments, it is irrefutable that the Bush administration has shown an alarming level of incompetence in pursuing such a complex, problematic and idealistic endeavor. It is becoming increasingly difficult to justify this invasion on the grounds that it is a successful application of the doctrine of democracy promotion through pre-emptive invasion which will serve to undermine the appeal and popularity of radical anti-American organizations and thought. Every step of the way.

Although a daunting task, I will try to provide a comparison of the relative strategies for fighting the poorly named "war on terror." I will focus on the respective approaches laid out by each presidential candidate, and where necessary, include third options and voices not attributed to either camp.

There are many components that make up the the various strategies for dealing with the menace of anti-American jihadist terrorism. First, there must be military action and, even more so, the effective use of intelligence and law enforcement assets to track down, imprison, kill and disrupt known terrorists and their organizational infrastructure. Military action is absolutely required for situations in which the terrorist agents become intertwined with the ruling government, as in Afghanistan.

Some have argue a more controversial position - that military force can be used to attack regimes with few ties to terrorism, and whose people show no history of involvement in terrorist activities abroad, as in Iraq, in order to implement regime change which would create a force for change in the region that could affect regimes and regions that themselves spawn the terrorists.

In either scenario, the efforts of law enforcement and intelligence assets will do the heavy lifting of actually tracking down the terrorists and neutralizing them wherever they reside, since they tend not to remain localized in any one area or nation, nor are they organized like an army - and thus the military remains too blunt a tool in almost all settings.

While these are crucial to the effort, much like the Cold War, they must be married to an ideological campaign, a war of ideas which is the only way to effectively stem the tide of new recruits that tend to make the military and law enforcement efforts an exercise in treading water, with little discernible progress.

The Nature Of The Enemy

Part of the problem with the "war on terror" is that it is overly vague. I quoted Ronald Bruce St John in a prior post on this subject:

[The] White House [has] label[ed] almost anybody opposed to its policies as a terrorist organization. Groups as diverse in structure and objectives as Peru's Shining Path, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Basque Fatherland and Liberty, the Communist Party of the Philippines, and Hamas are on the State Department's list of designated foreign terrorist organizations.

Early on, this approach served the White House well in its search for recruits in the war on terrorism. Opposition groups in countries whose support the U.S. deemed essential to winning the war were often labeled "terrorist" in an effort to curry support from host governments.

But over time, the failure to define terrorism has become a real liability.

Indeed, in one of the most striking examples of selective application of the definition of a "terrorist" occurred last month when the Bush administration granted access to four Cuban nationals convicted of committing acts of terror - which resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians in an effort to destabilize the Castro regime. Inconsistencies such as these give rise to cynicism in the Muslim world, and elsewhere, regarding our motives, and lend credence to the charge that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." They make the moral high ground we aspire to, that much more untenable which in turn undermines our cause.

While I think it is important that we remain consistent in our condemnation of all civilian targeting, no matter the political context, for the purposes of this discussion, I contend that the true enemy in our "war on terror" is al-Qaeda and its ideological brethren - groups that target American civilians in a religiously inspired jihad. That being said, understanding the goals, motivations and objectives of Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda and their ilk has also been a source of some confusion and disagreement.

President Bush famously declared about al-Qaeda that, "they hate us for our freedom." He did this in order to cast Bin Laden and his followers as a nihilistic, pathologically anti-Western group. While I do not condone their actions in any respect, a more comprehensive understanding of our enemy will help to forge a winning strategy. For that reason, let's abandon the overly simplistic and jingoistic declarations of our President and look at the reality of the situation. Career counterterrorism expert and CIA agent, Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris, made the following observations (via Slate.com):

Page 8: The fundamental flaw in our thinking about Bin Laden is that "Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than what we do." Muslims are bothered by our modernity, democracy, and sexuality, but they are rarely spurred to action unless American forces encroach on their lands. It's American foreign policy that enrages Osama and al-Qaida, not American culture and society.

Page 114-6: Bin Laden isn't a loose cannon trying to bring the world to Armageddon. He's an eloquent and rational actor, more CEO than gangster. He often blames Muslims for their failure to repel Western invaders. His analyses of al-Qaida's victories and defeats are often more cogent than Western leaders' tirades against him.

James Fallows in a recent article in the Atlantic Monthly had this to say about Bush's characterization:

There may be people who have studied, fought against, or tried to infiltrate al-Qaeda and who agree with Bush's statement. But I have never met any. The soldiers, spies, academics, and diplomats I have interviewed are unanimous in saying that "They hate us for who we are" is dangerous claptrap. Dangerous because it is so lazily self-justifying and self-deluding: the only thing we could possibly be doing wrong is being so excellent. Claptrap because it reflects so little knowledge of how Islamic extremism has evolved.

"There are very few people in the world who are going to kill themselves so we can't vote in the Iowa caucuses," Michael Scheuer said to me. "But there's a lot of them who are willing to die because we're helping the Israelis, or because we're helping Putin against the Chechens, or because we keep oil prices low so Muslims lose.

...The distinction between who we are and what we do matters, because it bears on the largest question about the Iraq War: Will it bring less or more Islamic terrorism? If violent extremism is purely vengeful and irrational, there is no hope except to crush it. Any brutality along the way is an unavoidable cost. But if it is based on logic of any sort, a clear understanding of its principles could help us to weaken its appeal - and to choose tactics that are not self-defeating...

An article appearing in the Christian Science Monitor (via Tim Dunlop - my favorite Aussie blogger), details the emerging picture regarding al-Qaeda and the ideological underpinnings of the movement. The article describes how, acting at the Pentagon's behest, RAND terrorist analyst Brian Jenkins has compiled a summary entitled the "State of Jihad."

Among his points: Al Qaeda's objectives are broad - to Western eyes, so broad as to seem almost fantastical: The group wants to drive infidels from the Middle East, topple what they see as apostate regimes in Saudi Arabia and other Islamic nations, and foster an Islamic religious revival. The goal is to build a following, not to take ground. The group is vague on when its goals might be reached. It has no road map for victory.

For the sake of facility, many have cast Bin Laden's goals as unmoored from political aspirations, or in the other extreme, rooted in a desire to take over the world. This is dangerously myopic. Bin Laden's message, if not his overall aspirations, are very much a result of political grievances. Among them, he has famously cited the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia following Gulf War I, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and others:

Bin Laden's rhetoric often focuses on perceived injustices inflicted on the Islamic world. He portrays Muslims in Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and the former Central Asian republics of the USSR as victims of a US-led crusade.

He seems to feel that his theological credibility rests on convincing Muslims that they are everywhere under attack. He tells Americans that he knows many are "good and gentle people," but that he is at war with their government. He even urges US citizens to convert to Islam so as to rid themselves of their "dry, miserable, and spiritless materialistic existence."

His objective is to create a pan-Islamic uprising that will expel the West from the Muslim world, end the perceived persecution of Muslim peoples by agents of the West, and restore a fundamentalist caliphate to unite the Muslim world and make it a potent force in the world. That is not necessarily the same as world domination or animosity to freedom - though he is surely no friend to representative government and individual rights.

Spencer Ackerman of The New Republic has penned an invaluable article (non-subscribers can find it here) describing the foreign policy espoused by presidential candidate John Kerry. For any that remain agnostic about their choice for the upcoming election, and consider foreign policy and the "war on terror" important issues, this is a must read. I will use the following quote from the Ackerman piece to introduce an important concept:

When Kerry accused Bush of "diverting [his] attention from the real war on terror" against Al Qaeda by invading Iraq, the president's surrogates shot back that Kerry possessed an insufficiently broad understanding of the war. "The idea that somehow you kill Osama bin Laden, and maybe Al Qaeda wraps up, and then you're done with the war on terrorism could not be further from the truth," Condoleezza Rice told CNN. Conservative New York Times columnist David Brooks dismissively wrote that Kerry "defined the enemy in narrow, concrete terms."

It's true that Kerry conceives of victory in the war on terrorism chiefly in terms of destroying Al Qaeda. But what Kerry understands--and the administration disastrously does not--is that Al Qaeda is not "narrow," nor, increasingly, is it "concrete." [emphasis added]

Ackerman picks up on a disturbing trend. The danger represented by al-Qaeda is evolving. What was once a finite group of actors, has become an ideology that is inspiring many copy-cat organizations and individuals. The landscape of the conflict is shifting. The article in the Christian Science Monitor notes:

Hard-pressed by US forces, bin Laden - a former management student - may have adapted by decentralizing his operation, says Dr. Jerrold Post, director of the political psychology program at George Washington University. Leaders who function as regional directors may now be charged with raising their own cash and planning their own operations.

Al Qaeda "has become more of an inspiring ideology, rather than maybe an organized network," says Dr. Post, who also ran the CIA's psychological profiling unit.

While we must certainly continue to track down, imprison and kill known members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the task is in fact much more complex than that alone. Al-Qaeda has become amorphous, a confounding hydra that will keep attacking us despite our efforts to decapitate its myriad vipers. Although necessary to insure success, victory exists apart from these tangible gains. This perhaps marks the conceptual stumbling block so many encounter while pondering the true nature of this war. Human nature leads us to desire observable manifestations of success, like battles won, territory gained and armies vanquished. Those instincts betray us in the current conflict.

"We regard war as a finite process, with a beginning, middle, and end. For our jihadist foes, it is a perpetual condition," said Jenkins at a recent RAND terrorism conference in Washington.

There is a battle raging for the future of the Muslim world, and the safety and stability of the world hang in the balance. It is not occurring on a battlefield though. An article appearing in Foreign Policy described Bin Laden's role thusly:

Bin Laden is a propagandist, directing his efforts at attracting those Muslims who have hitherto shunned his extremist message. He knows that only through mass participation in his project will he have any chance of success. His worldview is receiving immeasurably more support around the globe than it was two years ago, let alone 15 years ago when he began serious campaigning. The objective of Western countries is to eliminate the threat of terror, or at least to manage it in a way that does not seriously impinge on the daily lives of its citizens. Bin Laden's aim is to radicalize and mobilize. He is closer to achieving his goals than the West is to deterring him.

Neoconservative dissident Francis Fukuyama described the situation with thusly:

...It is hard to see how we can deal with [the terrorists] other than by killing, capturing or otherwise militarily neutralizing them.

But the radicals swim in a much larger sea of Muslims - 1.2 billion of them, more or less - who are not yet implacable enemies of the United States...for the broad mass of public opinion in Muslim countries, we are disliked or hated not for what we are, but rather for what we do. What they do not like is a familiar list of complaints about our foreign policy that we somehow continue to fail to take seriously: our lack of concern for the plight of the Palestinians, our hypocritical support for dictators in Muslim countries, and now our occupation of Iraq.

The War on Terror is, in other words, a classic counter-insurgency war, except that it is one being played out on a global scale. There are genuine bad guys out there who are much more bitter ideological enemies than the Soviets ever were, but their success depends on the attitudes of the broader populations around them who can be alternatively supportive, hostile or indifferent-depending on how we play our cards. As we are seeing vividly in Iraqi cities like Fallujah and Najaf, counter-insurgency wars are incredibly difficult to fight, because we must somehow destroy the enemy without alienating the broader population and making things worse. Counter-insurgency requires a tricky mixture of precisely targeted force, political judgment and extremely good intelligence: a combination of carrots and sticks.

Ackerman believes that Kerry appreciates the stakes:

"For Al Qaeda, this war is a struggle for the heart and soul of the Muslim world. We will win this war only if the terrorists lose that struggle," he said in a recent speech at Temple University. "We have to preempt the haters. We have to win the war of ideas." Which is not to say that a Kerry war on terrorism would be a purely ideological exercise. Kerry proposes to redouble U.S. military efforts to "defeat, capture, and kill those who commit terror"--and promises not to be distracted by the supposed state-sponsors of terrorism that have fixated the Bush administration. In planning both to kill the jihadists and to prevent new ones from taking their place, Kerry is presenting the victory strategy for the war on terrorism that has eluded Bush.

Bush's supporters claim that the president understands the stakes too, and that is why he chose to invade Iraq. The theory is that through the creation of a stable democracy in Iraq, democratic forces for change will spread through the Middle East like the tumble of dominoes. Furthermore, where democracy flourishes, terrorist ideology withers in a zero sum game. Therefore, it is argued, spreading democracy will in itself serve to defeat terrorism. I will discuss this phase of the strategy in the war on terror in my next post.

What if George W. Bush wins re-election on November 2nd? What should we expect if the Bush administration is given the mandate to lead the nation for four more years? That is a question that is being considered by pundit and journalist alike with increasing frequency as we approach election day. Some have argued that a second Bush administration will be more circumspect, more restrained, dare I say it, more nuanced in its approach to a variety of issues. Critics charge that the President who can't admit a mistake, a man noted for his "stubbornness" or "resolve," depending on your perspective, one who values loyalty and team cohesion over accountability, will likely "stay the course," not "waver" or reassess his past performance with a critical eye. There is also the increased anxiety over the potential lack of concern for electoral politics that would permeate a second Bush term: it is unlikely that Cheney would seek re-election so there would be no temperance in terms of policy since the primary actors would be leaving politics upon the conclusion of the term regardless. With nothing left to lose, they would proceed unchecked in the pursuit of their policies.

Gregory Djerejian of The Belgravia Dispatch (my favorite right-leaning blog) has put together one of the most coherent and powerful enunciations of the case for voting for Bush. While I disagree with many of the arguments made by Djerejian, he is not knee-jerk or unrealistic about the limitations and mistakes of Bush's first four years. However, one justification he lists for supporting Bush, that he seemingly accepts as an article of faith, is that the Bush administration's foreign policy team will be radically different from that of the first four years - almost a 180 degree turnabout.

Let me also say this. A Bush II will not be a Bush I repeat. By that, I guess, I mean that we are not rushing into Iran or Syria. The neo-cons, of course, have lost a lot of street cred. Bush might be stubborn and not wont to admit mistakes. But he's not an idiot. He knows, say, a land war in Iran would be folly. And he knows he has gotten a lot of bogus advice from the Pentagon. Bush is a hard competitor, indeed he's ruthlessly competitive. Above all, he's a survivor. He will be getting advice from a broader swath of advisors in his second term, I trust.

Other than a vague sketch of his character, which conveniently downplays the inconvenient character flaws, Djerejian offers little in the way of support other than a faith that it must be this way since we have not already invaded Iran or Syria - and Bush is not an idiot. That is not convincing. Even if Bush were still firmly entrenched in the neocon camp, it is unlikely that an invasion of Iran or Syria would be underway at this point in time because of the military, diplomatic, and logistical realities. With the conflict in Iraq still raging (having just passed the tragic milestone of 1,100 U.S. deaths), troop requirements in Afghanistan and abroad straining our capacity to a near breaking point, and world opinion and support for America at unprecedented lows, few but the most fervent neocons would counsel for such a move at this juncture. Better wait until the situation is more conducive to some modicrum of success. Say, some point in the next four years.

Middle East expert Ronald Bruce St John detects some disturbing trends in actions undertaken by the Bush administration that seem to run counter, at least partially, to Djerejian's thesis:

In the period between the president's remarks to the Republican National Convention and his address to the UN General Assembly, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East continued on a familiar course. After imposing sanctions on Syria in May, the United States cosponsored a UN Security Council resolution in early September, demanding the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The Bush administration later threatened additional sanctions in the event that Syria refused to quit Lebanon. At the same time, the White House continued its policy of isolating Iran, pushing the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer the question of nuclear proliferation to the UN Security Council where Washington could increase diplomatic pressure on Tehran. At a time when ample room for negotiations remained, reports also surfaced of preplanning for a preemptive American or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.

In a piece announcing the increasing likelihood that he will vote for Kerry, right-leaning blogger Daniel Drezner makes the following observation which undermines Djerejian:

If Bush gets re-elected, he and his team will view it as a vindication for all of their policy decisions to date. Whatever groupthink occurred in the first term would pale besides the groupthink that would dominate the second term.

To which Djerejian responds:

Does Dan really believe that a Bush victory will have Doug Feith feeling "vindicated" so that group-think would prevail via some Libby-Bolton-Feith axis? Er, I think not. Nor do John Negroponte or Zal Khalilzad, I suspect. Regardless, some of these folks, I'd wager, aren't even going to be around in a Bush II.

Again, should Bush win in November, I hope that Djerejian is right. Unfortunately, I see little evidence to add credence to this prediction of a paradigm shift within the White House, especially since the Libby-Bolton-Feith axis which Djerejian assumes is on the outs, is in fact the backbone of Vice President Cheney's policy arm, and I see no indications that Cheney will wield less power in a second Bush administration. Observing the relative performances of Bush and Cheney in the debates only serves to confirm suspicions that Cheney is one of the most powerful vice president in U.S. history, and invaluable as an advisor to Bush. For Djerejian to be right, Cheney would have to lead the way in sacking his own people, and that is highly unlikely. Bush would never force Cheney's hand in this matter.

One of the smartest commenters on The Belgravia Dispatch, under the tag praktike, takes Djerejian to task using historical evidence to undermine his assumptions - citing numerous examples that go far beyond a lack of accountability to actually rewarding incompetence:

Greg, I think you're mistaken if you think that Bush Round II would empower smart, reasonable people like you.

Remember, it was Dick Cheney's allies in the administration who are responsible for this. Bush didn't fire them, nor did he hold anyone of consequence's feet to the fire for this. Donald Rumsfeld is, apparently, the best Secretary of Defense America has ever had. Two of the leading candidates for Secretary of State are apparently Paul Bremer and Wolfowitz, neither of which inspires a modicum of confidence. A third option is Condi Rice, who is chronically incapable of getting different agencies working towards a common policy. Rick Sanchez is getting his fourth star. Barbara Fast got promoted. The general who dreamed up using MPs to help "set the conditions" for interrogations in Guantanamo was sent to fix the problems in Iraq. A toadie has been put in charge of the CIA, not to fix our intelligence problems, but rather to ride herd on the groans of dissent coming out of Langley. And the man who wrote that "the power to set aside the law is inherent in the President" got rewarded with a plum judgeship.

I don't think any of this bodes well for a second term.

No it doesn't. Praktike points out Cheney's continuing reluctance to fire those around him who have erred so greatly, but Djerejian takes the eventuality of Cheney's change of heart as a fait accompli. Why? If Paul Wolfowitz, the author of so many of the most grievous post-invasion blunders, is being considered for a promotion, why should intelligent people assume that others with less dubious resumes will be fired?

While Djerejian is taking the approach that everything will change after Bush is re-elected, and that accountability will at last descend upon a group that has shown the strongest aversion to the notion up until now, I think that is a counter-intuitive reach. After listing several examples of rhetoric and actions that indicate a continued embrace of the neoconservative world outlook, St John concludes thusly, and I agree:

Based on the statements and actions of the Bush administration, talk of a "new look" in foreign policy in a potential second term would appear to be wishful thinking. At this point, there is no evidence of a substantive change in direction, tone, or content of the president's foreign policy. President Bush remains a man on a mission, regardless of the lack of wisdom and efficacy of that mission. And he looks prepared and determined to employ any and all tools at his disposal to achieve his goals. Contrary to the hopes of optimists, a Bush success in November, instead of being a force for moderation in foreign affairs, would more likely invigorate and embolden a president no longer concerned with re-election.

Drezner also makes the following observation:

Given the foreign policy stakes in this election, I prefer a leader who has a good decision-making process, even if his foreign policy instincts are skewed in a direction I don't like, over a leader who has a bad decision-making process, even if his foreign policy instincts are skewed in a direction I do like.

To which Djerejian replied:

Boy Dan, you couldn't be more wrong in my book. This line of argument might have flyed in the 90's--but I think it's a dangerous outlook in the post 9/11 world. Perhaps if the policy making process were fatally flawed--I'd agree. But any occasional NSC breakdowns in brokering a coherent policy on Iran, NoKo, the Arab-Israeli peace process--while they have bothered me much over the past years--I must nevertheless conclude that such issues pale in comparison with the specter of a commander-in-chief who would view terror as something merely constitutive of a "nuisance" to be managed in routine fashion.

First of all, it is disappointing to see someone of Djerejian's intellect resort to this disingenuous line of attack on Kerry's use of the term "nuisance." Kerry clearly does not view terrorism as a nuisance, he was making the same point Brent Scowcroft made about the goals of reducing the levels of terrorism, but Bush supporters and professional spinners have nevertheless seized on this lexical gaffe in order to ascribe a whole set of policy directives to Kerry. It appears that Djerejian, to some degree, fell for it. I explained this all in a prior post, and thus will not examine any further at this point.

The real heart of that exchange is in the analysis of the policy making process in the Bush administration. While Djerejian dismisses the numerous examples of errors, blunders and miscalculations, and claims they are not the result of a process that is fatally flawed, he is too quick to elide the obvious inversion in logic and rational thought that runs rampant in the Bush White House. Publius of Legal Fiction, in one of many posts analyzing the breakdown in process which I highly recommend, captures the essence of the philosophical underpinnings:

The assault on empiricism has been particularly striking. The whole idea behind empiricism is that one begins with a question. That is followed by an empirical investigation involving experiments or debate, which is then followed by a tentative conclusion based on the evidence from those experiments. The Bush administration flips this process on its head. It begins by adopting a conclusion, and then seeks out ways to justify that conclusion. Empiricism plays no role in reaching the conclusion - only politics.

This deficiency of process has been noted by conservatives and liberals alike. This is the administration that has been accused of politicizing science by Nobel winning scientists, politicizing intelligence gathering by career intelligence operatives, and politicizing monetary policy by CEO's and business leaders. There were lifelong Republican insiders in the Bush administration like Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, Christie Todd Whitman, John DiIulio, and Richard Clarke who complained about the hostility of the administration to inconvenient facts, divergent scientific conclusions, and contradictory expert input regarding all aspects of decision making - from economic and environmental policy to foreign policy and post-war planning.

How can the administration's rejection of the expert input contained in the Future of Iraq Project and other post-invasion planning by the CIA, State Department, Army War College, etc., in favor of the fantastical predictions of convicted embezzler and known con-man Ahmed Chalabi result from anything other than a fatally flawed process? What functional process led administration officials to dismiss global warming as a hoax as the problem is accelerating at out of control rates? How could any reasonable process let civilians in the Pentagon over-rule and embarrass the Army Chief of Staff who correctly stated the need for more troops in Iraq. If this process is working, I shudder to think what fatal flaws would look like.

In an article appearing in the New York Times Magazine, author Ron Suskind makes this observation:

Bruce Bartlett, a domestic policy adviser to Ronald Reagan and a treasury official for the first President Bush, told me recently that "if Bush wins, there will be a civil war in the Republican Party starting on Nov. 3." The nature of that conflict, as Bartlett sees it? Essentially, the same as the one raging across much of the world: a battle between modernists and fundamentalists, pragmatists and true believers, reason and religion.

In this sense, Bartlett is predicting a showdown within the White House and the GOP at large, with the neoconservatives on one side, and the realists and moderates on the other should Bush win again. What Djerejian assumes as a premise, that the second Bush administration would veer away from the neocons, Bartlett foresees as a battle yet to be waged. It appears premature and wishful thinking to a certain degree to assume that these conflicts have already been settled with the moderates, internationalists, and realists emerging the victor. Too much remains to be seen, and a positive result in the election itself might tip the balance in favor of the neoconservative camp - assuming that Bush and Cheney are even entertaining a change of course.

Furthermore, those battles will be fought whatever the outcome on November 2. As I have argued before, there is a struggle for the soul of the Republican Party going on as we speak, with the moderates losing their place due to the overzealous consolidation of power under the far-right wing. This election will serve as a referendum on this movement. As Christie Todd Whitman observed:

Frankly, if the president wins walking away with this, maybe the country is in a different place than where the moderate Republicans are...If he loses, it is an absolute validation of the fact that you cannot be a national party if you are excluding people.

In trying to gauge the nature of the Bush administration's policy making apparatus in a potential second term, I think it would be foolish to ignore the weight of historical evidence regarding current policy, past policy, tendencies for self criticism, accountability and openness to dissent. If past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior, even if Bush II turns away from the neoconservatives (an unlikely outcome in its own right) whatever course is charted, it will again fall victim to the same dearth of process that has so plagued the past four years. Unless empiricism is embraced, philosophical precepts won't make a bit of difference.

Can anyone in the so-called liberal media or right wing punditry explain to me how these comments:

In an interview with SIRUS satellite radio, the Internet's Drudge Report said Wednesday, [Republican Senate hopeful Alan] Keyes called Mary Cheney "a 'selfish hedonist' because she is a lesbian."

Keyes said: "The essence of ... family life remains procreation. If we embrace homosexuality as a proper basis for marriage, we are saying that it's possible to have a marriage state that in principal excludes procreation and is based simply on the premise of selfish hedonism."

Asked whether that meant Mary Cheney "is a selfish hedonist," Keyes said: "That goes by definition. Of course she is."

Are worse than these:

KERRY: We're all God's children, Bob. And I think if you were to talk to Dick Cheney's daughter, who is a lesbian, she would tell you that she's being who she was, she's being who she was born as.

Can anyone make that case? "Selfish hedonist" has got to be worse than one of "God's children" doesn't it? Why wasn't the liberal media all over that one with shock and awe? And where was the "angry father" Dick Cheney then? Where was Lynne's outrage and accusations? Nowhere to be found. Not a whiff of a defense for their daughter. And how did Mary's sibling respond to Keyes' comments:

Liz Cheney, Mary's sister, refused to comment Wednesday during an interview on CNN.

One more update to this story, from Andrew Sullivan:

Gary Bauer has long denied he's anti-gay, or catering to anti-gay prejudice. But this morning he came clean, in referring to Kerry's mentioning Mary Cheney's lesbianism:

"I think it is part of a strategy to suppress traditional-values voters, to knock 1 or 2 percent off in some rural areas by causing people to turn on the president."

Think about that for a minute. Bauer believes that his core supporters would be likely to "turn" on the president just because the vice-president's daughter is a lesbian. Notice that there's no indication of homosexual "acts", just a revulsion at Mary Cheney's simple identity as a lesbian. This is their base. This is why they're worried. Some of the subtler arguments I've heard overnight say the following: it's not that homosexuality is wrong; it's just that many people believe that and Kerry therefore exploited their homophobia to gain a point. I don't buy it, but let's assume the worst in Kerry's motives for the sake of argument. What these emailers are saying is that Kerry should hedge what he says in order to cater to the homophobia of Bush's base. Why on earth should he? The truth here is obvious: Bush and Cheney are closet tolerants. They have no problem with gay people personally; but they use hostility to gay people for political purposes, even if it means attacking members of their own families. What they are currently objecting to is the fact that their hypocrisy has been exposed. To which the only answer is: if you don't want to be exposed as a hypocrite, don't be one. [emphasis added]

Yup. Andy's got it.

I didn't want to have to address this, but it appears there is no way around it. The so-called liberal media is all a flutter over John Kerry mentioning the fact that Vice President Dick Cheney's daughter is gay during Wednesday's debate. See the liberal media dutifully reporting without a critical eye on the suspiciously demonstrative righteous indignation on display from Dick and his wife Lynne. Watch as they betray their own bigotry and prejudices in the process. Much is revealed about America and Americans by this spectacle.

In responding to this most ludicrous of moments in American electoral politics, I will rely on the insights of openly gay journalist Dave Cullen, from an article he penned for Salon.com (to access Salon, just agree to watch a brief web ad for a one day pass). Cullen puts his finger on what so many in the media are suggesting by their confected outrage:

Let's get one thing straight. It is not an insult to call a proudly public lesbian a lesbian. It's an insult to gasp when someone calls her a lesbian. That's how all the gays I have spoken to the past 24 hours perceived the press response. You're embarrassed for us. And it's infuriating.

So utterly true there is little to add to that. Calling someone gay is not an insult unless you perceive being gay as somehow base or deserving of scorn. It's not as if Kerry outed her. She is in a public role, and has never seemed shy about her homosexuality in the past. In fact, she uses the fact that she is gay to appeal to gay constituencies on the campaign trail and in her capacity as a political operative. So if she stands up and declares something proudly, why is Kerry's mention of it so abhorrent? She was not hiding something, and Kerry was not exposing it. He stated the obvious, and if you were ignorant about Mary Cheney's lifestyle, don't let your own surprise color the import of the revelation.

First, let's dispense with the comic aspects of the parental indignation:

Mary Cheney has been happily out of the closet for at least a decade, so John Kerry was hardly dragging her out against her will. She spent the late '90s working as a veritable professional lesbian, as gay and lesbian corporate relations manager for Coors Brewing Co. Dick Cheney himself has been using her sexuality on the campaign trail. Click here to watch a Human Rights Campaign ad with him on the stump on Aug. 24, 2004: "Lynne and I have a gay daughter ... " The Bush-Cheney administration has shamelessly used homosexuality as a wedge issue, never hesitating to play the sodomite card when it serves their political ends. John Edwards brought up Mary Cheney in response to a similar gay-rights question just eight days earlier in the veep debate. Dick Cheney responded by thanking him for his kind remarks.

Uh...right. What Cheney first praised, is now an unthinkable act. What was different in what Kerry said than Edwards? Not much, other than the delivery, which for Kerry was a bit more halting and self-conscious. Both of them mentioned Mary in the context of preaching tolerance, acceptance and compassion for homosexuals. Is there anything to justify saying that the difference in intonation between Edwards and Kerry reveals Kerry as "a man who will do and say anything to get elected" as Dick Cheney suggested. Or as Lynne put it that, "This is not a good man." Let me see if I'm following this: Edwards mentions Mary's homosexuality, the Cheney's say thank you, Kerry does it, and he is evil?

But the discourse in the media, if you can call it that, hasn't focused on the different approaches of Kerry and Edwards. Instead, they are fixated on the word itseld, and the act of calling Mary Cheney by "that word" - betraying a deliberate amnesia to the substance of Edwards' comments last week. Cullen observes:

The most outlandish exchange I've seen came in a scholarly Fox News debate Thursday -- seriously, it happens -- over the candidates' linguistic styles, of all things. The conservative guy, Eric Dezenhall, charged that "the invocation of Vice President Cheney's daughter's lesbianism was sort of a radioactive concept. The words lesbian in a presidential debate -- even if you don't mean it to be mean -- came across as off the grid, and very, very shrill."

Is he serious? If it's innocent little gay people you think you're protecting here, listen up! Gay people do not consider the invocation of our existence radioactive. It's the comparisons to plutonium that drive us nuts. We are not toxic. [emphasis added]

Again, Cullen nails it. It is our own juvenile and bigoted view of homosexuality that would even turn this into an issue in the first place. Should we really treat homosexuals as "those we don't speak of" as if the mere evocation of the name will bring God's wrath upon us? How does that square with an administration that has brought homosexuality into the public discourse to a degree that none of its predecessors ever had - and even then in the pursuit of permanently enshrining discrimination against them into the Constitution of the United States and stirring up anti-gay emotions for gains at the polls.

So, it's okay to talk about homosexuals in vague and abstract terms, especially if you are talking about curtailing their rights, or if you are spreading misleading campaign literature that says that Democrats want to force gay marriage on you - maybe even force heterosexuals to marry the same sex - but to mention that one person close to that effort is gay, in the midst of preaching tolerance, would be stepping over the line?

I will give the last word to Cullen, who is magnanimous enough to provide us ignorant heterosexuals with a little much needed perspective.

Most of you out there have never been a homo. Let me share a personal story to illustrate how this works for a gay person. I came out to my parents when I was in my 30s -- they were shocked, then understanding, but also a little queasy about it. The queasiness was much less about them accepting me as it was their friends accepting them.

That's the part that stings. No matter how old you get.

Once you're happily out of the closet a few years, you don't bat an eye at someone hearing you're gay. Even on national television. Even if your father's the vice president. (Especially if your father's the vice president -- don't you think she's used to it by now?)

What rips your heart out is when someone close to you denies your sexuality in public. Or shudders at the mention of it, so you can see how desperately they want to.

It may sound like a subtle implication to a straight person -- clearly it does; even the most liberal straight pundits appear oblivious to it -- but a gay person hears it scream out loud and clear. You people still feel there's something to be ashamed of here.

[Update: (Via Atrios) When considering all the outrage and chest thumping going on in the conservative punditry and political circles, keep in mind sentiments such as these from Republican Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave, who sponsored the gay marriage amendment in the House. This is from a campaign letter she sent to her supporters:

Dear friend of the family,

Radical homosexual-agenda leaders have declared me Public Enemy #1 and are spending over a million dollars on vicious, false TV ads to defeat me.

I need your help.

You may know that I have been the U.S. House leader to protect traditional marriage from the radical agenda of the homosexual lobby by sponsoring the Marriage Protection Amendment.

What you may not know is that the last sponsor of the Amendment was defeated for re-election, and now the bull's eye is on my back.

Leaders of the homosexual lobby know if they can take me out, no one will stand against them in the future.

I have no other choice but to ask for urgent help from pro-family Americans like you.

...

I’m also worried that if I don’t raise enough money for our ad campaign, I will be powerless to respond to these vicious attacks against me.

Unlike the homosexual lobbies’ ads, my ad campaign will be based on truth and compare my solid record to that of my opponent, liberal Democrat Stan Matsunaka

Stan Matsunaka fears the truth because he knows his record in the State Senate shows he supports homosexual marriage and will promote it as a U.S. Congressman.

If we allow these vicious ads to go unanswered then Stan Matsunaka and the radical homosexual lobby could succeed by deceiving the voters, and win on Election Day.

But wait, Kerry said Mary Cheney was a lesbian. So it's a wash.]

[Update II: For those tempted to judge John Kerry negatively despite the ridiculousness of the argument, please refer to the way that John McCain, his wife, and their adopted child were smeared by Bush/Cheney in the 2000 primary. In that instance, they didn't state that their child was Bangladeshi at an open forum. No, what they did was suggest that the child was in fact African American and the product of an illicit affair of McCain and his fictitious mistress. These are the people that are claiming that John Kerry stepped over the line by evoking the name of a candidate's family member. The hypocrisy knows no bounds.]

[Update III: Eric Alterman in a succinct fashion: "While her parents might be ashamed of her - judging by their attacks on Kerry for saluting her - did it occur to any of these people that Mary Cheney might be glad - even proud - to be gay?"]

[Update the Fourth: The updates keep coming because people keep making points that warrant repetition. First is Slate.com's Kevin Arnovitz (via Beautiful Horizons):

Kerry did not out Cheney. Unlike Alan Keyes, he did not call into question Mary Cheney's moral character. The only thing Kerry sought to do was humanize an issue which is being discussed in alarmingly abstract terms. In fact, the vice president has alluded to his daughter on numerous occasions in public statements and appearances.

So what about Kerry's remarks so offended the Cheney clan? Had the president, when speaking about immigration, referenced Teresa Heinz Kerry's experience in a positive or neutral light, would that have been inappropriate? Is Mary Cheney's homosexuality some sort of affliction? A verboten family tragedy like the death of John Edwards' son? The only "cheap and tawdry political trick" performed Wednesday night was the one turned by the Cheney parental units. It was they who used their daughter's sexuality as a weapon against John Kerry's sympathetic (and very general) remark. If only Dick and Lynne were so indignant when their daughter was legitimately under attack by an administration willing to write gays and lesbians out of the nation's founding document. Selective indignation has never been so crass... [emphasis added]

And wouldn't I be remiss if I didn't let Andrew Sullivan get his two cents in on a topic he has more personal connection with than most conservative pundits (via Lawyers, Guns and Money, with a hat tip to Liberal Zoo from Science and Politics):

I keep getting emails asserting that Kerry's mentioning of Mary Cheney is somehow offensive or gratuitous or a "low blow". Huh? Mary Cheney is out of the closet and a member, with her partner, of the vice-president's family. That's a public fact. No one's privacy is being invaded by mentioning this. When Kerry cites Bush's wife or daughters, no one says it's a "low blow." The double standards are entirely a function of people's lingering prejudice against gay people. And by mentioning it, Kerry showed something important. This issue is not an abstract one. It's a concrete, human and real one. It affects many families, and Bush has decided to use this cynically as a divisive weapon in an election campaign. He deserves to be held to account for this - and how much more effective than showing a real person whose relationship and dignity he has attacked and minimized? Does this makes Bush's base uncomfortable? Well, good. It's about time they were made uncomfortable in their acquiescence to discrimination. Does it make Bush uncomfortable? Even better. His decision to bar gay couples from having any protections for their relationships in the constitution is not just a direct attack on the family member of the vice-president. It's an attack on all families with gay members - and on the family as an institution. That's a central issue in this campaign, a key indictment of Bush's record and more than relevant to any debate. For four years, this president has tried to make gay people invisible, to avoid any mention of us, to pretend we don't exist. Well, we do. Right in front of him.

Well said Andy. Still waiting for you to see the light in the grand sense though.]

[Update V: Digby provides this insightful take:

This isn't just a little game. It is a serious matter of equal rights under the constitution. And, the Cheneys' behavior can be directly compared to the type of behavior that used to be tolerated from white men like Strom Thurmond who agitated for decades for Jim Crow and discrimination against african americans while privately being quite fond of his african american daughter. That goes beyond hypocrisy. For any enlightened person, it is intellectually and emotionally incoherent.

We, as citizens, are not in a position to pass judgment on how people deal with such issues in their personal lives. But those like Thurmond and Cheney publicly promote laws that discriminate against selected people in our society and in their own families. That is such a counterintuitive concept to most Americans that it deserves to be exposed and openly discussed. [emphasis added]

Digby strikes again.]

Few, even on the right, disagree with the fact that the first debate was a decisive victory for Kerry. It was also duly noted that viewership for that debate reached unprecedented levels: 62.5 million viewers.

While the second and third debates did not draw as many viewers, 46.8 and 51.2 million viewers respectively, those two numbers still represented substantial increases over their 2000 counterparts. For example, the final debate in 2000 only snared 37.7 million viewers, 13.5 million fewer than the 2004 version.

This means that more people saw Bush at his worst, than tuned in for the subsequent performances when he put on a better show. Not only will those impressions from the first debate be hard to shake, there is also the logistical reality that millions did not stick around for rounds two and three (even though more did this year than in prior elections).

Viewership for the vice presidential debate was a respectable 43.6 million, an increase of 14 million over the 29 million that watched the vice presidential debate between Cheney and Lieberman in 2000.

The heightened levels of interest (roughly 40% more viewers across the board for each debate), is a testament to the fact that more Americans are paying attention this election cycle than in years past. This will translate into a substantially higher turnout on election day, which is one of the reasons that the polls have not been able to correctly gauge the support for John Kerry.

High turnout, historically speaking, has always favored Democratic candidates, and this year is no exception. Voter registration is trough the roof, as many state election committees have been inundated with new applications - so much so that some have had to resort to hiring temporary workers to process the forms. A large number of the new registrants are from the 18-25 demographic, a group that skew heavily in favor of Kerry, and which is all but ignored in polls of likely voters since most have never voted before. This bodes well for Kerry/Edwards.

As further evidence of how this political contest has recaptured America's attention, I noted in a prior post that in the New York City area, 2.7 million viewers watched the vice presidential debate compared to 1.5 million who watched the Yankee playoff game against Minnesota which was aired on the same night in the same time slot. For New York City's rabid Yankee fans, that says a lot.

Surely this feat would not be repeated on Wednesday night, though, because that debate conflicted with a contest between the Yanks and their bitter rivals, the Boston Red Sox. There is no way that the third presidential debate could beat out a Yankee/Red Sox clash in New York City, especially considering that the country must have had some type of debate fatigue having already sat through three of the events.

But wait...that is exactly what happened. 3.5 million viewers in the New York City area watched the debate, while 2.7 million opted for the baseball game instead, according to Nielsen ratings.

While the team from Massachusetts got beaten a second time in as many nights, the fact that the debate beat out such a popular event bore a glimmer of hope for the Senator from the same state. America is paying attention, and that favors the Democrats - even if it won't reverse the curse of a certain baseball icon.

In a prior post I discussed an article by Joshua Green, which appears in the latest edition of the Atlantic Monthly, the subject of which is the career of Republican political strategist, and Bush campaign guru, Karl Rove. In that post, I discussed Rove's more conventional strengths (and there are many) and weaknesses (regrettably few) as a political operative and campaign manager. What I left out of that discussion is the five hundred pound gorilla lurking in the corner of every room that Rove occupies. To put it in plain English, Karl Rove is the most underhanded, nasty, and downright dirty political mind in the modern era of American politics. Furthermore, Rove has been remarkably consistent in returning to the same dubious tactics and themes in campaign after campaign. The current presidential contest is no exception to the rule. This race has been vintage Karl Rove, which makes some of the recent events which have garnered substantial media attention that much more suspect.

To his credit, Rove has been as adept at keeping the reality of his reputation obscured from the public's eye, as he has been at winning elections - and in doing so, often taking the "by any means necessary" credo to its most extreme and destructive conclusions. By way of introduction, I rely on the words of Joshua Green:

This summer, with the presidential race looking as if it would be every bit as close as the one in 2000, I spent several months examining the narrowest races in Karl Rove's career to better understand the tendencies and tactics of the man who will arguably have more influence than anyone else over how this election unfolds. Rove has already generated a remarkable body of literature, including several notable books and numerous magazine and newspaper articles. I spoke to many of Rove's former candidates and their opponents; to his past and present colleagues and the people who faced off against them; and to political insiders and journalists-primarily in Texas and Alabama, where Rove has done the majority of his campaign work. I learned much about Rove that hasn't made it into the public sphere.

...How Rove has conducted himself while winning campaigns is a subject of no small controversy in political circles. It is frequently said of him, in hushed tones when political folks are doing the talking, that he leaves a trail of damage in his wake-a reference to the substantial number of people who have been hurt, politically and personally, through their encounters with him. Rove's reputation for winning is eclipsed only by his reputation for ruthlessness, and examples abound of his apparent willingness to cross moral and ethical lines.

Media Manipulation

One of Rove's most valuable assets is his ability to manipulate the media in order to achieve the desired result. Through a careful study of the patterns of reporting, Rove has distilled a few core principles. First, because of the media's over-reaction to charges of bias, the press will treat every story in a he said/she said manner - merely reporting what each side of an issue has to say with minimal, if any, determination of what the objective truth is.

Second, Rove relies on the fact that the media prefers to cover a controversy, so even if truth is not on your side, the he said/she said dynamic will be enough to create a controversy which in turn will breathe life into even the most scurrilous of rumors and innuendo in a self sustaining cycle. Rove has incorporated these theories into all facets of government, especially in the realm of marketing policy to the public. A post on Legal Fiction discusses, in depth, this political technique vis a vis the Spinsanity book. Here is an excerpt from the book via Legal Fiction:

Bush has made dishonest PR tactics his standard method for marketing policies to the press and public. Whether on offense or defense, whether the issue is foreign or domestic, the answer is almost always the same - more deceptive spin. For all of his personal and scandal-related dishonesty, Clinton did not promote his policies in such a continually misleading fashion, nor did Reagan use them as systematically or consistently. (p. 238-39)

The examples of this dishonesty in action, and the reliance on the media to dutifully report the administration's talking points with an uncritical eye, are too numerous to list - especially for the purposes of this discussion. Refer to the post on Legal Fiction for the details.

The relevance to this discussion, however, is how Rove uses his knowledge of gaming the media in the context of political campaigns. Green tells of this story from an Alabama judicial race involving one of Rove's candidates:

One particularly damaging ad run by the Hooper campaign [Rove's client] was a fictionalized scene featuring a lawyer receiving an unwanted telephone solicitation from an unseen Chief Justice Hornsby, before whom, viewers were given to understand, the lawyer had a case pending. The ad, and the unseemly practices on which it was based, drew national attention from Tom Brokaw and NBC's Nightly News.

The attacks began to have the desired effect. Judicial races that no one had expected to be competitive suddenly narrowed, and media attention-especially to Hooper's race after the "dialing for dollars" ad-became widespread. [emphasis added]

Think about that for a moment. Rove created a "fictionalized" scene, played it off as fact, and then rode the wave of media attention surrounding the controversy to its full potential. This one ad generated more coverage and exposure than he could have ever hoped to achieve through expensive media buys alone - and the best part is, it was almost entirely free. The message reached the voters, and the media stayed above the fray, refusing to sully its hands with the unsavory task of actually debunking the untruths.

Sound familiar? It should. That is precisely the strategy Rove employed with the Swift Boat Veterans For Truth ads - point by point. Through surrogates (another trademark Rove tactic), the Bush campaign spread "fictionalized" accounts of Kerry's service in Vietnam, and then cashed in as the media provided a windfall of free coverage, without assessing the veracity of the claims (or only doing so half-heartedly). It was extremely successful. Rove effectively shut down the momentum Kerry had built up emerging from the Democratic Convention and was able to turn an issue that was a much touted Kerry strength (perhaps too much so), his decorated Vietnam service, into a negative. After the damage was done, few in the electorate were left with the impression that Kerry's service was an unmitigated positive. The media did too little too late to undo the harm.

It should come as no surprise that someone who is this attuned to media patterns of coverage is also very knowledgeable of the motivations and weaknesses of the individual members of the press. Rove has used threats of restricted access and career ending bans to de-fang the Washington press corp. For years, they were as sycophantic a bunch as had ever before been seen on Capitol Hill. He even banished veteran correspondent, and elder statesperson, Helen Thomas to the back row never to be called on again because she showed the temerity to give the President a tough question and a related follow up. Only now has the media begun to rediscover its role, and not a moment too soon. This partially explains Rove's ability to elude media scrutiny of his disreputable record, despite the fact that it is the worst kept secret in the Beltway.

In the opening pages of Bush's Brain, Wayne Slater describes an encounter with Rove while covering the 2000 campaign for the Dallas Morning News. Slater had written an article for that day's paper detailing Rove's history of dirty tricks, including a 1973 conference he had organized for young Republicans on how to orchestrate them. Rove was furious. "You're trying to ruin me!" Slater recalls him shouting. The anecdote points up one of the paradoxes of Rove's career. Articles like Slater's are surprisingly few, yet as I interviewed people who knew Rove, they brought up examples of unscrupulous tactics - some of them breathtaking - as a matter of course.

Negative Campaigning

It will come as no surprise to anyone who has paid attention to the current campaign that Rove's most notable tendency in close races has been to go negative against his opponent, early and often.

Negative campaigning is nothing new. It has been a staple of politics since the dawn of time. Karl Rove did not invent the stuff, and thus this affliction should not be laid at his doorstep. What can be said of Rove, though, is that he has repeatedly taken this aspect of campaigning to new depths, beyond the pale of decency, even for the rough and tumble world of American politics.

Some of Rove's darker tactics cut even closer to the bone. One constant throughout his career is the prevalence of whisper campaigns against opponents. The 2000 primary campaign, for example, featured a widely disseminated rumor that John McCain, tortured as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, had betrayed his country under interrogation and been rendered mentally unfit for office.

Ponder that for a moment. Rove was running a candidate who, although in theory had supported the Vietnam War, had used his father's connections to avoid service. He then proceeded to question the heroic service of John McCain, who himself could have used his family's connections to avoid combat but opted against it - going as far as to label him, of all things, a traitor. The veteran is the traitor, and the draft dodger is the patriot. Rove's audacity knows no bounds, but the same message has been trumpeted in Rove's attacks on Kerry's distinguished service. He has shown a willingness do disregard the patriotism and service of veterans in the interest of victory at the polls.

McCain actually refused early release from a POW camp because it was won through the influence of his father, himself an Admiral in the US Navy. McCain chose to stay in a POW camp rather than enjoy the benefits of privilege that his fellow prisoners did not enjoy. Is there a starker contrast to Bush who did not hesitate to use his father's connections to avoid the draft, and to his advantage in almost every other aspect of his adult life? Rove, nevertheless, used the very fact that McCain was in a POW camp for 5 1/2 years against him. I guess the concept of supporting the troops does not apply when you are an opponent of Karl Rove.

But it didn't end there for McCain. Rove also distorted McCain's record to actually claim that McCain had consistently voted against veteran's benefits, a charge particularly insidious for someone with McCain's resume. Still, despite the nastiness of these two attacks, Rove's lowest point came with the whisper campaign, supported by cold calls by surrogates in South Carolina, that suggested that McCain had fathered an African American child out of wedlock. This was particularly despicable because McCain and his wife had the generosity of spirit to adopt an impoverished Bangladeshi orphan years earlier. Rove relied on the dark complexion of McCain's adopted child to give the rumor its strength.

The treatment McCain received drove him to challenge Bush in a debate about the tactics employed, to which Bush replied, "It's just politics." McCain responded, "Not everything is politics George." McCain's naivete shined through. For Karl Rove, there is nothing else.

The Homosexual Card

I discussed in my prior post about Rove that he has deliberately made homosexuality a topic of discussion in this election, more than any other election in the nation's history, through his frequent utilization of the wedge issue of affording marriage rights to homosexuals, and the related Constitutional amendment to outlaw such a practice. It turns out that homosexuality is a bit of a preoccupation for Karl Rove, and a frequent line of attack to levy against his political adversaries. This is a cynical line of attacks that are not only dishonest, but suggest that there is something wrong with being a homosexual in the first place.

More often a Rove campaign questions an opponent's sexual orientation. Bush's 1994 race against Ann Richards featured a rumor that she was a lesbian, along with a rare instance of such a tactic's making it into the public record-when a regional chairman of the Bush campaign allowed himself, perhaps inadvertently, to be quoted criticizing Richards for "appointing avowed homosexual activists" to state jobs.

But Rove does not reserve these types of accusations for electoral opponents alone:

Another example of Rove's methods involves a former ally of Rove's from Texas, John Weaver, who, coincidentally, managed McCain's bid in 2000. Many Republican operatives in Texas tell the story of another close race of sorts: a competition in the 1980s to become the dominant Republican consultant in Texas. In 1986 Weaver and Rove both worked on Bill Clements's successful campaign for governor, after which Weaver was named executive director of the state Republican Party. Both were emerging as leading consultants, but Weaver's star seemed to be rising faster. The details vary slightly according to which insider tells the story, but the main point is always the same: after Weaver went into business for himself and lured away one of Rove's top employees, Rove spread a rumor that Weaver had made a pass at a young man at a state Republican function. Weaver won't reply to the smear, but those close to him told me of their outrage at the nearly two-decades-old lie. Weaver was first made unwelcome in some Texas Republican circles, and eventually, following McCain's 2000 campaign, he left the Republican Party altogether. He has continued an active and successful career as a political consultant - in Texas and Alabama, among other states - and is currently working for McCain as a Democrat. [emphasis added]

Anyone familiar with the meme's that have been circulating through the right wing punditry will recognize Rove's fetishistic use of the homosexuality card against Kerry. From the onset, Kerry has been called effete, effeminate, French looking, foppish, etc. There have also been many insinuations about the relationship of Kerry and Edwards based on Edwards' comely appearance and there physical contact at campaign events. Perhaps motivated by the tightening polls, Rove has leaned more vigorously on the homosexual angle. Consider these events as reported on Legal Fiction:

Fox News Reporter Carl Cameron - who covered Bush in 2000 while his wife was campaigning for Bush - included the following quotes which Kerry was credited with saying, even though he didn't say any of them. Now, I've never been to journalism school, but I suspect they teach you not to do this. Anyway, the following quotes appeared on the Fox News website, before they jerked it down.

Rallying supporters in Tampa Friday, Kerry played up his performance in Thursday night's debate, in which many observers agreed the Massachusetts senator outperformed the president.

"Didn't my nails and cuticles look great? What a good debate!" Kerry said Friday.
. . .

"It's about the Supreme Court. Women should like me! I do manicures," Kerry said.
. . .

"I'm metrosexual - he's a cowboy," the Democratic candidate said of himself and his opponent.

A "metrosexual" is defined as an urbane male with a strong aesthetic sense who spends a great deal of time and money on his appearance and lifestyle. [emphasis added throughout]

If history is any indicator, I expect Rove to ramp up the innuendo and rumor in the coming weeks regarding the sexual orientation of his Democratic rivals. The fact that this is even considered and effective attack in the first place is a testament to how much further America needs to progress on the issue of homosexuality. The fact that Rove frequently returns to this line of attack, reinforcing the notion that it is in fact an attack in the first place, is astoundingly ugly.

Rove's Lowest Low

Deciding on which moment in particular marks the nadir of Rove's dubious ethical record is not an easy task. Still, there is something about this anecdote that seems to stand out against the tawdry backdrop of Rove's career (again, note how Rove uses surrogates to accomplish his goals - and the undercurrent of homosexuality).

But no other example of Rove's extreme tactics that I encountered quite compares to what occurred during another 1994 judicial campaign in Alabama. In that year Harold See first ran for the supreme court, becoming the rare Rove client to lose a close race. His opponent, Mark Kennedy, an incumbent Democratic justice and, as George Wallace's son-in-law, a member in good standing of Alabama's first family of politics, was no stranger to hardball politics. "The Wallace family history and what they all went through, that's pretty rough politics," says Joe Perkins, who managed Kennedy's campaign. "But it was a whole new dimension with Rove."

...When his term on the court ended, he chose not to run for re-election. I later learned another reason why. Kennedy had spent years on the bench as a juvenile and family-court judge, during which time he had developed a strong interest in aiding abused children. In the early 1980s he had helped to start the Children's Trust Fund of Alabama, and he later established the Corporate Foundation for Children, a private, nonprofit organization. At the time of the race he had just served a term as president of the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse and Neglect. One of Rove's signature tactics is to attack an opponent on the very front that seems unassailable. Kennedy was no exception.

Some of Kennedy's campaign commercials touted his volunteer work, including one that showed him holding hands with children. "We were trying to counter the positives from that ad," a former Rove staffer told me, explaining that some within the See camp initiated a whisper campaign that Kennedy was a pedophile. "It was our standard practice to use the University of Alabama Law School to disseminate whisper-campaign information," the staffer went on. "That was a major device we used for the transmission of this stuff. The students at the law school are from all over the state, and that's one of the ways that Karl got the information out-he knew the law students would take it back to their home towns and it would get out." This would create the impression that the lie was in fact common knowledge across the state. "What Rove does," says Joe Perkins, "is try to make something so bad for a family that the candidate will not subject the family to the hardship. Mark is not your typical Alabama macho, beer-drinkin', tobacco-chewin', pickup-drivin' kind of guy. He is a small, well-groomed, well-educated family man, and what they tried to do was make him look like a homosexual pedophile. That was really, really hard to take." [emphasis added]

I think that speaks for itself. He actually started a rumor that a man who dedicated his life to public service in the interest of children's issues was a homosexual pedophile, driving that man out of a career of good works. If that is not scorched Earth campaigning, I do not know what is.

The Faux Attack

Above all things, Rove is a creature of habit. He has a successful formula for winning elections, and he repeats it time and again. In my prior post, I outlined his considerable logistical, organizational and technical talents that have been an asset to Rove over the past twenty-plus years. I also pointed out that his history might be a hindrance in this election because there is a changing dynamic in the nation, while Rove is less flexible in his outlook - opting instead to run this election as he has so many others in the insular markets of Texas and Alabama by appealing to the core conservative base.

One thing that is also clear, is that Rove uses almost identical tactics in every close race he is in, including and especially the current one: he manipulates the media to get free exposure for fictitious claims (Swifties), goes negative early and often attacking his opponents on their perceived strengths - showing no reluctance to assault the service of veterans (Swifties, flip-flopper, "liberal", etc.), he will cast his opponents as homosexuals (effete, French looking, Fox News quotes, etc.) and he will use surrogates to do most of the dirty work (all of the above). This takes me to the final tactic employed by Rove: he feigns an outrageous attack on his own candidate in order to paint his opponent in a negative light and/or distract the electorate from a pertinent topic in the news.

A typical instance occurred in the hard-fought 1996 race for a seat on the Alabama Supreme Court between Rove's client, Harold See, then a University of Alabama law professor, and the Democratic incumbent, Kenneth Ingram. According to someone who worked for him, Rove, dissatisfied with the campaign's progress, had flyers printed up-absent any trace of who was behind them-viciously attacking See and his family. "We were trying to craft a message to reach some of the blue-collar, lower-middle-class people," the staffer says. "You'd roll it up, put a rubber band around it, and paperboy it at houses late at night. I was told, 'Do not hand it to anybody, do not tell anybody who you're with, and if you can, borrow a car that doesn't have your tags.' So I borrowed a buddy's car [and drove] down the middle of the street - I had Hefty bags stuffed full of these rolled-up pamphlets, and I'd cruise the designated neighborhoods, throwing these things out with both hands and literally driving with my knees." The ploy left Rove's opponent at a loss. Ingram's staff realized that it would be fruitless to try to persuade the public that the See campaign was attacking its own candidate in order "to create a backlash against the Democrat," as Joe Perkins, who worked for Ingram, put it to me. Presumably the public would believe that Democrats were spreading terrible rumors about See and his family. "They just beat you down to your knees," Ingram said of being on the receiving end of Rove's attacks. See won the race.

So Karl Rove initiated a campaign to attack his own candidate in order to discredit his opponent. Shocking? Yes. A one time affair? Not exactly. Rove also partook in a similar bit of chicanery during the closely contested 1986 Texas governor's race, "in which his candidate and mentor, the Republican oilman Bill Clements, sought to oust the Democratic incumbent Mark White." During this infamous chapter of Rovian campaigning, Rove bugged his office (though he has never acknowledged the fact) and then announced, innocently enough, that his office was bugged on the same day as "an evening debate in which his candidate was expected to fare poorly." Rove made White's camp look unethical, as if they were guilty of bugging his offices, and then used the revelation of such a "crime" to obscure the events of that night - which would have hurt his own candidate's prospects. Needless to say, Rove's candidate won.

Having seen Rove's penchant for pattern and repetition, does this tactic look familiar? While I have no proof to this effect, and what I am about to say is pure speculation (albeit based on Rove's extensive record), I think there is a good chance that the forged memos that CBS quoted from in a piece on Bush's National Guard service originated from Karl Rove. Before you dismiss this as the wild ravings of a conspiracy theorist, consider a few points.

First of all, it should be asked if Rove is capable of something like this. I think his record speaks for itself. If his career proves one thing, it is that he is capable of anything. What's worse, he has actually engaged in similar tactics before, using an attack on his own candidate to undermine his opponent, and Rove is known for repeating a successful formula.

Further, consider who this helped. It clearly helped Bush. Just when the media was turning its attention to Bush's controversial record in the Texas Air National Guard, as a sort of quid pro quo for giving so much attention to the Swift Boat Vets, that whole line of inquiry was cut off completely. No news organization will touch the topic with a proverbial ten foot pole for fear of appearing biased. In fact, CBS scuttled a whole program on the Iraq war that was set to air this month out of concern of appearing to harbor an anti-Bush agenda.

In addition, consider the nature of the memos. They didn't actually contain any new or particularly damaging information about Bush's record that wasn't also available in records released by the White House and Pentagon. The secretary of the alleged author of the memos, Lt. Col. Jerry B. Killian, said that while they were forgeries, the content was an accurate depiction of her bosses sentiments. To think that CBS or a Kerry supporter would forge memos in order to parrot information that was available in the public record is beyond strategically unwise. They would have nothing to gain, and everything to lose - whereas Rove stood to gain tremendously.

An article appearing in the Air Force Times summarizes the real record of Bush, and discusses the fact that for every substantive claim, there is corroboration outside of the forged memos. Here is one example:

"Lt. Bush is an exceptionally fine young officer and pilot," wrote his commanding officer in the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron in Houston, Lt. Col. Jerry B. Killian. Bush performed in an outstanding manner...a natural leader."

But from there, Bush's performance slipped. The descent began when Bush apparently did not follow an order to report for his annual flight physical in May 1972, which got him grounded.

The grounding was noted in one of the four documents unveiled by CBS - which were given to the White House, which released them to the rest of the media. It appears to be an order signed by Killian suspending Bush from flight status "due to failure to perform to USAF/TexANG standards and failure to meet annual physical examination (flight) as ordered."

Handwriting experts hired by many media organizations as well as other critics contend the document, and possibly all four, are forgeries. However, Killian's order is confirmed by two documents that were not part of the CBS papers. The first is a White House-released letter from the commander of the 147th Fighter Group, Col. Bobby W. Hodges, to its Texas higher command dated Sept. 5, 1972, with a subject line of "Suspension From Flying Status."

The letter documents the missed flight physical and the suspension, "effective 1 Aug 1972." A Sept. 29 order from the National Guard Bureau further confirms the missed physical and the suspension.

For the record, I am not absolving CBS's role in all of this. They should never have aired the forged memos, no matter what the source. Simple journalistic scrutiny would have revealed the fact that they were forgeries, and the lack of these measures is inexcusable. That being said, they have suffered enough.

Whether or not the CBS memo scandal eventually gets traced back to Karl Rove or not remains to be seen. It is certainly possible that Rove had nothing to do with it, and I reiterate my lack of certainty, but it is Rove's record itself which leads many to suspect his hand in this matter. At the very least, it has been a serendipitous turn of events for Bush. Regardless, Rove's record is shameful enough to warrant widespread condemnation and attention. The fact that he has been able to avoid such deserved scorn is a confounding reality.

I will leave the conclusion to Joshua Green:

If this year stays true to past form, the campaign will get nastier in the closing weeks, and without anyone's quite registering it, Rove will be right back in his element. He seems to understand - indeed, to count on-the media's unwillingness or inability, whether from squeamishness, laziness, or professional caution, ever to give a full estimate of him or his work. It is ultimately not just Rove's skill but his character that allows him to perform on an entirely different plane. Along with remarkable strategic skills, he has both an understanding of the media's unstated self-limitations and a willingness to fight in territory where conscience forbids most others.

It is hard to say this any differently than I put it the first two times: objectively speaking, Kerry won. He had better answers that stayed truer to the questions, provided more details, displayed greater integrity, and perhaps most importantly, looked more presidential.

Both camps will walk away from tonight's events claiming victory, I assume, but to the independent eye, Kerry was more appealing. His strongest points came on the domestic front, evoking a steady diet of Clintonian economics and a progressive social agenda, a one-two combination that carried Clinton to two victories at the polls during the 1990s. He combined the tenets of fiscal discipline, with the priorities of middle class empowerment and relief. He picked up on the Edwards two America's theme by presenting Bush's tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans as a choice between needed social programs and a bigger tax return for the people that need it the least. To the millions of middle class Americans feeling the pinch of higher taxes from states and municipalities, combined with increased costs of goods, health care, tuition, etc., these messages will resonate.

Bush, on the other hand, largely dodged every major economic question, opting to change the subject to a vague rant on the values of education. When talking to the worker whose job was just outsourced, as one question beckoned, discussing the value of education is not going to win many votes. These people need to hear about minimum wage, level playing fields, corporate incentives for domestic production, middle class tax breaks that don't forestall the federal government from contributing to sate coffers to ease the local tax burdens, extension of unemployment benefits, etc. When health care came up, Bush again derided a system by which the government contributes to the efforts of private citizens. For the millions of Americans struggling to pay for health insurance, or doing without it, Kerry's plan had massive appeal.

George W. Bush looked even more out of touch with the middle class than his father did, and that perception spelled defeat for the elder.

It was discouraging to see just how closely Bush adhered to the Cheney doctrine. Both sides had minor discrepancies of facts, but Bush's lies were major distortions that far outpaced Kerry's deceptions in both size and scope. Bush's lies were bold and daring. Not only did he lie in a grandiose fashion, but when he was called on it, he just repeated the fabrications with a sense of righteous indignation.

There was the moment after Bush erroneously claimed, once again, that Kerry had voted to raise taxes 98 times. When Kerry correctly noted that the Bush campaign's tally of his votes was a misleading manipulation and massive distortion (the actual number of votes was about one fifth that according to Dick Cheney's favorite watchdogs FactCheck.org), Bush just flat out lied to the American people. He said that there was no playing around with the numbers, Kerry just voted 98 times against tax cuts. It was a shameful display.

Bush also deliberately misled the American public about Kerry's "global plan." In a repetition of the gotcha campaigning tactic that seizes upon one word to build a mountain of prevarications, Bush told the crowd point blank that Kerry would ask the permission of the world before taking military action. Kerry repeated what he has said all along, that he would never wait for the world's approval or give the international community veto power over our national security. Bush was banking on the power of lies over truth. He repeated his claim in the face of Kerry's proclamation. It was a shameful display. The examples abound, and I expect FactCheck.org will be busy into the late hours chasing down the many Bush deceptions.

I actually have confidence that the American people will see through the thin performance of Bush in these three debates, to come to the realization that the man in office is out of touch with everyday Americans. That he is the champion of interests that run counter to theirs, and above all, is simply not competent to hold the nation's highest office. Bush is relying on the rhetoric of fear and the ability of lies, repeated often enough and with a sufficient number of bangs to the podium, to sway public opinion. This election, the American people are paying attention like never before. Bush can run, but he can't hide.

[Update: It would only be proper if I once again took stock of the post-debate reaction from Rupert Murdoch's New York Post. The headline for the lead article stuck with the boxing theme (two prior headlines were "Kerry Comes Out Swinging," and "Cheney Comes Out Swinging") and read "Left Jabs And Right Hooks." Although the headline implies that Bush's punches were more potent, the four person panel of undecided voters scored the night a draw, two giving it to Kerry, two to Bush. This is significant because of the various panels of experts and undecided voters that Murdoch's Post assembled, not one majority broke for the Republican contestant. Two times Kerry was given the night, Edwards/Cheney was scored a draw, and the final debate between Bush and Kerry was scored a draw. That means that Murdoch's people couldn't see fit to call any night a Bush victory. That is a testament to the fact that Kerry's (and Edwards') margin of victory in each contest was substantial.

In addition, the accompanying article was a story about Republican pollster Frank Luntz's focus group of undecided voters. Out of the 23 members, 13 scored it a Kerry victory, 10 scored it a draw, and 0, that's right, 0, scored it a Bush victory. In terms of the election, four declared they were going to vote for Kerry, two for Bush, and the rest remained non-committal. And that's from a Republican pollster.

Update II: The "Grand Gaffe" from last night was obviously Bush's sarcastic retort to Kerry's statement that Bush had previously declared his lack of interest in Bin Laden. As I have said before, the big lies that should get the attention often go unreported by the media. Instead, the easy to explain, simple ones get all the focus. And of course, pictures help. This explains the ubiquitous coverage of Cheney's lie about never meeting Senator Edwards prior to the debate. Much to Cheney's chagrin, photographs of the pair together on numerous occasions began circulating around the blogosphere almost instantly, and these were quickly picked up by the mainstream folks. The second Bush/Kerry debate had the timber company flap. Though there weren't any pictures of Bush in a flannel shirt with a chainsaw, his sarcastic response about "wanting wood" and his incredulous admission that it was "news" to him, only made the fact that Kerry was right and Bush was wrong that much worse. Publius at Legal Fiction captures last night's Grand Gaffe better than I:

Bush and Kerry both said a couple of things that weren't true - Bush on the statement about Osama bin Laden, and Kerry on the Congressional Black Caucus. Now, I personally don't consider these falsehoods to be in the same ballpark as the one listed above. But still, the bin Laden line will hurt Bush more than the Black Caucus line will hurt Kerry. That's because Bush was a smartass about it:
BUSH: Gosh, I just don't think I ever said I'm not worried about Osama bin Laden. It's kind of one of those exaggerations.

Here is what Bush actually said in a press conference when asked a question concerning the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden:

I don’t know where he is. Nor — you know, I just don’t spend that much time on him really, to be honest with you. I....I truly am not that concerned about him.

Now back to publius with some words of advice worth heeding:

The first commandment of presidential debates is: "Thou shall not say something goofy that can be played over and over again by the media and make you look silly." By being a smartass, the subsequent clip (which CNN played immediately) is even more damning. Yes, Kerry's line was equally wrong. But the video of Bush's earlier statement, coupled with the smartass-ness from the debate, will hurt Bush. In fact, that alone will make it difficult for Bush to claim outright victory. The same thing happened to Cheney. He chose to make the point about Edwards's Senate attendance in the most smartass of ways, and the subsequent picture became many times more damning because of it.

True indeed]

Last week, I posted about the announcement by moderate Republican Senator Lincoln Chafee that he would not vote for President Bush this coming November. Well, yet another career Republican has gone public with a similar announcement, although in a decidedly less diplomatic fashion.

Elmer L. Andersen, long a bastion of conservative politics in the state of Minnesota, and the state's governor from 1961 to 1963, is the latest to air his discontent with the Bush administration. Unlike Chafee, Andersen is unequivocal in his support for Kerry. Here is Andersen's statement (via Arran's Alley which is a very worthwhile, informative and satirically witty blog - also by that blog's author is From The Trenches, a comprehensive roundup of events from the working class perspective):

Throughout my tenure and beyond as the 30th governor of this state, I have been steadfastly aligned -- and until recently, proudly so -- with the Minnesota Republican Party.

It dismays me, therefore, to have to publicly disagree with the national Republican agenda and the national Republican candidate but, this year, I must.

The two "Say No to Bush" signs in my yard say it all.

The present Republican president has led us into an unjustified war -- based on misguided and blatantly false misrepresentations of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The terror seat was Afghanistan. Iraq had no connection to these acts of terror and was not a serious threat to the United States, as this president claimed, and there was no relation, it's now obvious, to any serious weaponry. Although Saddam Hussein is a frightful tyrant, he posed no threat to the United States when we entered the war. George W. Bush's arrogant actions to jump into Iraq when he had no plan how to get out have alienated the United States from our most trusted allies and weakened us immeasurably around the world.

Also, if there as well had been proper and careful coordination of services and intelligence on Sept. 11, 2001, that horrific disaster might also have been averted. But it was a separate event from this brutal mess of a war, and the disingenuous linking of the wholly unrelated situation in Iraq to 9/11 by this administration is not supported by the facts.

Sen. John Kerry was correct when he said that seemingly it is only Bush and Dick Cheney who still believe their own spin. Both men spew outright untruths with evangelistic fervor. For Bush -- a man who chose to have his father help him duck service in the military during the Vietnam War -- to disparage and cast doubt on the medals Kerry won bravely and legitimately in the conflict of battle is a travesty.

For Cheney to tell the hand-picked, like-minded Republican crowds in Des Moines last month that to vote for John Kerry could mean another attack like that of 9/11 is reprehensible. Moreover, such false statements encourage more terrorist attacks rather than prevent them.

A far smaller transgression, but one typical of his stop-at-nothing tactics, was Cheney's assertion in last Wednesday's vice-presidential debate that he'd never met Sen. John Edwards until that night. The next day -- and the media must stay ever-vigilant at fact-checking the lies of this ticket -- news reports, to the contrary, showed four video clips of Edwards and Cheney sitting next to each other during the past five years.

In both presidential debates, Kerry has shown himself to be of far superior intellect and character than Bush. He speaks honestly to the American people, his ethics are unimpeachable and, clearly, with 20 respected years in the Senate, he has far better credentials to lead the country than did Bush when he was elected four years ago. And a far greater depth of understanding of domestic and foreign affairs to do it now.

Not that the sitting president has ever really been at the helm.

I am more fearful for the state of this nation than I have ever been -- because this country is in the hands of an evil man: Dick Cheney. It is eminently clear that it is he who is running the country, not George W. Bush.

Bush's phony posturing as cocksure leader of the free world -- symbolized by his victory symbol on the aircraft carrier and "mission accomplished" statement -- leave me speechless. The mission had barely been started, let alone finished, and 18 months later it still rages on. His ongoing "no-regrets," no-mistakes stance and untruths on the war -- as well as on the floundering economy and Bush administration joblessness -- also disappoint and worry me.

Liberal Republicans of my era and mind-set used to have a humane and reasonable platform. We advocated the importance of higher education, health care for all, programs for children at risk, energy conservation and environmental protection. Today, Bush and Cheney give us clever public relations names for programs -- need I say "No Child Left Behind? -- but a lack of funding to support them. Early childhood education programs and overall health care are woefully underfunded. We have not only the largest number ever of medically uninsured in this nation, our infant mortality rates, once among the lowest in the world, have worsened to 27th.

As taxes for the wealthy are being cut, jobs are being outsourced if not lost and children are homeless and uninsured, this administration is running up the biggest deficit in U.S. history -- bound to be a terrible burden for future generations.

This imperialistic, stubborn adherence to wrongful policies and known untruths by the Cheney-Bush administration -- and that's the accurate order -- has simply become more than I can stand.

Although I am a longtime Republican, it is time to make a statement, and it is this: Vote for Kerry-Edwards, I implore you, on Nov. 2.

Elmer, why don't you tell us how you really feel?

David Scott Anderson is working on a project to bring schoolbooks to Costa Rican Schoolchildren. Project Apollonia is an ongoing project of the blog In Search of Utopia to help in this effort.

Joshua Green has written an insightful appraisal of the work of political strategist Karl Rove for the latest edition of the Atlantic Monthly. The portrait drawn by Green is both disturbing and illuminating. Karl Rove is many things to many people, but analyzing his resume, two things stand out: On the one hand he is a masterful political strategist with an impressive record of electoral success, sometimes in very unlikely settings. The flip side of that coin is the fact that Karl Rove might be the most underhanded and downright dirty political operative of the modern era.

The two most immediate examples of Rove's success are: First, the narrow defeat of Al Gore, the vice president of a popular incumbent president, by George W. Bush, a relatively inexperienced Governor from Texas who did have the advantage of almost universal name recognition. Second, the impressive gains made by Republicans in the Congressional midterm elections.

Rove began receiving national attention on a much smaller stage, though, and one in which he faced daunting odds - and triumphed.

In 1994 a group called the Business Council of Alabama appealed to Rove to help run a slate of Republican candidates for the state supreme court. This would not have seemed a plum assignment to most consultants. No Republican had been elected to that court in more than a century. But the council was hopeful, in large part because Rove had faced precisely this scenario in Texas several years before, and had managed to get elected, in rapid succession, a Republican chief justice and a number of associate justices, and was well on his way to turning an all-Democratic court all Republican. Rove took the job.

The results were overwhelming. Rove went on to transform, the political climate for the judiciary in Alabama as he had done in Texas. He, almost singlehandedly, reversed over a century of intractable political realities in less than a decade. As a testament to the totality of Rove's success, Green notes:

Earlier this year the lone Democrat on the Alabama Supreme Court announced his retirement. There's an excellent chance that on Election Day the court will at last become entirely Republican.

Other examples of Rove's electoral achievements abound.

So what makes Karl Rove so good, or bad, depending on your perspective? The answer is multifaceted, as Rove possesses many talents: some unique, some mundane and some of a more dubious ethical nature. But all of them are encompassed in one package, which makes him a formidable figure and a worthy adversary to any politician unlucky enough to find him or herself in his sights.

First, I will focus on Rove's less controversial attributes. It has been noted by Green and others that many of Rove's tendencies were informed by his early days as a direct mail campaigner and fund raiser. That experience has imbued in him an instinctual feel for voter tendencies and motivations and a system and strategy for compartmentalizing marketing to specific groups and demographics. To this, Rove adds a well studied knowledge of language and how to frame the issues to corner the debate, a careful attention to detail, a dedication to efficiency of operations, and a solid underlying strategic foundation - he has been known to quote Napoleon in staff memos saying, "The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack." Anyone who has paid attention to Rove run campaigns recognizes the tactics of Bonaparte.

Rove's tenure as a direct mail campaigner has taught him how to compile and read demographic data, and given him an appreciation for the details within the data. It also provided an understanding of the limitations of marketing and how to gauge the efficacy of various aspects.

According to Karl Rove & Co. data on the 1994 Texas governor's race, Rove was aware, for instance, that households that received a single piece of mail turned out for Bush at a rate of 15.45 percent, and those that received three pieces at a rate of 50.83 percent. Turnout peaked at seven pieces (57.88 percent), after which enthusiasm for Bush presumably gave way to feelings of inundation, and support began to drop.

For Rove, attention to detail is all important, and the routine is the same: identify a demographic that can be won over, target the marketing expenditures to reach that group, and frame the message to make it most appealing to the intended audience.

Identify the target audience:

Rove would typically begin a race by constructing seven-layer spreadsheets of the electoral history of a particular office, charting where votes for each candidate had originated and which groups had supplied them. In the 1980s these data led Rove to conclude that his candidates ought to target "ticket-splitters" - Texans who supported Ronald Reagan for President but voted Democratic in downballot races.

Focus the marketing efforts:

As with direct mail, Rove was skilled at reaching specific voter segments with television commercials, buying air time only during programs that he believed would attract the audience he was trying to reach. In his Alabama races he was known particularly to withhold advertising from The Oprah Winfrey Show and similar afternoon programming - "trimming a media buy," as it is known in the trade. Bill Smith, who worked on a series of close races with Rove in Alabama, says, "There's a real overlap in what he specialized in professionally and what you need to do in a tight race." Whether he is seeking donors in a direct-mail fundraising campaign or manipulating a particular demographic sliver to win a close race, Rove's professional goal has been strikingly consistent: to reach the right people.

Frame the debate:

"Throughout his career Rove has been able to stage-manage races to an extraordinary degree. This is possibly his least appreciated skill." The way that Rove determines the dynamic in a given race is through controlling the terms of the debate. By framing the terms, he makes his opponents' positions seem indefensible, while his candidates come across as the only reasonable choice. Furthermore, as a truly skilled framer, he can turn one phrase into coded language that means different things to different groups - thus appealing to them all without unnecessarily alienating potential supporters. In this sense, Rove has been practicing what George Lakoff has been preaching.

Among Rove's other innovations was a savvy use of language, developed for speaking to the conservative base about judicial races. Candidates were to attack "liberal activist judges" and to present themselves as "people who will strictly interpret the law and not rewrite it from the bench." A former Rove staffer explained to me that the term "activist judges" motivates all sorts of people for very different reasons. If you're a religious conservative, he said, it means judges who established abortion rights or who interpret Massachusetts's equal-protection clause as applying to gays. If you're a business conservative, it means those who allow exorbitant jury awards. And in Alabama especially, the term conjures up those who forced integration. "The attraction of calling yourself a 'strict constructionist,'" as Rove's candidates did, this staffer explained, "is that you can attract business conservatives, social conservatives, and moderates who simply want a reasonable standard of justice."

I will address Karl Rove's more ethically suspect talents in a subsequent post, but before I do, I want to highlight some weaknesses in Rove's approach that may provide an infusion of hope for Kerry supporters, especially after the litany of Rovian skills that I just provided. His weaknesses fall into two categories: logistical and strategic.

Logistically speaking, the political terrain of the current presidential election is less advantageous than what Rove is used to, at least up until this point.

If there is any compelling reason to think that Rove may be out of his depth in this election, it is an odd lacuna in his storied career: no one I spoke with could recall his ever having to run an incumbent in a tough re-election race. This is partly a by-product of his dominance.

It is partly a result of Rove's dominance, and partly a result of the political realities of a national election at this moment in history. Whereas most of Rove's success stories have been in regions of the country that were already converting to a more conservative mindset (Texas and Alabama), this election is on a national stage with two sides that are firmly entrenched ideologically.

Democrats who want to feel sanguine about the coming election might well find comfort in the particulars of Rove's career. Several of his usual advantages are lacking this time around, conspicuously in geography. As a direct-mail consultant, Rove worked for races across the country, in blue states as well as red. The nature of that work mostly entailed identifying conservatives and motivating them to donate money - a fine skill for one in his current position as Bush's chief strategist, but not the equivalent of running a campaign. Rove compiled his stellar record in Texas and Alabama - and, of course, in the 2000 presidential election, even if his candidate lost the popular vote. During the period in which he rose to power, both states, deeply conservative, were transitioning from a firmly Democratic electorate to a firmly Republican one. A charge frequently levied against Rove by beleaguered Democratic consultants in Texas and Alabama is that he merely "surfed the wave" of the demographic change. This ignores his political talent. It's true, though, that for most of his career Rove has enjoyed a kind of home-field advantage, and in this election he does not.

Another aspect of the race that has run counter to the Rove-doctrine has been Kerry's unexpected ability to raise money, and the related involvement of left-leaning "527's" that have proved to be powerful and wealthy allies to the Kerry campaign.

Rove is also riding on less of a decisive financial advantage than the one he normally enjoys. In their book Bush's Brain, James Moore and Wayne Slater explain how Rove's success as a fundraiser provided the impetus for his move into political consulting, and how, once established in that capacity, he consolidated his power by controlling candidates' access to major donors, usually ensuring that his clients were better funded than their opponents. This enabled him to engage in what amounted to asymmetric warfare against anyone who challenged his candidates.

Whereas Rove had a decisive monetary edge over Gore in 2000, utilized to its full potential, Kerry has had the necessary resources to fight back when challenged, and make stronger plays at various target demographics. Rove is not accustomed to such financial parity, and has had to run flanking maneuvers at times in response.

The strategic weaknesses of Rove will be perhaps even more determinant of the outcome in November than the aforementioned logistical obstacles. Rove's strategy will be deemed either folly or brilliance depending on the final result, but the tack he has taken has drawn the ire and criticism of many, including members of his own party. His strategic failings, if that is indeed what they turn out to be, can be seen as two related shortcomings: First, an inflated sense of confidence based on a career of consistent success, and secondly, a myopic reliance on the lessons of those successes and an inability to adapt them to the current context.

As with all great minds, Rove also has big blind spots. Those have, perhaps, been exacerbated by his success as a certain intellectual complacency has settled in, reinforced by history.

A surprising number of Rove's former colleagues believe that his unprecedented success in Texas, where for years his candidates rarely faced serious challenges, has fostered what in the boxing world would be known as a "tomato-can" syndrome. Like a heavyweight champion who lets down his guard after beating up a series of hapless "tomato-can" opponents, Rove, they fear, may have been blinded to current national realities by hubris.

Whether born out of hubris, complacency, or just the astute perception of the winning strategy, there is no doubt that Rove is running on a different set of themes than in 2000.

While John Kerry's campaign has made an extraordinary effort to gather moderate voters to his liberal base by stressing its candidate's decorated war record and centrist views, Rove - in contrast to 2000's invitingly gauzy message of "compassionate conservatism" - has returned to his traditional strength: motivating the base of conservative voters.

Rather than soften Bush's appeal to reach moderates, Rove, as he has done throughout his career, is attempting to control the debate by expertly spotlighting issues sure to inspire his core constituency: the drive for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage, the pronouncements about love of country, the unremitting attack against anything in an opponent that seems impregnable. All these tactics stand out in Rove's most memorable past victories.

This move marks a part of a strategy that Rove has been espousing ever since the events of 9/11. The results have been mixed and the risks enormous. In this sense, Rove's post-9/11 approach marks his biggest gambit as a political operative.

In the months following the tragic events, the nation was unified unlike any time in history. Political divides were ignored, unity was valued at a premium, and bipartisanship ruled the day in the normally divisive world of politics. For a brief moment in time, George Bush seemed to grow into his campaign promise to be a uniter and a broacher of differences. He benefited greatly from the decision by the press corp, and the Democratic opposition, to abstain from criticizing his leadership. To do so, it was thought, would appear unpatriotic and shrill at a time when stability and togetherness were sacrosanct. With the invasion of Afghanistan raging half a world a way, there was a somewhat surreal pax-Americana in Washington. Having reaped the political capital of 9/11, and the subsequent events in Afghanistan, George Bush's re-election was a fait accompli.

A funny thing happened on the way to November 2, 2004, however, and for this Karl Rove's legacy will always be judged. Instead of expanding the mandate that Bush had achieved post-9/11, and ushering in an era of bipartisan support reminiscent of Reagan, which would have carried Bush to a landslide in 2004, Rove went for broke. Taking advantage of the nation's fears and insecurities, the GOP machine, with Rove at its helm, used 9/11 as a hammer to bludgeon foes in a most scurrilous fashion.

The saga of triple-amputee and Vietnam veteran Max Cleeland typifies the plight of Democrats during the interim elections and throughout many post-9/11 legislative battles. The patriotism of Cleeland, and other Democrats, was called into question - with one campaign advertisement juxtaposing his image with that of Bin Laden's in a not so subtle innuendo. Opponents of the Patriot Act were labeled terrorist accomplices. The Iraq war resolution was suspiciously timed to coincide with the run-up to the interim elections themselves, with its detractors painted as cowards, appeasers and reckless peaceniks. When the Iraq war began the GOP looked stronger than ever. Rove had begun to scorch the Earth in an all out effort to insure Republican dominance in Washington.

On the one hand he was successful, as the GOP picked up seats in the House and the Senate, tightening their grip on Congress. In doing so, however, Rove stomped all over the nascent bipartisanship that had begun to take root in Washington. Perhaps emboldened by these successes, Rove employed the same strategic outlook for Bush's re-election campaign. It is as if Rove interpreted the midterm elections as a sign that the country was experiencing a sea change, much as the electorate had in Texas and Alabama where he gamed the system so brilliantly. The landscape began to take on familiar dimensions for Rove, so he played it the only way he knew how: surfing the wave of the conservative revolution by extolling the virtues of the movement while leaving moderates and leftists to drown in his wake.

But this is where Rove overplayed his hand. The country was not going the way of Texas and Alabama. Quite the contrary, Rove's sharp turn to the right awoke the slumbering apathetic left. The Democratic party, at the urging of vocal leaders like Howard Dean, rediscovered its sense of purpose, and the grass roots support flourished. Instead of serving a coup de grace, Rove inadvertently gave rise to a level of activism that hasn't been witnessed since the 1960s. All of a sudden, what should have been a sure Bush landslide has turned into a fiercely contested toss up. The lost opportunity has not gone unnoticed.

Privately, Rove has been challenged and even denounced for his approach. A common refrain I heard from Republican consultants a few months ago was that his approach is foolish, because for the sake of an ideologically intense campaign, Rove is ceding to the Democrats the moderates Kerry is pursuing. And, these consultants fear, it puts Bush in jeopardy of seeing outside events decide the race.

"I think Karl's success in Texas is almost a hindrance," a veteran strategist who worked with him in that state told me. "The rest of the country doesn't emulate Texas in terms of voting behavior. But sometimes you see his southern roots in Texas and his experience in Alabama kind of overtake him, and he seems to think the United States is one big-ass Texas."

Several consultants pointed to the issue of gay marriage, which one described as a perfect Texas wedge issue because it would attract culturally conservative Democrats in the eastern part of the state - "the rednecks," as he put it - who are normally the key to winning statewide office. But he doubted that the issue would have the same effect in the less conservative battleground states that are expected to decide this election.

Whether Rove succeeds or not remains to be seen, but it is obvious that this has turned into a bigger fight than anyone would have foreseen in the months following September 11, 2001, at a time when Bush looked unbeatable. In a sense, the electoral cycle has come full circle, with prospects for a tightly contested election, potential legal battles, and a tempest of controversies emanating from stormy Florida. Like the mythical Daedalus, Rove has proven to be a master artisan, a crafter of political campaigns and electoral victories. But maybe he is like Icarus as well, flying too close to the sun in a bout of arrogance, engrossed in his own acumen, only to come crashing down to Earth in defeat. Only time will tell.

"Can we win the war on terrorism? Yes, I think we can, in the sense that we can win the war on organized crime. There is going to be no peace treaty on the battleship Missouri in the war on terrorism, but we can break its back so that it is only a horrible nuisance and not a paralyzing influence on our societies." [emphasis added]

-"9/11 a Year On" conference, Sept. 2002, (via Altercation)

Despite the impression you might have had from the buzz in the conservative punditry over the past couple of days, that wasn't John Kerry speaking, that was lifelong Republican General Brent Scowcroft, who was George H. W. Bush's National Security Advisor and the current President Bush's appointee to the Forum for International Security.

Here is Kerry on the same subject, as it appeared in the New York Times Magazine this past weekend:

"We have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they're a nuisance," Kerry said. "As a former law-enforcement person, I know we're never going to end prostitution. We're never going to end illegal gambling. But we're going to reduce it, organized crime, to a level where it isn't on the rise. It isn't threatening people's lives every day, and fundamentally, it's something that you continue to fight, but it's not threatening the fabric of your life." [emphasis added]

I guess it should come as no surprise that the Bush/Cheney campaign is trying to make Kerry's evocation of the word "nuisance" into the linchpin of his foreign policy vis a vis the war on terror. This is the latest example of a tactic that can best be described as "gotcha" campaigning - taking a statement by Kerry out of context, distorting it, and then exaggerating its relevance and significance to Kerry's policies despite the vast mountains of evidence to the contrary (see the "global test" canard).

It is the most cynical form of campaigning because its success depends on the fact that enough of the electorate is uninformed and will not look beyond the sound-bites to learn more about the issues and each candidates' stances. If the voters investigate further, they will learn that such protestations are much ado about nothing.

As an indication as to how ludicrous the charges have been, consider that Bush himself in an interview with Matt Lauer on the Today Show, said that the war against terror was unwinnable. "I don't think you can win it," Bush said. Well then, if you can't win it, maybe you can bring it down to acceptable levels. "Nuisance" may have been a poor choice of words, something that Kerry can certainly be accused of, but that does not justify the over-reaction.

With astonishing mendacity, Kerry's words have been contorted into a means of understanding many of Kerry's so-called positions. There is the argument that Kerry views terrorism, and all of its attendant violence and brutality, as a nuisance and not something more serious. And the accompanying suggestion that Kerry thinks that a pre-9/11 mentality is appropriate, even absent any progress in disrupting terrorist networks worldwide. Finally, there is the suggestion that Kerry will use law enforcement and intelligence as opposed to military operations.

For an example of all three feckless arguments, and a testament to how he has wrung every last bit of respect out of the body of this New Yorker, Rudolph Giuliani has a relevant piece up on the Bush/Cheney website.

As an aside, there was a time when Giuliani represented a true New York City Republicanism - a certain amount of moderation and independent thinking combined with a more liberal social agenda on reproductive rights and homosexuality. He even supported Democratic incumbent Mario Cuomo in his unsuccessful bid for re-election as Governor of New York against then challenger George Pataki. In the aftermath of 9/11, Giuliani's hands-on, authoritarian, micromanaging approach provided a welcomed sign of stability and order amongst the chaos, and coupled with the fond memories of his Cuomo allegiance, for a brief moment in time Giuliani broached the partisan divide. His fear-laced, exploitation of the tragedy of 9/11, replete with his suggestions that the Democrats were traitorous and weak, last month at the Republican National Convention did much to erase any goodwill he had built up for me. His subsequent appearances and statements have been the coffin nails. He has gone from independent minded conservative to a Bush administration apologista, trading in his credibility and intellectual honesty for demagoguery.

Giuliani had this to say about Kerry's words:

In fact, his comments are kind of extraordinary, particularly since he thinks we used to before September 11 live in a relatively safe world. He says we have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they’re a nuisance.

I’m wondering exactly when Senator Kerry thought they were just a nuisance. Maybe when they attacked the USS Cole? Or when they attacked the World Trade Center in 1993? Or when they slaughtered the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972? Or killed Leon Klinghoffer by throwing him overboard? Or the innumerable number of terrorist acts that they committed in the 70s, the 80s and the 90s, leading up to September 11?

As a former law enforcement person, he says ‘I know we’re never going to end prostitution. We’re never going to end illegal gambling. But we’re going to reduce it.’ This is not illegal gambling; this isn’t prostitution. Having been a former law enforcement person for a lot longer than John Kerry ever was, I don’t understand his confusion. Even when he says ‘organized crime to a level where it isn’t not on the rise,’ it was not the goal of the Justice Department to just reduce organized crime. It was the goal of the Justice Department to eliminate organized crime. Was there some acceptable level of organized crime: two families, instead of five, or they can control one union but not the other?

To respond to this point by Giuliani, I will rely on the words of the conservative blog Powerline (via another right-leaning blog American Future):

On the issue of terrorism, Kerry stated that "we have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they're a nuisance." I don't understand Kerry to be saying that we should give terrorism the same type and limited level of attention we gave it pre-9/11; rather I think he was providing a realistic, though tone-deaf, assessment of what it is possible to achieve in the war on terror. Like Kerry, I don't expect that we will ever succeed in eliminating terrorism. I doubt whether President Bush believes we will ever do so either; this is probably what he had in mind earlier this year when he expressed skepticism about winning the war on terrorism.

Kerry obviously (and perhaps tellingly) blundered when he compared terrorism to prostitution and illegal gambling, though these are also things that can't be stamped out completely. A better analogy (though still an impolitic one) would have been traffic fatalities. As it happens, my old Dartmouth roommate and CIA anti-terrorism point man Paul Pillar has used this analogy. Each year many people die as a result of automobile accidents. That will always be the case. Similarly, under the best of circumstances, I expect that people, including some Americans, will die each year as the result of acts of terrorism around the world. If we use the correct approach to combating terrorism, for example bringing about regime change in states that have the potential and the propensity to give terrorists what they need to commit mass terror, it is realistic to think that the number can be kept small. Anything better than that is probably beyond our reach.

That about sums it up. Honest conservatives can disagree on the tactics and approaches that Kerry has espoused, and whether or not the Iraq invasion was the right strategy, but poorly executed. But the recent attempts to cast everything Kerry says in the worst possible light, distorted and twisted to meet some pre-determined Bush/Cheney campaign talking point, is not contributing to the overall discourse. For politicians like Giuliani, it has mean the sacrifice of a valuable reserve of political capital. He has lost the benefit of the doubt and the presumption of independence.

Here is more about Kerry's actual stance from the same interview that gave rise to the "nuisance" frenzy:

Kerry told me he would stop terrorists by going after them ruthlessly with the military, and he faulted Bush, as he often does, for choosing to use Afghan militias, instead of American troops, to pursue Osama bin Laden into the mountains of Tora Bora, where he disappeared. "I'm certainly, you know, not going to take second seat to anybody, to nobody, in my willingness to seek justice and set America on a course -- to make America safe," Kerry told me. "And that requires destroying terrorists. And I'm committed to doing that. But I think I have a better way of doing it. I can do it more effectively."

"I think we can do a better job," Kerry said, "of cutting off financing, of exposing groups, of working cooperatively across the globe, of improving our intelligence capabilities nationally and internationally, of training our military and deploying them differently, of specializing in special forces and special ops, of working with allies, and most importantly -- and I mean most importantly -- of restoring America's reputation as a country that listens, is sensitive, brings people to our side, is the seeker of peace, not war, and that uses our high moral ground and high-level values to augment us in the war on terror, not to diminish us."

Beware of David Brooks. The newspaper columnist, author and talking head extraordinaire has been the beneficiary of a presumption of moderation that many have ben led to accept - an image that he no doubt helped to craft by his own meticulous efforts. His tone is calm and non-confrontational (especially when contrasted with other well known conservative pundits like Limbaugh, Hannity, O'Reilly, Coulter, etc.), his demeanor pleasing, his rhetoric toned down, and his arguments are often couched in a folksy common sense, running counter to the wonkish sub-narrative permeating the text. He even holds court in two venues perceived as left of center, or at the very least intellectual: The New York Times and the NewsHour With Jim Lehrer on PBS. In this regard, Brooks is a wolf in sheep's clothing.

Brooks is famous for his frequent analysis of the Red State/Blue State cleavages, and his subtle re-iterations of the "liberals as elites vs. conservatives as everyday Americans mythos" (see: Bobos In Paradise). Brooks disarms the reader by openly acknowledging his own "elitism" in order to lend credence to his dubious conclusion that Americans as a whole fit into two broad categories: elites and common people, with the geographical concentrations contouring perfectly with the political map of Blue States and Red States. The not so subtle implication is that the liberals are the wealthy powerful elites whereas the conservatives are the disempowered, ordinary, authentic Americans - a fallacy that Thomas Frank so eloquently dispels in What's The Matter With Kansas?: How Conservatives Stole The Heart of America. Despite the fact that Brooks also admits to a less than scientific means to gathering his data, he is relentless in his repetition of anecdotes and examples that reinforce the narrative of liberal elitism. But that is just one example of how Brooks disingenuously utilizes his appearance of fair-mindedness to push for decidedly partisan goals.

During the October 8th airing of NewsHour, Brooks was at his worst. Here is an excerpt from the transcript:

JIM LEHRER: And there is, of course, a presidential election underway in this country as well, and that reminder brings us once again to the analysis of Shields and Brooks: Syndicated columnist Mark Shields, New York Times columnist David Brooks. First, today's jobs numbers. What's your political read on them, David?

DAVID BROOKS: For some reason, the consensus seems to be the magic number is 150,000. If you get 150,000 jobs in a month that is it's good for Bush, under that, not so good... [emphasis added]

Here you have Brooks musing that for some seemingly unknown reason, an arbitrary number - 150,000 new jobs - was plucked out of thin air by the media or some other nefarious entity seeking to make Bush's performance seem worse than it was. But that number is far from arbitrary or magic and David Brooks knows it. It is the number needed to keep up with the monthly expansion of the working-age population. Brooks was feigning ignorance in an effort to cloak the bad news in a veil of partisanship. Don't pay attention to those inconvenient facts, they are just politicized figures. These are not the actions of a fair-minded or intellectually honest type. Mark Shields was on the spot to make this point, to his credit:

MARK SHIELDS: It's a big thing, Jim, in the sense that 150,000 is the magic number because that's the number you need just to meet the new number of people coming into the work force.

But Brooks took it one step further. In response to Shields' point, Brooks went all out in his effort to exonerate the miserable performance of the Bush administration in the economic arena - particularly in the realm of job creation:

DAVID BROOKS: I'll send any candidate a box of chocolates who says "the president has no control of this. Presidents don't control these numbers."

Interesting. That's not how I remember President Bush describing his economic package. When advocating his second round of tax cuts, Bush would often repeat the mantra, "if cutting taxes a little creates jobs, cutting taxes more creates more jobs." Every step of the way, Bush has held fast to the claims of the efficacy of his tax cuts as an engine for the creation of jobs - both before they were passed in order to sell them, and after the fact in order to justify them. In fact, the Bush administration even touted the underwhelming, and statistically insufficient, September jobs numbers as a positive achievement of Bush's tax cuts (via Bob Herbert's column in today's Times):

The administration's upbeat public response to the Labor Department report was described in The Times as follows: "The White House hailed it as evidence of continued employment expansion, saying that it validated Mr. Bush's strategy of pursuing tax cuts to support a recovery from the 2001 economic downturn."

There are two possibilities: Either David Brooks is lying to down-play President Bush's dismal record on job creation (the only President since Herbert Hoover to preside over a net loss of jobs during a four year tenure), or he is right and Presidents, and the policies they enact, "don't control" or effect the creation of jobs. If the former is true, then it is one more example of the charade Brooks puts on in terms of his objectivity and reasonableness in order to serve partisan aspirations.

If the latter is true, and policies have little impact on economic performance, then why cut taxes in the first place if that move is going to drive up the deficit and cause the Government to bleed money away financing the debt? Furthermore, if the tax cuts don't impact the economy, why give the lion's share of the money to the wealthiest Americans - those that need it the least - while the middle class is struggling under rising prices, declining wages and an increased tax burden from states and localities which is causing so many hard working Americans to succumb to defaults, bankruptcies and foreclosures at record rates, disrupting lives and spreading hardship?

Maybe Brooks would say it's because the Republicans are the Party of ordinary hard working Americans while the Democrats are the Party of the arrogant wealthy elites - out of touch with the common man. I wouldn't put it past him.

An article in today's New York Times traces the continuing evolution of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war. The inability to find WMDs in Iraq, a point recently reinforced by the Duelfer Report, has led the Bush administration to begin to tinker with, in a subtle fashion, the precepts on which the Bush pre-emptive doctrine was based.

Traditionally, pre-empting an enemy is all about urgency, striking before the enemy strikes. In the prelude to the invasion in March of last year, Mr. Bush and his aides stopping short of saying Saddam Hussein posed an "imminent" threat. Still, they used urgent-sounding language at every turn to explain why they could not afford to wait for inspectors to complete their work, or for the United Nations Security Council to come to a consensus on authorizing military action. "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud," he said in a speech delivered Oct. 7, 2002.

There are, of course, more such statements by the upper echelon of the Bush administration. At the request of Representative Harry Waxman (D - CA), the House Committee on Government Reform has compiled a searchable database, summarized here, containing 237 specific misleading statements, made on 125 separate occasions, "about the threat posed by Iraq made by the five Administration officials most responsible for providing public information and shaping public opinion on Iraq: President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice." Below, are some of the quotes pertaining to the urgency and imminence of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein:

- President Bush stated on October 2, 2002: "the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency...[I]t has developed weapons of mass death."

- President Bush stated on November 20, 2002: "Today the world is...uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed by Iraq."

- Vice President Cheney stated on August 26, 2002: "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us."

- In one instance, Secretary Rumsfeld said that Iraq could give weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda in "a week, or a month," resulting in the deaths of up to 100,000 people. [emphasis added throughout]

In the wake of the release of the Duelfer report, the Bush administration was fast at work parsing the findings in order to try to shore up the lack of "imminence" of the threat that Hussein posed. The urgency of the risk posed by Hussein's regime was undermined by the findings that Iraq's WMD programs, and even conventional weapons programs, had greatly deteriorated since 1991 to the point of non-existence, in the case of WMDs, and severe degradation, in terms of conventional weapons. The focus for Bush has shifted from actual WMDs to a more nebulous concept of future intent and the existence of corruption within the United Nations.

"We did not find the stockpiles we thought were there," Mr. Bush told supporters in Waterloo, Iowa, on Saturday. "But I want you to remember what the Duelfer report said. It said that Saddam Hussein was gaming the oil-for-food program to get rid of sanctions.

While much is being made of the graft resulting from the oil-for-food program, which was established to allow Iraq to sell oil through the United Nations in order to address humanitarian economic needs, the results of this corruption have been overstated by Bush and his supporters. While some money was most likely diverted to Hussein through illicit business dealings with companies based in the United States, France, Russia, Germany and elsewhere, the full parameters of the scandal, and its economic ramifications, have not been disclosed. The Duelfer report itself speculates that if the corruption continued, then it is conceivable that at some future point, Hussein could begin using the money to revitalize his moribund WMD programs, or further weaken the sanctions regime in place since the early 1990s. That being said, it is crucial to realize that no such effort at re-starting the WMDs programs was being made at the time of the invasion, despite the corruption that was occurring and the money this provided Hussein. In fact, there wasn't even a plan in place to re-start the programs, so any such speculation is several steps removed from reality. Here is a quote from the Duelfer report:

The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.

The sanctions and inspections regime was, in fact, quite effective, as spelled out in this article appearing in Foreign Affairs:

The United Nations sanctions that began in August 1990 were the longest running, most comprehensive, and most controversial in the history of the world body. Most analysts argued prior to the Iraq war -- and, in many cases, continue to argue -- that sanctions were a failure. In reality, however, the system of containment that sanctions cemented did much to erode Iraqi military capabilities. Sanctions compelled Iraq to accept inspections and monitoring and won concessions from Baghdad on political issues such as the border dispute with Kuwait. They also drastically reduced the revenue available to Saddam, prevented the rebuilding of Iraqi defenses after the Persian Gulf War, and blocked the import of vital materials and technologies for producing WMD. The unique synergy of sanctions and inspections thus eroded Iraq's weapons programs and constrained its military capabilities. The renewed UN resolve demonstrated by the Security Council's approval of a "smart" sanctions package in May 2002 showed that the system could continue to contain and deter Saddam. Unfortunately, only when U.S. troops invaded in March 2003 did these successes become clear: the Iraqi military that confronted them had, in the previous twelve years, been decimated by the strategy of containment that the Bush administration had called a failure in order to justify war in the first place.

The unique synergy of sanctions and inspections thus eroded Iraq's weapons programs and constrained its military capabilities. The renewed UN resolve demonstrated by the Security Council's approval of a "smart" sanctions package in May 2002 showed that the system could continue to contain and deter Saddam. Unfortunately, only when U.S. troops invaded in March 2003 did these successes become clear: the Iraqi military that confronted them had, in the previous twelve years, been decimated by the strategy of containment that the Bush administration had called a failure in order to justify war in the first place.

That does not mean that there were not problems with the sanctions. The corruption needed to be addressed, the situation needed closer monitoring in order to insure that Saddam did not profit unduly, and to some degree, they could have been made less onerous on the Iraqi people, although Saddam himself had much to do with this impact. Fixing the weaknesses in the sanctions regime would have been difficult, but certainly not more difficult than convincing the international community to support a pre-emptive invasion that entailed nation building in the Middle East, in the midst of a hostile and cynical population, brokering peace between warring ethnic groups who have decades of grievances to settle, establishing representative Democracy, and keeping out foreign fighters and governments with their own differing agendas - to list just some of the complications of the Iraq project. Fixing the sanctions regime, though troublesome, was the right course of action considering how remote Saddam's threat actually was - and the United States was in a position to get tough on the UN's handling of the sanctions regime considering its standing in the international community vis a vis the events of September 11.

To paraphrase the Duelfer Report, Saddam may at some future point re-start his WMD programs, even though he had no strategy or plan in place, using money grafted from the oil-for-food plan, and this despite the fact that he had not used any such ill-gotten gains for WMDs up until the time of the invasion. The Times article applies these facts to the recent iteration of the Bush doctrine:

Mr. Bush appears to be saying that under his new standard, a country merely has to be thinking about developing illicit weapons at some time. "He's saying intent is enough," said Joseph Nye, a Harvard professor who under the Clinton administration headed the National Intelligence Council, the group that assesses for the president when countries have trespassed that hard-to-define line.

"The classical definition for pre-emption was 'imminent threat,' " Mr. Nye said. Then, with the development of the president's "National Security Policy of the United States," that moved to something less than imminent, because, as Mr. Bush argued, it is often hard to know when a country is about to attack. Now, said Mr. Nye, "the Duelfer report pushed him into a box where capability is not the standard, but merely intention."

This is, simply stated, an unworkable doctrine. There are far too many nations in the world that might have an intent to at some future point in time start up a WMD program that could yield results, and then, in turn, after all the time and effort spent acquiring WMDs, turn them over to terrorists who would successfully administer them in an attack on the United States. We do not have the military capacity to address every eligible candidate under this rubric, and our credibility will suffer if its application is seen as arbitrary. What is particularly perplexing about this standard, is how it applies to other nations currently in pursuit of WMDs.

To listen to Mr. Bush in the last few days, a country that merely desires to obtain the world's worst weapons is a potential target - but he has clearly avoided threatening Iran and North Korea, the two nations racing fastest toward such weapons.

Also free from the wrath of U.S. led pre-emptive invasion was Pakistan - a nation that had acquired the most potent of all WMDs (nuclear weaponry), had close ties to al-Qaeda, and had displayed a willingness to share the nuclear materials and technologies with other rogue nations and terrorist sponsors, including Iran, North Korea and Libya to name a few. Apparently, that is less blameworthy than a possible intent in the future.

President Bush has criticized Senator Kerry for sending "mixed messages" to our allies. Bush has questioned Kerry's ability to lead other nations and garner their support based on Kerry's critical observations of the incompetence and poor judgment shown in the invasion of Iraq and the post-invasion efforts. The Bush doctrine, in actuality, sends the most incomprehensible of messages to our allies, and is based on principles that have been contorted into a Gordian knot of confusion and uncertainty by political expediency. The Bush pre-emption doctrine is the wrong plan, from the wrong candidate at the wrong time.

[Update (of sorts): Kevin Drum at Political Animal quotes this article detailing the Bush administration's military strategy in Iraq:

The Bush administration will delay major assaults on rebel-held cities in Iraq until after U.S. elections in November, say administration officials, mindful that large-scale military offensives could affect the U.S. presidential race.

...."When this election's over, you'll see us move very vigorously," said one senior administration official involved in strategic planning, speaking on condition of anonymity.

....Any delay in pacifying Iraq's most troublesome cities, however, could alter the dynamics of a different election -- the one in January, when Iraqis are to elect members of a national assembly.

With only four months remaining, U.S. commanders are scrambling to enable voting in as many Iraqi cities as possible to shore up the poll's legitimacy.

U.S. officials point out that there have been no direct orders to commanders in the field to pause operations in the weeks before the Nov. 2 election. Top administration officials in Washington are simply reluctant to sign off on a major offensive in Iraq at the height of the political season.

Drum then goes on to recall this moment in the most recent presidential debate:

What was it Bush said during last Friday's debate? Oh yeah: "I don't see how you can lead this country in a time of war, in a time of uncertainty, if you change your mind because of politics." [emphasis added]

So Bush is not only guilty of sending mixed messages to our allies and enemies, but also of letting politics affect his judgment in a time of war. The irony is thick.]

Four years ago, then Governor Bush benefited greatly from the comparative expectations for him and Vice President Al Gore. Bush, it was said, was not as gifted a debater as Gore, and not known to be particularly adept at thinking on his feet. The talented Gore, the consensus held, was going to dismantle Bush.

As the debates unfolded, Gore obviously did better than Bush from a technical point of view, but that didn't matter. Because the expectations game favored Gore so heavily, Bush's loss looked like a victory. Add to that Gore's unfortunate sighs, perceived arrogance and the inordinate focus on Gore's innocent mistruths (whether his dates were correct for when he was with FEMA's director), and Bush won by a landslide.

Last night, Bush again benefited from low expectations. The bar, set lower than the limberist limbo-ist could clear, by Bush's astoundingly incompetent performance in the first debate not only boosted the perception of the truth-challenged Dick Cheney on Tuesday, but it allowed Bush partisans to crow about how much stronger the president looked on Friday, and how aggressive and animated he was - a new man. Compared to last Thursday, this is undoubtedly true. But if this was the first debate, there wouldn't even be a discussion, because once again Bush lost.

Don't be fooled by the fact that his performance was "stronger" as the lead story in Rupert Murdoch's New York Post proclaimed, Kerry was still better. I noted in my analysis of the Cheney/Edwards debate that the left might have been spoiled by Bush's meltdown in round one, and given a false sense that all debates would turn out in so lopsided a fashion. Of course they wouldn't. Bush's team had time to recalibrate and make adjustments, and they did their best to correct some of the flaws in Bush's performance, to varying levels of success.

Bush looked less mystified this time around. He fought back harder and seemed to actually care about the issues, and not regard the nights proceedings as an inconvenient annoyance. Mercifully, someone on his team convinced him to stop making that inexplicable facial expression when Kerry was speaking - I'll call it a "pursmirk" (a smirk with pursed lips).

He was better prepared to talk about more subjects than on Thursday, especially in the beginning of the night. But even last night it became apparent, as the night wore on, that Bush was running out of things to say and was less able to think on the fly - falling back on the non-sequitur loops of the tried and true mantras that have been the consistent output of his campaign's message machine. To his credit, Bush actually scored some points this time around too. At the very least, he provided a sigh of relief to his dedicated base that were left speechless, perplexed and worried after his first effort.

Predictably, Bush's effort has been over-exaggerated because of its contrast to last Thursday. The left, which at times is pathologically self-critical (especially compared to the right's disciplined loyalty), seemed intent to snatch defeat out of the jaws of victory simply because a more composed and less clueless Bush showed up in St. Louis. That would be a mistake because Bush, despite his rehabilitation, still lost.

Part of the reason is that Bush was over the top in his effort to dispel the images of last Thursday's massacre. What the right is trying to spin as "strong" and "aggressive" was actually a rather un-presidential demeanor. Through much of the beginning of the night he was shouting, his tone was shrill, and his interruption of the calm and placid Charlie Gibson was outright rude. Such emotion is unbecoming a leader, and is generally the recourse of the insecure and defensive.

I'm not sure when it happened, but Bush's posture has taken on a definitive slouch, with his head craning forward, which further undermined his stature as a leader. Of course, the media will still call him the more likeable candidate, but to the American people watching last night, Bush was hardly likeable.

In comparison, Kerry was once again composed, dignified and commanding. He stood tall and spoke authoritatively, though remained calm and didn't raise his voice which contributed to the perception of confidence. Kerry greedily hoarded all the gravitas on the stage. Once again, Bush lost the all important body language contest that has traditionally been his strength as a candidate.

On substance, Kerry gave detailed answers, but not too much so, while Bush was again prone to over simplification and non-answers. On the economy, the environment (Bush citing his dismal record and then calling himself a good steward of the land?), health care, and almost every other domestic issue, Kerry easily out-dueled Bush. I thought Bush was playing a dangerous game by attacking Kerry's health care plan by asking America if they want the government to provide health care for them. Uh, Mr. President, right about now, I think that most Americans would welcome the assistance. You see, most people reject big government as a vague notion, but when you discuss the concept in specific, like health care or Social Security, the public overwhelmingly supports it. While many of the have-mores, what Bush described as his "base," bristle at the concept of government assisted health insurance, the increasingly besieged middle class (read: most Americans), are desperate for the help. In this sense, Bush's attack helped Kerry immeasurably.

Things got a bit prickly when abortion and stem cell research were discussed, and Bush seized on those moments to give a powerful message to his base. Kerry, likewise, appealed to his base, so the net result was a wash.

On foreign policy, Kerry once again was able to state unequivocally that he would not require permission from the rest of the world before taking military action, but was also able to note the importance of allies. I don't think he made as much of the incompetence of the post-invasion planning record this time, and thus left some points on the table. Bush was effective in hammering away at his themes that Saddam was a threat, and his decisiveness as a leader. But he offered few specifics in terms of policy, and once again was unable to list a single mistake - other than some appointments he made (which implies that any mistakes were not his own, but those of some of his appointees).

FactCheck.org has a thorough documentation of the numerous distortions and prevarications by both candidates from last evening. While some of the more serious lies deserve the lion's share of the post debate coverage, the one that seems ripest for media consumption, though, was Bush's memorable response to Kerry's charge that Bush was technically a small business under the calculus Bush was using for determining the effect that repeals of certain portions of the tax cuts would have on small businesses in general. Here is the exchange:

Kerry: The president got $84 from a timber company that owns, and he's counted as a small business. Dick Cheney's counted as a small business. That's how they do things. That's just not right.

Bush: I own a timber company?

That's news to me. Anybody want any wood?

It might be news to Bush, but that only reinforces the popular perception that he is less than in command of the facts and events around him. If Bush didn't know, he should have, so he was either woefully ignorant of his own personal finances, or he was lying:

In fact, according to his 2003 financial disclosure form, Bush does own part interest in "LSTF, LLC", a limited-liability company organized "for the purpose of the production of trees for commercial sales."

So Bush was wrong to suggest that he doesn't have ownership of a timber company. And Kerry was correct in saying that Bush's definition of "small business" is so broad that Bush himself would have qualified as a "small business" in 2001 by virtue of the $84 in business income.

The timber company gaffe has all the right dimensions for an info-tainment bonanza: it's simple, there are pictures (of Bush's incredulity on the stage in St. Louis), and there is the embarrassment factor - that either Bush was caught in so open a lie or that John Kerry knows more about Bush's finances than Bush. In either scenario, not very presidential.

[Murdoch Watch: Since I have monitored the coverage of the right-wing New York Post, for the first two debates, I thought it appropriate to share their coverage of last night's affair as well. The title for the lead article is "Bush Comes On Stronger," a reference to the comparison between Bush's two performances. They did not include a panel of experts this time, but they did have a panel of "undecided voters." Of the four, one scored the night for Bush, two scored the night for Kerry, and one scored the night a draw. I remain surprised that even Murdoch's paper could not call any of the three debates a clear victory for their candidates.]

It's Friday so I thought it appropriate to offer you all a bit of comedy to take into the weekend. The good folks at JibJab are at it again with a new song and dance routine involving the nation's favorite political characters entitled, "Good To Be In DC" (performed to the tune of Dixie).

For more political movies of varying degrees of humor, check out this link.

That Dick Cheney told numerous lies in his debate with John Edwards is a well documented fact - just ask factcheck.org not "com" Mr. Cheney (though I don't consider that one a lie - more of a gaffe really). There was Cheney's numerous distortions of very serious matters: about the case for war against Saddam, thoroughly sussed out in this article, his implausible claim that he never linked 9/11 to Iraq, the jobs figures, the impact of the repeal of portions of Bush's tax cuts on small businesses, his record at Halliburton, and the list goes on.

Yet, the press has seized on one of the more trivial examples of Cheney's dishonesty: the infamous quote regarding John Edwards' attendance in the Senate and Cheney having never met him before the debate. This is what Cheney said:

You've got one of the worst attendance records in the United States Senate. Now, in my capacity as vice president, I am the president of Senate, the presiding officer. I'm up in the Senate most Tuesdays when they're in session.

The first time I ever met you was when you walked on the stage tonight.

The problem for Cheney is that the two had met on several occasions prior to the debate, and there is photographic evidence to prove it. Reminiscent of the attention Gore's erroneous, and relatively innocuous, statement about touring disaster areas with FEMA director James Lee Witt received (Gore actually really only got the dates confused), the media has seized on this less serious fallacy with the zeal of the info-tainment credo: It makes for good television.

Whereas Cheney's other prevarications require background, context, explanation and nuance, his lie about never meeting Edwards is simple, easy to understand, and heck, you don't even need to use words and other such complex constructs. It's the picture book version of politics.

While I think Cheney's other mistruths are more worthy of examination by the press corps, I have resigned myself to the knowledge that the mainstream media will only cover four things in elections: polls, scandals, attacks and mistakes. This one falls in the category of "mistake." So in the interest of hashing out Cheney's "mistake," I want to focus on another part of Cheney's statement that has received far less attention than the photographs and videos of the two together at various functions.

Before he dropped the bombshell that the debate was the first occasion he and Edwards had met, Cheney set up the punch-line with the following introduction:

Now, in my capacity as vice president, I am the president of Senate, the presiding officer. I'm up in the Senate most Tuesdays when they're in session. [emphasis added]

Cheney said he was in the Senate on "most Tuesdays" that the Senate is in session acting in his official capacity as president pro-tem. Turns out, he has a pretty liberal definition of "most" (probably the only time liberal and Cheney can be used in the same sentence).

According to the government's own records, Cheney only presided over the Senate in his capacity as president pro-tem a whopping two times out of approximately 127 sessions, over the past four years. That equates to roughly 1.5% of the time - not exactly what most mathematicians, statisticians or average folks would call "most" of the time.

But wait, it gets worse. During that same period, John Edwards himself served as the president pro-tem of the Senate twice himself. So John Edwards served in Cheney's role as often as Cheney did. And Cheney was mocking Edwards' attendance record. Pretty tricky, Dick.

You can't make this stuff up.

The Republican Party has its version of Zell Miller. No, I'm not talking about Senator Jim Jeffords from Vermont who left the Republican Party to become an Independent early in Bush's term, citing the extreme policies of the administration (including Bush's famous flip-flop on carbon dioxide emissions standards that left Jeffords' legislation backing up Bush's campaign promise to die on the vine in committee) and the rancorous hostility to moderates emanating from within the ranks of Tom Delay's Congress.

Neither am I talking about former New Jersey governor and EPA Administrator under Bush, Christine Todd Whitman, who resigned from her post at the EPA on somewhat acrimonious terms over numerous public disagreements with Bush over environmental policy (including the carbon dioxide emissions flip-flop that so incensed Jeffords). She recently authored a book due out early 2005 entitled, Its My Party Too, a reference to the increasing marginalization of moderates by the strident Republican leadership.

Nor am I talking about a handful of Republican Senators (Lugar, Hagel, McCain amongst others) who have recently begun to openly criticize the President's handling of post-invasion Iraq, as exemplified by some comments at a hearing into the shift of spending from reconstruction to security. Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, called it "exasperating for anybody look at this from any vantage point," and Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, said, "It's beyond pitiful, it's beyond embarrassing. It is now in the zone of dangerous." Harsh words, but not the Zell I'm hunting.

I am talking about lifelong Republican and Senator from Rhode Island, Lincoln Chafee, who has recently made an announcement that seems shocking considering the context: despite his Party affiliation, he will not vote for George W. Bush for president in November. Far from the bluster, vitriol and over the top prevarications spewed by Zell Miller at the Republican National Convention, Chafee is a calm and reasoned politician, not interested in seeking the limelight to air his concerns. It helps that he sticks to the facts and to honest differences of opinion rather than wild mischaracterizations and propaganda. A glance at Chafee's Republican Party bona fides might explain his non-Zellian demeanor:

Chafee was destined to be a Republican since birth when his mother and father (himself a Republican Senator from Rhode Island up until his death in 1999) named him "Lincoln" after the first Republican president. His Party allegiance never faltered over the arc of his life in the private sector and public service. His family also had close personal and professional ties to the Bush family. Growing up, Chafee attended prep school with, and befriended, the president's brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush. Chafee's father, the late Senator John Chafee, was close to the first President Bush, which explains why "former President George Bush came to Rhode Island and raised $300,000 for Mr. Chafee, an unheard of sum for a Republican in tiny Rhode Island" during Chafee's Senate run in 2000.

His personal and political history makes it difficult for the President's supporters to dismiss Chafee as a Bush hater. So then, how does a career Republican, and multi-generational friend of the Bush clan, find himself in the curious position of not supporting a Republican named Bush in his bid for the presidency? Chafee offers this account of his journey:

One day after the Supreme Court sealed the 2000 election for George W. Bush, his running mate, Dick Cheney, went to the Capitol for a private lunch with five moderate Republican senators. The agenda he laid out that day in December 2000 stunned Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island, sending Mr. Chafee on a painful journey of political conscience that, he said in an interview last week, has culminated with his decision not to vote for Mr. Bush in November.

"I literally was close to falling off my chair," Mr. Chafee said, recounting the vice president's proposals for steep tax cuts, missile defense programs and abandoning the Kyoto environmental accords. "It was no room for discussion. I said, 'Well, you're going to need us; it's a 50-50 Senate, you're going to need us moderates.' He said, 'Well, we need everybody.'"

For Mr. Chafee...that day was the beginning of an estrangement with the president, whom he had worked to elect. In the months since, he has opposed Mr. Bush on everything from tax cuts to gay marriage and the war in Iraq. Now, this life-long Republican has concluded that he cannot cast his ballot for the leader of his party.

Chafee went on to describe his anger at what he calls the:

Broken campaign promises by the current occupant of the White House. He said Mr. Bush's promise to be "a uniter, not a divider" resonated with him, as did Mr. Bush's remark in a 2000 debate that the United States would have to be humble, not arrogant, to be respected in the world.

"As soon as victory was achieved came people with a completely different agenda than being humble," he said. Asked if he regretted supporting the president, he said, "I regret that some of the answers to important questions weren't more forthright and that there wasn't more adherence to campaign rhetoric."

I think that translates to a "yes."

"I'll vote Republican," he said, explaining that he would choose a write-in candidate, perhaps George Bush the elder, as a symbolic act of protest. Asked if he wanted Senator John Kerry to be president, Mr. Chafee shook his head sadly, as if to say he could not entertain the question. "I've been disloyal enough," he said. [emphasis added throughout]

I think that also translates to a "yes."

Chafee echoed a refrain that is becoming all too frequent along the fringes of the increasingly polarized Republican Party; that he was "waiting for the moderate wing of the party to rise again." In a prior piece entitled A Tale of Two Parties, I discussed the fact that the Republican Party platform of George W. Bush's 2004 campaign stood in sharp contrast not only to his Democratic opponents, but also to the platform the GOP when his father ran in 1992 - and in a bizarre twist, the 2004 platform is even more extreme than the platform in 2000 when Bush ran against Gore.

There is a battle raging, as we speak, for the soul of the Republican Party, with the conservative wing currently winning the tug of war, pulling the Party ever toward the pole. The internal struggle has been punctuated by pitched primary battles between moderates and conservatives. The battles have been the same for newcomers like moderate Pete Coors who fought off a spirited challenge from conservative stalwart Bob Schaeffer in the Colorado primary, as well as long time incumbents like moderate Senator Arlen Specter (PA) who narrowly eked out a victory in his primary contest with ultra-conservative Patrick Toomey.

One of Toomey's chief backers was the conservative group the Club For Growth, which has led the fight to defeat candidates they define as RINOs or "Republicans In Name Only." Stephen Moore, president of the Club for Growth, acknowledges that his organization's goal is to make moderate Republicans an endangered species. "The problem with the moderates in Congress is they basically water down the Republican message and what you get is something that infuriates the Republican base," Mr. Moore said. Can you blame Chafee, Specter, Coors, Whitman, Hagel, McCain, Graham, Lugar and others for feeling besieged if these forces are lined up against them - within their own Party.

For these moderates, everything hangs in the balance with this election. Christine Todd Whitman, assesses the impact on the Party dynamic thusly:

Frankly, if the president wins walking away with this, maybe the country is in a different place than where the moderate Republicans are...If he loses, it is an absolute validation of the fact that you cannot be a national party if you are excluding people.

As Whitman predicts if Bush wins, the conservative leadership, validated and emboldened by their victory, will steer the Party even farther to the right. Don't be fooled by the centrist facade on display in the prime time slots during the convention. Although the speakers chosen may have moderate leanings, their message was pure and unadulturated red meat for the base. If Bush wins, their autonomy and independent thinking will be further penned in. Tom Delay and the conservative wing want total loyalty and uniformity of ideology. The only options for the last of the moderates will be to convert to the Democratic Party, follow Jeffords into the Independent fold, or jump on the ultra-conservative band-wagon.

When he was asked if he went to bed at night wondering how he could remain a Republican, Chafee gave a telling response:

"Yes," he said, "I don't deny that." He's probably not the only one.

I have long maintained that the turnout for this election will reach record levels in terms of American electoral history. There will be more people at the polls, in sheer numbers, than ever before. Even as a percentage of the eligible voting public, the numbers will be higher than any election in the past 50 years and beyond. The events of the past four years have shaken the American public out of its long dormant apathetic slumber (relatively speaking).

For example, look at the viewership of the debates. 62.5 million tuned in to watch the Bush/Kerry debate last Thursday. That number is unprecedented - we're talking Super Bowl big, only without the snarky commercials. The American people are paying more attention.

While viewership for the vice presidential debate dipped to 43.6 million, that number marked a significant increase over the 29 million that watched the vice presidential debate between Cheney and Lieberman in 2000. The public is tuning in, even to the undercard.

For another example of the new found prominence of politics in the lives of an increasing number of Americans, just take a look at how the Edwards/Cheney debate fared against the juggernaut that is the New York Yankees. Edwards/Cheney took on the Yanks on their home turf - and won. In the New York City area, 2.7 million viewers watched the vice presidential debate compared to 1.5 million who watched the Yankee playoff game against Minnesota which was aired on the same night in the same time slot. This Yankee fan was among the 2.7 million who put aside their interest in America's past time in favor of a glimpse at America's future.

Maybe the Red Sox should consider taking debating lessons.

In case you haven't noticed, we're at war. I'm not referring to the war on terrorism. I'm referring to the no-holds-barred, scorched-earth war that extremist right-wing Republicans are waging to transform every aspect of our society so that it conforms to their ideology. In higher education, they've got academic freedom in their sights. And they've just about killed it. Read on, and you'll see what I mean.

So starts a very troubling piece by University of Virginia Professor Bryan Pfaffenberger, which was the subject of one of my prior posts. In that article, Pfaffenberger, makes the case that the well-oiled, right-wing opinion machine has introduced, disseminated and solidified the myth that the academia is a bastion of liberal demagoguery and indoctrination. With this fallacy nearly enshrined as conventional wisdom, the right-wing has begun to propose solutions to the phantom problem in the form of the dubiously entitled Academic Bill of Rights. Recently, Professors Juan Cole of the University of Michigan and Dr. Graham Larkin of Stanford University have weighed in on the subject with some incisive critique of the proposed legislation, and its most vocal proponent, David Horowitz.

The Myth Makers

The first step in the process is to create the myth, or better yet, transform the myth from vague suspicion to conventional wisdom. In this regard, the right-wing has been ruthlessly efficient - owing, in part, to the disciplined dedication to the long view, and the ability to delay instant gratification at the polls (current Presidential regime excluded). As journalist and author Rick Perlstein lamented, the Democratic Party has increasingly become a Party with no discernible platform. As he points out, "We are left with a political party whose fixation on shifts in public opinion can be hawk-like, one that concertedly questions core principles in the interests of flexibility."

Conservatives, on the other hand, have taken a more patient approach by adopting their vision of a "unified conservatism" in the early 1970's and suffering losses in the short term, especially in Congress, as their then unpopular theories were being fleshed out. They have, however, benefited greatly in the long run by presenting a clear message, an alternative and comprehensive world view, that allows voters to identify with the party and a pre-packaged heuristic for viewing the world around them.

Part of the formation of this comprehensive world view involved the creation of many sub-narratives that bolster the positions and increase the appeal of the GOP. One such narrative is the ahistorical critique that Democrats are soft on defense. While this seems to make sense, and polls indicate that most people are quick to make this assumption, history tells a different story. Throughout the 20th Century, Democrats and Republicans alike have waged wars, used the military when necessary, and engaged our various enemies with varying degrees of success, not determined by Party affiliation. FDR, who managed to win World War II defeating the most pernicious and potent threat of Naziism, was this nation's greatest liberal president, and the supposedly "tough" Republican President Ronald Reagan responded to attacks on US Marines in Beirut by "cutting and running" at the first available opportunity - an event which many, including conservatives, claim emboldened the likes of Osama Bin Laden. There are myriad other examples that undermine this story, but history seems lost in the haze of propaganda. Just look at the national security advantage that Bush still receives in the presidential polls despite the tragic incompetence he has displayed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another great success story for the right wing propagandists has been their ability to foster almost universal acknowledgement that the mainstream media has a liberal bias. Never mind the vast conservative media empire controlled by the likes of Rupert Murdoch, Conrad Black, Richard Mellon Scaife, Reverend Moon, the Wall Street Journal editorial page, talk radio and the countless conservative think tanks that churn out ready-made talking heads and talking points for media consumption. According to this narrative, the mainstream media, which is either controlled by self-avowed conservatives (as listed above) or dominated by large multi-national corporate interests dedicated to the principles of de-regulation, supply side economics and free market capitalism, puts out a product that runs counter to their interests and is, to quote David Horowitz, "neo-Communist." These corporate powerhouses supposedly routinely undermine their own power by continuing to promulgate liberal propaganda.

If that sounds implausible, it's because it is. The truth of the matter is that the mainstream media represents the interests of its owners, bosses and patrons. Far from having a liberal bias, the mainstream media is the champion of the status quo, big business and in the case of the conservative media, an open cheerleader for all causes far-right. Furthermore, the allure of media de-regulation, which would allow big companies to own more media assets across the country, as dangled provocatively by current FCC head Michael Powell (son of Colin), has created a cozy alliance of interests between the Republican leadership and the corporate media tantalized by the prospect of an ever increasing share of the pie.

At the very least, the media is interested in presenting the news in a slick way to bolster market share and nielsen ratings. Substance, truth and public interest are frequently sacrificed at the alter of "info-tainment." Empirical evidence supports these claims. Media watchdog Fairness And Accuracy In Reporting conducted a comprehensive study of television and radio news coverage which showed that right-leaning guests outnumbered left-leaning guests on all the major networks, cable news programs and even the oft derided "liberal" National Public Radio (NPR). Journalist and author Eric Alterman provides a wealth of well-documented evidence that refute the spurious claims that have been so widely accepted.

What might be the most bizarre narrative to date, however, is the story that the Democrats are the elites who hold all the power, and the GOP is the perpetually disempowered Party of everyday people. That's right, the Party of labor unions, worker's rights, minimum wage, civil rights movements, social security, Medicare, strong public education, progressive taxation, unemployment benefits, etc., is the Party of wealthy, condescending snobs whereas the Party of big business, corporate power, supply side economics, shifting the tax burden to labor, heirs and heiresses, etc., is the Party of good old boys and down home values. That this narrative has taken root is an undeniable reality, as so eloquently portrayed in Thomas Frank's seminal work, What's The Matter With Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America. In no other country in the world do the lower classes so consistently vote against the Party of labor in favor of the Party of big monied interests - turning a blind eye to the economic realities in pursuit of a conservative social agenda. The results of the economic agenda have been catastrophic for the very people whose support makes the passage of that economic agenda possible.

Emboldened by the success of their recent forays into the realm of the public perceptions of the media, and the collective political wisdom in the arenas of values, economics, concentration of power and national security, the right wing has turned its attention, and the focus of its numerous and well funded media interests and think-tank thought producers, to the milieu of academia.

Target: Academia

You know the strategy by now. Hundreds of right-wing think tanks pound the media with press releases. Newspapers and cable TV stations smell a conflict -- always a safe bet for increasing circulations and ratings -- and bring in the "think tank" experts for interviews. They pound away, repeating the same stock phrases over and over. They'[re echoed by AM talk radio, Good Morning America, and even Jim Lehrer on the goddamned News Hour, and at a certain point, you'll hear your neighbors repeat them as if they were talking about truths handed down from the Mount.

That is the way that Professor Pfaffenberger described the process which is already underway. Leading the charge is ex-left wing extremist David Horowitz, who famously edited the 1960s-era ultra-left-wing Ramparts magazine. For Horowitz the pendulum of personal politics has swung violently in the other direction (his motto is apparently the anti-Aristotelian "moderation in no things"). He is now an ultra-conservative stalwart and founder of the right-veering think tank the Center for the Study of Popular Culture. His group has produced, along with Republican pollster Frank Luntz, some of the dubiously inaccurate studies of the academia that the right wing punditry has relied on to make its case.

According to the findings of the Horowitz/Luntz survey (and another by Horowitz and Eli Lehrer) professors on the left of the political spectrum outnumber professors on the right of the political spectrum by a factor of 10-1 and more. At some Northeast liberal enclaves like Brown and Wesleyan the ratio rises to 28-1 and 30-1.

There are abundant, and well-founded, criticisms of these surveys. First of all, they focused largely on 32 institutions, primarily from the Northeast, who tend to have a higher population of left-leaning scholars than most other universities. In essence, they cherry picked to make their case more compelling. In addition, as Juan Cole notes, the study of professors left out the business schools and other professional schools, which tend to include higher numbers of right-leaning scholars. Exactly how many liberals do you think are on the faculty at the top business schools in America? Not many. Cole notes one other factor left out by the studies' findings: "It does not consider the possibility that fewer conservatives seek academic careers in the liberal arts. Like most of these think tank studies, it was poorly designed and poorly analyzed."

Professor Pfaffenberger points to this piece of inconvenient empirical evidence that undermines the conclusions of the Horowitz studies: "College and university professors gave more money to Bush in 2000 than they did to Gore." While Kerry is enjoying a sizable fundraising edge among these constituents this election cycle, Bush's support in 2000 belies the notion that this group is dominated by liberals - unless they are independent minded enough to support candidates from both parties, and if so, what is the problem?

Dr. Larkin points out that the studies, which reported on the partisan affiliations of 1,431 professors at the various schools, failed to account for the 1,891 professors in the same departments who the studies determined to be "unaffiliated" in their party loyalty. Dr. Larkin had this to say:

I can think of only two ways of coherently defending such a move. On the one hand, one could argue that the unaffiliated majority simply doesn't matter, thereby leaving Horowitz free to concoct his 10-1 generalizations about all professors on the basis of less than half his dubious little data sample. On the other hand, one could simply assume that the unaffiliated majority must 'really' break down into exactly the same left/right proportions as the card-carrying Democrats and Republicans, leaving us with a 10-1 statistic that reasonably represents everyone.

Take your pick. Whether Horowitz is declaring the political irrelevancy of the inconveniently-unaffiliated majority, or whether he is presuming to represent their unstated affiliations, his fundamental disregard for their abstention from self-definition is obvious, and his "10-1" ratio is ludicrous.

The problem with such quantification goes beyond the deficiency of Horowitz's particular method of data fabrication. It is hard to think of any method that would provide us with reliable statistics about such a subtle and complex phenomenon as personal ideology--not least in environments, such as elite humanities departments, which actively cultivate ideological subtlety and complexity. The inherent absurdity of any claim to objective ideological profiling raises the issue of how one could possibly go about implementing the kind of diversity that the Academic Bill of Rights is aiming to institute in the university. After all, to successfully foster "a plurality of methodologies and perspectives" and ensure against "political, ideological, religious or anti-religious indoctrination," one would first have to develop a sufficiently broad and clear model onto which to map these differences and deviations, and then keep very close tabs on the professors.

These studies are further supported by the human angle - a wealth of anecdotal evidence about students who have been mistreated in classrooms by liberal professors because of their differing political beliefs. Some stories tell of indoctrination at the hands of rigidly dogmatic leftist lecturers, others tell of retaliatory grading practices for students who dared to disagree with the biases of the teacher. While some of these stories have merit, as discussed below, the solution is an over-reaction to the problem.

The Final Solution

Having made their case, and laid the groundwork, the next step in the process was to introduce the means of correcting the perceived imbalance. To do this, Horowitz and his group have crafted the Orwellian sounding Academic Bill of Rights and Student Bill of Rights. They sound innocent enough - progressive even - if not downright liberal. They're not. And they are also not just theoretical mandates, they form the backbone of legislation that is being introduced in most state legislatures across the country at this very moment.

The main thrust of the legislation is to mandate hiring practices at universities that result in an even split of Democrats and Republicans, as well as some other measures that serve to stifle discussion in the classroom that students could perceive as advocating a certain partisan view. At their core these legislative initiatives amount to affirmative action for conservatives in the academic world. Instead of seeking to compensate for past wrongs, and account for their lingering effects on the aggrieved groups, however, this form of affirmative action invents a wrong based on shaky evidence and then seeks to compensate for a false imbalance. This bit of irony was not lost on Professor Cole:

Horowitz was once a civil rights activist, but over the years he gravitated further and further to the political right Now that he is a conservative, he wants set-asides for conservatives in academic departments. But he does not want race to figure in college admissions.

Here is the pertinent section of the Academic Bill of Rights:

All faculty shall be hired, fired, promoted and granted tenure on the basis of their competence and appropriate knowledge in the field of their expertise and, in the humanities, the social sciences, and the arts, with a view toward fostering a plurality of methodologies and perspectives. [emphasis added]

The problem is that this "plurality" seems to be Republican and Democratic Party affiliation, as noted by the criteria used in the Horowitz studies. The American Association of University Professors, one of the most vocal opposition groups to the efforts of Horowitz's movement, had this to say of the system these legislative efforts would create:

The danger of such guidelines is that they invite diversity to be measured by political standards that diverge from the academic criteria of the scholarly profession. Measured in this way, diversity can easily become contradictory to academic ends. So, for example, no department of political theory ought to be obligated to establish "a plurality of methodologies and perspectives" by appointing a professor of Nazi political philosophy, if that philosophy is not deemed a reasonable scholarly option within the discipline of political theory....Advocates for the Academic Bill of Rights... make clear that they seek to enforce a kind of diversity that is instead determined by essentially political categories, like the number of Republicans or Democrats on a faculty, or the number of conservatives or liberals. Because there is in fact little correlation between these political categories and disciplinary standing, the assessment of faculty by such explicitly political criteria, whether used by faculty, university administration, or the state, would profoundly corrupt the academic integrity of universities.

Aside from this, what if political attitudes change? What mechanism is in place to account for shifting political mores and beliefs. What if the Democrats gain the support of 60% of the population? Should the composition of faculties nationwide be altered to account for the change? Is it reasonable to subject professors, and their job security, to the whims of the electorate instead of the rigors of academic scholarship and peer review. Juan Cole took the mandates of the Academic Bill of Rights to their further logical conclusions:

If we go by opinion polls, about half of Americans reject Darwin, so Horowitz's proposal would require that half of all biologists would have to be creationists. Then, with regard to party preference, opinion polls show that at some points in the past 8 months Ralph Nader has been favored by 6% of the electorate. At other points it has been 2%. So presumably between 2% and 6% of the professors would have to be Nader supporters. Indeed, we might have to put people on monthly contracts so that we can adjust the percentage in accordance with the latest polls. About 10% of Americans support radical fringe groups, so of course there would have to be a place for the American Nazi Party on the faculty, Horowitz seems to be arguing. Maybe we could have the supremacist teach modern German history; that seems to be the sort of thing that would make Horowitz happy. How sad that at present the Nazi period in Germany is usually taught by some wimpy liberal, Horowitz seems to be saying.

Moreover, there is no obvious reason that "balance" should be conceived only along the narrow US spectrum. A fifth of human beings lives under Chinese Communism, so the logical conclusion is that Horowitz is insisting that 1/5 of all US university professors be believers in Chinese communism. And, of course, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i Islami would have to have its faculty representatives in proportion to the popularity of those fundamentalist parties in the world.

Cole then applies this paradigm to other segments of the society. After all, why stop at the academia? If balance is such a noble concept in academic life, it surely must be worth implementing in other segments of society. What's good for the goose is surely good for the gander:

For instance, Corporate Executive Officers of major corporations are vastly more powerful and influential than are mere college teachers. And yet, it has long been known that CEOs are heavily Republican in their voting patterns. Shall we make a law that half of all persons chosen CEOs of corporations must be registered Democrats, and must give their campaign donations to that party?

Or, let us take the officers in our military services, who have grown increasingly rightwing in the past thirty years. Polling data show that in 1976 only one third of military officers said they were Republicans. By 1996 two-thirds of officers identified with the GOP, and only ten percent were Democrats. This development is truly worrisome. Would President Bush have been so successful in pushing his joint chiefs of staff to put away their objections to an Iraq campaign last summer if he knew two thirds of his officers had voted against him? Did not the open contempt many in the armed services expressed for Bill Clinton weaken our democracy?

The real danger, though, is that excellence in academic and scholarly pursuits would be subsumed to partisan beliefs. We would sacrifice much to achieve this bizarre sense of balance. The repercussions would be catastrophic. How much longer can America expect to maintain its position of dominance in the world of higher education if our standards departed from competence to political affiliation? Would we attract the best and the brightest, both among students and teachers, if our system were so turned on its head?

Pfaffenberger noted, ruefully, "progress in science and scholarship requires that professors are sufficiently free from political interference that they can advocate unpopular ideas." Under the Academic Bill of Rights, and its companion, the Student Bill of Rights, independence of thought and speech would lose out to partisan quibbles and a reverse political correctness that suppresses the opinions of professors in favor of bland instruction that no partisan would object to.

Dr. Larkin recalls the opinions of Supreme Court justices Roberts and Reed, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." (West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Under the Academic Bill of Rights, government figures would be called upon to do just that in an ever vigilant monitoring of ideas on campuses nationwide.

In fact, this process has already begun with the creation of "black lists" of professors who are put on databases by right wing student activists. These same activists then target the professors for termination by waging relentless campaigns of protest, inundating the administrative offices with messages and mailings until the professor in question is removed. Think of it as grass roots McCarthyism. Of course, they have yet to target a right wing professor for their bias or tendency to indoctrinate. Those, it appears, don't count.

The Real Problem And Real Solution

The truth of the matter is, there is a problem on campuses across the country, even if it is not of the magnitude that Horowitz and his ilk would have you believe. Professors are human beings, and as such, occasionally allow their personal beliefs to cloud their professional judgment. They are hardly the only group in society to fall victim to this, and thus it is flawed reasoning to target them. It is also disingenuous to suggest that there aren't mechanisms in place to curb the abuses and punish the behavior when it manifests. Pfaffenberger made the following observations:

But wait, you'll no doubt say. Isn't there some truth to the conservative's grievances with academia?
Frankly, yes. I've known faculty who use their courses to promulgate an essentially political point of view. (I've seen this done from the right as well as the left, I might add.) And I've had students come to me, privately, and complain that they were graded down because they refused to go along with their professor's not-so-secret political biases.

This sort of thing shouldn't happen. And when it does, it should be a matter of concern for this professor's peers, who are alone capable of determining where the line separating political indoctrination from legitimate instruction should be drawn. And frankly, I don't think we've been attentive enough to the harm this sort of thing causes to our students. But it happens less often than conservatives think...

Universities, administrations, and the profession of professors themselves should remain ever-vigilant to avoid abuses, but these isolated examples do not justify the extreme approach proposed by Horowitz. Professor Pfaffenberger had this to say:

Colleges and university teachers aren't perfect, I'll willingly admit, but we don't need the medicine right-wing extremists prescribe. If they get their way, you're going to be saying "bye-bye" not only to academic freedom, but also to our higher education system's sterling, worldwide reputation.

I think freedom is worth fighting for, as is the invaluable laboratory of ideas that our institutions of higher learning have become. In many ways, they are our ambassadors to the world, inviting emissaries from abroad to partake in our scholarly endeavors. Losing this would be yet one more example of how America, under the current leadership, would become more isolated, less trusted and less respected. That also is worth a fight.

Now we know why George Bush insisted on Dick Cheney being present when he appeared before the 9/11 Commission. Cheney clearly has a better command of events, facts (although he plays fast and loose with them) and policies than Bush, and the difference is obvious when you compare the debates.

You see, Bush was so terrible that it made Cheney's performance look that much better. The left might have gotten a little spoiled watching Kerry trounce Bush on Thursday, and this might have led some to believe that all debates would be that easy. They won't be.

That being said, I bet you if the Bush team could have the decision all over again, they would rather two presidential and two vice presidential debates, instead of the current agreement for three presidential and one vice presidential debate. What were they thinking? Did they start believing their own hype about Bush being a commanding leader?

Despite our somewhat unreal expectations following Kerry's exemplary performance on Thursday, Edwards was very impressive tonight. He stood toe to toe with the older more experienced Cheney and exchanged big blows. He returned fire with fire, and never retreated. He was aggressive to match Cheney, and Cheney was left without a response on more than one occasion. He dismissed the inexperience charge with a cogent argument that the past four years has proven that experience does not guarantee sound judgment. In essence, Edwards did enough to carry the night, or at the very least fight the formidable Cheney to a stalemate which is all his team needed.

He did a fine job hammering away at the themes of the Bush administration's credibility gap and incompetence in the prosecution of the Iraq war effort, building on the narrative that John Kerry so eloquently gave life to last Thursday. Independents and moderates will stay focused on these issues, and pursue the matter further, which is exactly what Kerry/Edwards wanted from tonight's events. Stay on message.

He was also very effective connecting to everyday Americans with the two Americas-esque populist appeals. The skilled trial lawyer in him came out when he reduced many problems and issues to a question of easy to understand economic priorities, with the Bush administration favoring big business and big wealth over the middle class and ordinary Americans. His delivery was occasionally over-enthusiastic, but he presented a warmer rendition of Kerry that will reach a different demographic.

Cheney did what he wanted to in many ways too. He landed some shots, trotted out some old disinformation (Iraq/al-Qaeda again?) and leaned heavily on the fear factor - which is the Bush administration's most potent weapon. Cheney may have appeared more presidential than Edwards to some but he was also clearly more presidential than Bush himself, which only reinforces the popular critique of the inverted dynamic within the administration. On delivery, he had an authoritative tone at his strongest, but he tended to drone on and trail off on non-sequitur tangents at other times which probably lost a lot of less wonkish people who might have tuned him out from boredom.

Unfortunately for Bush/Cheney, though, Cheney is only the vice president, and the country will see two more one-on-ones between Bush and Kerry for the top spot. The bad news is, George will have to appear without Dick by his side - again.

[Update: Since I tracked the post-debate response of Rupert Murdoch's New York Post in my summary of the first presidential debate (which unanimously gave the night to Kerry), I thought I would check in on how the Post covered the post-vice presidential debate spin. It was interesting to see that the title of the lead story was almost exactly the same as the prior debate's lead story. Whereas the first caption read "Kerry Comes Out Swinging," today's line was "Cheney Comes Out Swinging." Still, the conclusion of the analysis was that it was more or less a draw. Of the four person panel of experts assembled to critique the performance, one gave Cheney the edge, two called it a draw and one called it a draw - but leaning toward Edwards. Again, I am struck by the fact that the Post could not call either debate a clear win for their candidates. This only confirms in my mind that Edwards did a superb job of holding his own.]

I can not praise Thomas Frank's seminal work, What's the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America, enough. In it, Frank lays out how the GOP has successfully manipulated the culture wars to elect politicians that have enacted an economic agenda that is actually against the interest of many, if not most, of these politicians' supporters. According to Frank, the GOP has effectively used values issues like religion, evolution, school prayer, abortion, flag burning, gun rights and homosexuality to motivate and convert a base of supporters that were either previously inactive or Democratic in persuasion respectively.

What is even more telling, though, is how successful the right wing has been at tapping into class resentment in order to motivate lower income segments of the electorate to support ultra-conservative candidates. There has been an effective characterization, by pundits on the right, of liberals as wealthy elitists from big cities and old money enclaves on the east and west coasts. Liberals, according to the narrative, are the driving force behind Hollywood, television, the media and the entertainment industry in general - forces which have been instrumental in pushing their liberal agenda of moral decay, thought policing and compelled tolerance of all manner of perversion, on an unreceptive populace.

It is the wealthy, privileged, liberal elitists that have the real power in this society, the Goliath that the conservative outsiders are trying to take down. Never mind the fact that the Republican Party, which happens to control all three branches of the federal government and most state governments too, has long been the party that represents corporate interests, wealthy individuals, supply side economics, union busting, tax cuts for the wealthy, etc. Disregard the reality that the Democratic Party represents unions, worker's rights, minimum wage, social security, environmental issues, product safety, civil rights, and a host of other progressive ideals. Ignore the fact that the entertainment industry and media industry are, well just that: industries, driven by profit, corporate mandate and capitalist principles - conservative, not liberal, precepts. The new paradigm is the conservative as disempowered outsider, fighting the establishment.

As these working-class heroes rail against the wealthy and the privileged, they elect politicians that enact policies that make the targets of their scorn wealthier, more elite and more privileged. Even when the ultra-conservatives win, they lose. Frank calls it a French Revolution in reverse, where the sans culottes take to the streets and storm the Bastille demanding more money and privilege for the aristocracy.

The inverted logic of this trend is captured well in the following piece via Science and Politics:


"A DAY IN THE LIFE OF JOE THE BUSH SUPPORTER"

Joe gets up at 6 a.m. and fills his coffeepot with water to prepare his morning coffee. The water is clean and good because some tree-hugging liberal fought for minimum water-quality standards. With his first swallow of water, he takes his daily medication. His medications are safe to take because some stupid commie liberal fought to ensure their safety and that they work as advertised.

All but $10 of his medications are paid for by his employer's medical plan because some liberal union workers fought their employers for paid medical insurance - now Joe gets it too.

He prepares his morning breakfast, bacon and eggs. Joe's bacon is safe to eat because some girly-man liberal fought for laws to regulate the meat packing industry.

In the morning shower, Joe reaches for his shampoo. His bottle is properly labeled with each ingredient and its amount in the total contents because some crybaby liberal fought for his right to know what he was putting on his body and how much it contained.

Joe dresses, walks outside and takes a deep breath. The air he breathes is clean because some environmentalist wacko liberal fought for the laws to stop industries from polluting our air.

He walks on the government-provided sidewalk to subway station for his government-subsidized ride to work. It saves him considerable money in parking and transportation fees because some fancy-pants liberal fought for affordable public transportation, which gives everyone the opportunity to be a contributor.

Joe begins his work day. He has a good job with excellent pay, medical benefits, retirement, paid holidays and vacation because some lazy liberal union members fought and died for these working standards. Joe's employer pays these standards because Joe's employer doesn't want his employees to call the union.

If Joe is hurt on the job or becomes unemployed, he'll get a worker compensation or unemployment check because some stupid liberal didn't think he should lose his home because of his temporary misfortune. It is noontime and Joe needs to make a bank deposit so he can pay some bills. Joe's deposit is federally insured by the FSLIC because some godless liberal wanted to protect Joe's money from unscrupulous bankers who ruined the banking system before the Great Depression.

Joe has to pay his Fannie Mae-underwritten mortgage and his below-market federal student loan because some elitist liberal decided that Joe and the government would be better off if he was educated and earned more money over his lifetime. Joe also forgets that his in addition to his federally subsidized student loans, he attended a state funded university.

Joe is home from work. He plans to visit his father this evening at his farm home in the country. He gets in his car for the drive. His car is among the safest in the world because some America-hating liberal fought for car safety standards to go along with the tax-payer funded roads.

He arrives at his boyhood home. His was the third generation to live in the house financed by Farmers' Home Administration because bankers didn't want to make rural loans.

The house didn't have electricity until some big-government liberal stuck his nose where it didn't belong and demanded rural electrification.

He is happy to see his father, who is now retired. His father lives on Social Security and a union pension because some wine-drinking, cheese-eating liberal made sure he could take care of himself so Joe wouldn't have to.

Joe gets back in his car for the ride home, and turns on a radio talk show. The radio host keeps saying that liberals are bad and conservatives are good. He doesn't mention that the beloved Republicans have fought against every protection and benefit Joe enjoys throughout his day. Joe agrees: "We don't need those big-government liberals ruining our lives! After all, I'm a self-made man who believes everyone should take care of themselves, just like I have."

The man who was handpicked to replace retired general Jay Garner as the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, has lapsed into a fit of truth telling - again. Bremer had famously gone off the reservation in a speech given on Feb. 26, 2001, in his capacity as the co-chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism. Bremer is quoted as saying:

The [Bush] administration seems to be paying no attention to the problem of terrorism...

What they will do is stagger along until there's a major incident and then suddenly say, "Oh, my God, shouldn't we be organized to deal with this?"

That's too bad. They've been given a window of opportunity with very little terrorism now, and they're not taking advantage of it. Maybe the folks in the press ought to be pushing a little bit.

Despite this stern criticism, the Bush administration selected Bremer to revitalize the post-invasion reconstruction efforts that they perceived as lagging under the stewardship of Garner. The AP, via the New York Times, is reporting that Bremer has criticized the Bush administration once again in a series of speeches discussing his tenure in Iraq.

Bremer's critiques echo those emanating from a growing camp of war supporters who are highly critical of the incompetence of the Bush team in securing the peace, though remaining steadfast in their support for the overall mission of deposing Saddam Hussein. Whether or not you agree with the decision to invade Iraq, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to acknowledge that the conduct and planning for the war's aftermath has been recklessly inept and uninformed.

In remarks published Tuesday, the official, L. Paul Bremer, said he arrived in Iraq on May 6, 2003 to find "horrid" looting and a very unstable situation...

"We paid a big price for not stopping it because it established an atmosphere of lawlessness," Bremer said during an address to an insurance group in White Sulphur Springs, W.Va. The group released a summary of his remarks in Washington.

"We never had enough troops on the ground," Bremer said, while insisting that he was "more convinced than ever that regime change was the right thing to do." [emphasis added]

Bremer has since tried to qualify these statements, or at least clarify his position on the current state of affairs, through a press release given Monday night to The Washington Post:

"I believe that we currently have sufficient troop levels in Iraq," he said in the e-mailed statement, according to Tuesday's edition of the Post. He said references to troops levels related to the situation when he first arrived in Baghdad "when I believed we needed either more coalition troops or Iraqi security forces to address the looting."

But Bremer could not fully repudiate the quotes attributed to him because he is already on the record expressing the exact same sentiments. Apparently Paul Bremer has displayed a willingness to admit mistakes that has thus far eluded the entire Bush cabinet.

In an earlier speech Sept. 17 at DePauw University, Bremer said he frequently raised the issue of too few troops within the Bush administration and "should have been even more insistent" when his advice was rejected. "The single most important change -- the one thing that would have improved the situation -- would have been having more troops in Iraq at the beginning and throughout" the occupation, Bremer said, according to the Banner-Graphic in Greencastle, Ind. [emphasis added]

It remains highly unlikely that even if Bremer were "more insistent" about the need for more troops that he could have broken the ideological lockstep within Bush's inner circle - especially in regard to such a central tenet of Rumsfeld's vision for a transformed military. They have been slow to adapt to the changing environment, and stubborn in their rejection of expert input that reaches conclusions that vary from their preconceptions.

Here is Bill Maher from his September 3, 2004 show:

New Rule: You can't run on a mistake. Franklin Roosevelt didn't run for re-election claiming Pearl Harbor was his finest hour. Abe Lincoln was a great president, but the high point of his second term wasn't theater security. 9/11 wasn't a triumph of the human spirit. It was a fuck-up by a guy on vacation.

Now, don't get me wrong, Mr. President. I'm not blaming you for 9/11. We have blue-ribbon commissions to do that. And I'm not saying there was anything improper about your immediate response to the attacks. Someone had to stay in that classroom and protect those kids from Chechen rebels.

But by the looks of your convention, you'd think that the worst thing that ever happened to us was the best thing that ever happened to you. You just can't keep celebrating the deadliest attack ever as if it's your personal rendezvous with greatness. You don't see old men who were shot down during World War II jumping out of a plane every year. I mean, other than your dad.

But even your dad didn't run for re-election based on a recession and his propensity to barf on the Japanese. Now, I know you'd like us all to get swept away with emotionalism and stop sweating the small stuff like the deficit and the environment, and focus on what's really important: how you look in a fireman's hat. But crying during your speech? I mean, come on! There's no crying in politics! It's not fair! That's a trick chicks use. How are we supposed to discuss this rationally if you're going to cry?! There's a name for people who exploit their participation in historical events for political gain. They're called the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.

So I say, if you absolutely must win an election on the backs of dead people, do it like they do in Chicago, and have them actually vote for you.

With Mr. Maher's words of wisdom in mind, go watch this video. I don't know whether to laugh or cry, or both.

In addition to the independent reports on the status of Iraq released last month by three non-partisan think tanks, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (the group that Bremer and Rumsfeld used for studies on the progress of Iraq last July), the International Crisis Group and the Chatham House (part of the Royal Institute of International Affairs which I summarized here), in July the Bush administration received a National Intelligence Estimate pertaining to Iraq compiled with input from the various governmental intelligence agencies.

The conclusions and forecast contained in the report are decidedly more pessimistic than the campaign message disseminated by President Bush and Vice President Cheney. According to a New York Times story on the findings of the July Estimate:

A classified National Intelligence Estimate prepared for President Bush in late July spells out a dark assessment of prospects for Iraq, government officials said Wednesday.

The estimate outlines three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005, with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war, the officials said. The most favorable outcome described is an Iraq whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic and security terms. [emphasis added]

The pessimistic tone of the July estimate stands in contrast to recent statements by Bush administration officials, including comments by Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman, who asserted that progress was being made:

"You know, every step of the way in Iraq there have been pessimists and hand-wringers who said it can't be done," Mr. McClellan said at a news briefing. "And every step of the way, the Iraqi leadership and the Iraqi people have proven them wrong because they are determined to have a free and peaceful future."

Last week, Mr. Bush even went as far as to dismiss the latest intelligence estimate, saying its authors were "just guessing" about the future in Iraq. Recent developments, however, lend credence to the "guesses" posited by this group, especially when compared to the prognostications of Bush's Iraq policymakers.

According to a different story in the New York Times:

The same intelligence unit that produced a gloomy report in July about the prospect of growing instability in Iraq warned the Bush administration about the potential costly consequences of an American-led invasion two months before the war began, government officials said Monday.

The estimate came in two classified reports prepared for President Bush in January 2003 by the National Intelligence Council, an independent group that advises the director of central intelligence. The assessments predicted that an American-led invasion of Iraq would increase support for political Islam and would result in a deeply divided Iraqi society prone to violent internal conflict.

One of the reports also warned of a possible insurgency against the new Iraqi government or American-led forces, saying that rogue elements from Saddam Hussein's government could work with existing terrorist groups or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare, the officials said. The assessments also said a war would increase sympathy across the Islamic world for some terrorist objectives, at least in the short run, the officials said. [emphasis added]

The intelligence experts that prepared both the January 2003 and July 2004 National Intelligence Estimates have a pretty solid track record. Many of the predictions of the earlier Estimate have come to pass, much like the warnings and policy preferences contained in the Future of Iraq Project - the exhaustive post-war planning work conducted by the State Department - and other pre-war planning by the CIA, the Army War College, etc., that was totally disregarded by the Bush administration (if you haven't read James Fallows' expose of this debacle, check out Blind Into Baghdad). To give a sense of the extent to which the Bush administration repudiated the results of the Future of Iraq Project, Fallows describes this exchange between Rumsfeld and the initial administrator of post-invasion Iraq, retired three star general Jay Garner:

Garner had heard about the Future of Iraq project, although Rumsfeld had told him not to waste his time reading it. Nonetheless, he decided to bring its director, Thomas Warrick, onto his planning team. Garner, who clearly does not intend to be the fall guy for postwar problems in Baghdad, told me last fall that Rumsfeld had asked him to kick Warrick off his staff. In an interview with the BBC last November, Garner confirmed details of the firing that had earlier been published in Newsweek. According to Garner, Rumsfeld asked him, "Jay, have you got a guy named Warrick on your team?" "I said, 'Yes, I do.' He said, 'Well, I've got to ask you to remove him.' I said, 'I don't want to remove him; he's too valuable.' But he said, 'This came to me from such a high level that I can't overturn it, and I've just got to ask you to remove Mr. Warrick.'" Newsweek's conclusion was that the man giving the instructions was Vice President Cheney.

The competence of the pre-war planning that was ignored is only highlighted when compared with the naively optimistic predictions and prognostications produced by Douglas Feith's office in the Pentagon which usurped the Future of Iraq Project and its relatives, and became the foundation on which strategy and policy in post-invasion Iraq was based. Feith's office concluded that there would be no insurgency, no ethnic strife, no looting and, relatedly, no need for more than 100,000 troops.

On the contrary, relying on the fanciful notions put forth by the notoriously untrustworthy Ahmed Chalabi, the Pentagon, including Paul Wolfowitz, argued that our soldiers would be greeted with flowers and candies by a friendly and docile Iraqi population. They also counseled in favor of disbanding the Iraqi army, conducting widespread and low-level de-Ba'athification, implementing a rigidly conservative economic model, and other blunders that have come to mark the many near fatal mistakes and squandered opportunities of the occupation of post-invasion Iraq.

The responses to the recent revelations of the January 2003 estimate are curious:

Senior White House officials, including Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, have contended that some of the early predictions provided to the White House by outside experts of what could go wrong in Iraq, including secular strife, have not come to pass.

The strength of Rice's logic is weak. Just because these estimates were not 100% accurate does not justify the fact that they were willfully, and recklessly, ignored. Nor does the specific example relied on to make her point even support her argument. Widespread secular strife is a very real possibility in Iraq's not too distant future. Minor conflicts have flared up at various times already. The fact that this situation has not erupted yet does not mean that it will not, and thus the ultimate prescience of that particular prediction remains an unknown quantity.

In either case, if I had the choice to rely on the "guesses" of the experts that generated the National Intelligence Estimates and the Future of Iraq Project, as opposed the ideologues that relied on con-man extraordinaire Ahmed Chalabi, I'll take my chances with the experts. Even if, Dr. Rice, that means they're only right 99% of the time. Have you looked at Chalabi's numbers?

I wanted to provide an update to my post about the cynical opportunism displayed by the Bush administration's by their decision to help to prepare the content and delivery of interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's speech before Congress late last month. The criticisms of Allawi's speech by Kerry and some in his campaign team drew the ire of right wing pundits and bloggers. The outrage was two-fold. On the one hand, Kerry and his campaign were lambasted for suggesting that Allawi was a "puppet" of the Bush administration. On the other hand, there were accusations that Kerry was demoralizing the effort by claiming that Allawi was white-washing the realities of the insurgency. Kerry, it was argued, was being overly pessimistic whereas Allawi was merely reporting the good news that the media was ignoring.

Consider this quote from the Allawi speech, via Josh Marshall:

"In Samarra, the Iraqi government has tackled the insurgents who once controlled the city."

-Ayad Allawi (Address to Congress September 23rd, 2004)

Now contrast Allawi's rosy assessment of the scene in Samarra with the reality of the situation. Far from being under the control of the Iraqi government, Samarra has been besieged by violence and conflict between insurgents and U.S. and Iraqi forces for months (including the period when Allawi made his speech a week ago), despite a tentative, and tenuous, cease fire that had been reached in early September which collapsed days later.

Recent events belie the statements made by Allawi, and show the criticisms of Kerry to be valid. This article was reported in the Associated Press:

U.S. and Iraqi forces launched a major assault Friday to regain control of the insurgent stronghold of Samarra, trading gunfire with rebel fighters as they pushed toward the city center. The United States said 96 insurgents were killed.

It was not known if the push into Samarra represented the start of a larger campaign to retake several cities that insurgents have rendered "no-go" zones for U.S. and Iraqi troops. Officials have said that recapturing those cities is key before nationwide elections scheduled for the end of January.

The offensive came in response to "repeated and unprovoked attacks by anti-Iraqi forces" against Iraqi and coalition forces, the military said in a statement. Its aim was to "facilitate orderly government processes, kill or capture anti-Iraqi forces and set the conditions to proceed with infrastructure and quality of life improvements."

"Unimpeded access throughout the city for Iraqi security forces and multinational forces is non-negotiable," the statement said.

The military said insurgent attacks and acts of intimidation against the people of Samarra had undermined the security situation in the city, regarded as one of the top three rebel strongholds in Iraq, along with Fallujah and the Baghdad slum known as Sadr City. [emphasis added]

Not exactly a city under the control of Iraqi forces, with the insurgents on the run. I think all those that pounced on Mr. Kerry for pointing out that Allawi was not accurately portraying the facts on the ground in Iraq owe him an apology. Apparently, he is the one candidate brave enough to tell it like it is. And for those that derided the use of the "puppet" charge, why don't you direct your righteous indignation at the folks who thought it prudent to actually prepare the speech and coach Allawi on its delivery. How was that supposed to look in a country that was already suspicious of Allawi's subservience to Washington in the first place? If the perception of Allawi as a puppet so endangers the mission, do you think it was worth it to score some campaign points to so thoroughly undermine his credibility back home? Again, don't blame the messenger.